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The end of the cold war has created a safer environment for most 
nations and reduced the need for fielding huge armed forces and 
vast  investments   for  defense.   However,   due  to  her  very   special 
strategic position and historical responsibilities, Turkey still faces a 
range   of   substantial   threats   to   its   national   interests,   physical 
security,     economic     well     being.     These     threats     require     the 
maintenance of a broad set of military capabilities in order to deter, 
and if necessary, to fight and win any future conflict. This thesis 
investigates the  Turkish Defense Industry  and Turkey's efforts to 
transfer military  technology  to  establish  a required technological 
base  for  a  self-sufficient  defense  industry,   which  can  fulfill  the 
needs of the Turkish Armed Forces and stay competitive in a rapidly 
changing market place. The goal of this project is to evaluate the 
present   Turkish   Defense   Industry   and  to   present   strategies   that 
should   be   carefully   considered   in   developing   a   sound   defense 
industry   and   technological   base  policy.   It  addresses  the   defense 
industry and technology transfer issues as well as Turkey's security 
policy and future defense requirements. We make use of industry 
literature,  trade  publications,  United  States,  Turkish  and  several 
other international government and non-government resources, and 
professional publications. 
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A.       GENERAL 
In the years following the establishment of the republic, 
Turkey had to establish the infrastructure of an effective defense 
industry to cope with the various external threats and to eliminate 
these threats whenever necessary. Nevertheless, despite all efforts 
and all resources allocated to fulfill this aim, various factors have 
obstructed the materialization of this goal. Insufficiencies in 
planning, the allocation of resources in support of industrialization 
and providing qualified cadres to meet the challenges involved in 
meeting these targets have all become obstacles on the way to real 
progress. 
Due to its failure in building up a self-sufficient defense 
industry that could provide Turkish Armed Forces with major 
defense equipment, Turkey became heavily reliant on its allies in 
NATO, mostly the US. 
Based on lessons learned from the arms embargoes against 
Turkey, especially the US embargo after the country's intervention 
in Cyprus in 1974, Turkey decided to develop its own defense 
industry, aiming to reach a high level of self-sufficiency in 
supplying its armed forces with state-of-the-art weapon systems and 
defense equipment. 
Finding   itself caught  at  the  intersection  of three  points  of 
regional instability formed by the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the 
Middle East, Turkey is continuing to field the second largest armed 
forces   in   NATO   and   to   expand   its   national   defense   industry   to 
support     its     armed     forces.     As     a     percentage     of    the     GNP 
(approximately    4    percent)    and    of    the    Consolidated    Budget 
(approximately 15 percent), Turkish defense spending is among the 
highest   in  NATO;   and   among   all  the   world's  nations.   However, 
Turkey  still  obtains  79  percent of its  defense  equipment through 
imports.   With   only   21   percent  produced  by  the  national   defense 
industry, the level of domestic production is very low considering 
the size of the armed forces and the level of defense expenditures. 
Reduced military support from the allied countries, due to 
different disputes with Ankara, gave a big boost to Turkey's efforts 
to transfer military technology; in order to create a minimum 
required technological base, emphasis in Turkey has shifted from 
direct procurement to co-production of weapon systems, thereby 
developing a sustainable defense industrial base. 
Turkey recently accelerated its efforts to ready itself for the 
21st century by setting up effective and productive defense industry 
projects with maximum local input. Such efforts are expected to 
prevent it from lagging behind in the 21st century's rapidly 
developing defense sector. 
Currently, the Turkish Defense Industry and Technological 
Base (TDITB) have been giving two different impressions. On one 
hand, Turkey's efforts to gain new capabilities, like manufacturing 
battle tanks and helicopters, puts the TDIBT in the category of 
developing countries. On the other hand, most of the companies, 
which were established during the last couple of decades in a 
reactionary approach rather than proactively forming a national 
defense industry with long-term planning, have strongly been aware 
of the need to restructure in order to overcome the challenges in the 
national and international environment. Most of the projects that 
these companies were originally set up for have been completed and 
there is a very severe competition in the export markets, which 
looks like the only way for keeping their production lines open. 
Moreover, the irregularity of the government's approach towards 
these organizations seems to be short of emphasizing the need that 
the stability of these establishments is critical for a self-sufficient 
national defense industry. Due to the crisis in the country's 
economic health, which has been immune to such crisis every five to 
six years, political authorities have been showing reluctance to 
allocate sufficient funding to the development of the defense 
industry. The authors of this thesis attribute this fact to the lack of 
long-term   defense   industrial   policies   (or   of  a   development   and 
restructuring   plan),   with   inadequate   commitment   by   all   parties 
involved. 
B.       AREA OF RESEARCH 
This thesis investigates the Turkish Defense Industry and 
Turkey's efforts to transfer military technology to establish a 
required technological base for a self-sufficient defense industry, 
which can fulfill the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAFs) and 
stay competitive in a rapidly changing market place. The goal of 
this project is to evaluate the present Turkish Defense Industry and 
to present strategies that should be carefully considered in 
developing a sound defense industry and technological base policy. 
It addresses the defense industry and technology transfer issues as 
well as Turkey's security policy and future defense requirements. 
Research includes: 
■ Conducting a comprehensive analysis of defense industries 
and related issues in general and Turkish Defense Industry 
in particular. 
■ Examining technology transfer and particularly the transfer 
of military technology. 
■ Predicting Turkey's future defense requirements, and 
suggesting strategies for developing a defense industry and 
technological base that can fulfill these requirements. 
It    is   the    researchers'    intent   to   provide    all    the    parties 
interested in TDITB with a comprehensive source of information in 
the   related   areas   and   to   contribute   to   the   efforts   to   create   a 
knowledge   base   in   Turkey,   regarding   the   fields   of the   defense 
industrial base and technology transfer. 
C.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Primary question this research addresses is: 
- What should be the strategies that Turkey should adopt to 
develop a self-sufficient defense industry and technological base, 
which will meet the future requirements of the Turkish Armed 
Forces? 
To answer the primary question, the following subsidiary 
questions have been addressed as well: 
Questions Related to the Defense Industry 
- What is the defense industry? 
- Why does a country need to establish a defense industry? 
- What   are   the   benefits   and   costs   of   having   a   defense 
industry? 
- What is the relationship between science, technology, and 
the defense industry? 
- How do international relations affect the defense industry? 
- How does the economy affect the defense industry? 
- What are the characteristics of the defense market? 
- What is likely to happen to the defense market? 
- What are the general trades? 
- How will the changing markets affect the Turkish Defense 
Industry? 
Questions Related to the Technology Transfer 
- What  is  technology  transfer  and   what   factors   affect  the 
technology transfer? 
- What are the types and methods of technology transfer? 
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of technology 
transfer? 
Questions Related to the Transfer of Military Technology 
- Why do nations need to transfer military technology? 
- Which   sources   do   nations   transfer   military   technology 
from? 
- What    are    the    strategies    for    the    transfer    of   military 
technology? 
- What are the restrictions and the challenges of the transfer 
of military technology? 
- How do nations transfer military technology? 
- What are the results of the transfer of military technology 
transfer? 
Questions Related to the Turkish Defense Industry 
- What is the current state of the Turkish Defense Industry ? 
- Which factors obstructed the development of it? 
- What is the Turkish Government's defense policy? 
- What are the current defense projects? 
- What   is   the   technological   level   of the   Turkish  Defense 
Industry? 
- What is the level of the defense expenditures in Turkey? 
- From what resources does this money come? 
- What is Turkey's national security policy? 
- How is the Turkish Defense Industry affected by it? 
- What is Turkey's defense policy and military strategy and 
how is the Turkish Defense Industry affected by it? 
- What are the desirable characteristics of the future Turkish 
Defense Industry? 
- What are the Turkish Armed Forces' future requirements? 
- Which factors affect the future requirements of the Turkish 
Armed Forces? 
D.       METHODOLOGY 
To describe and to analyze current and future trends for the 
defense industry and the transfer of military technology in Turkey, 
as well as worldwide, and the Turkish security policy, this thesis 
research makes use of industry literature, trade publications, United 
States, Turkish and several other international government and non- 
government resources, and professional publications.  Specific and 
detailed background information is provided regarding the defense 
industries and technology transfer. 
Current events as described in several written and electronic 
publications are investigated and used in this research. 
E.       THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This research is organized to include: (1) an overall and 
detailed review of the defense industry and related issues, (2) an in- 
depth review of technology transfer, particularly the transfer of 
military technology, (3) an evaluation of the current situation of the 
Turkish Defense Industry and Technological Base, (4) predicting the 
future requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces and (5) an analysis 
of the strategies that Turkey can adopt to build a self-sufficient 
defense industry. 
Chapter I presents the study. Chapter II and III address the 
general issues about the Defense Industry and Technology Transfer 
topics. Chapter IV looks into the Transfer of Military technology 
for creating a minimum required defense industrial and 
technological base. 
Chapter V and VI give a background on Turkey's aggressive 
efforts to develop a national defense industry and the factors that 
obstructed the development of the Turkish Defense Industry, in 
addition   to   the   current   structure   and   capabilities   of   today.   It 
includes information about defense expenditures and financial 
resources, military modernization programs, and the current defense 
projects. 
Chapter VII looks into the future defense requirements of 
Turkey and outlines the capabilities and the characteristics of the 
future defense industrial base that will provide the Turkish Armed 
Forces with a state-of-the-art weapons system and defense 
equipment. 
Chapter VIII presents and discusses the strategies that have 
been experienced in other countries, that have both lived through 
periods of a defense industry build-up and draw-down. These 
strategies should be taken into consideration so as to develop and 
maintain a robust domestic defense industry. 
Chapter IX draws conclusions and presents'the proposals of 
the authors' recommendations. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
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II. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
A.      WHAT IS THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
1.       Definition of the Defense Industry 
The defense industry (or the defense industrial base: These 
two terms will be used interchangeably throughout this theses) is 
defined as "the combination of people, institutions, technological 
know-how, and the production capacity used to design, develop, 
manufacture, and maintain the weapons and supporting defense 
equipment needed to achieve a nation's security objectives" [Ref. 
1: p.5]. In this sense, the defense industry is a subset of the national 
industry. 
The defense industry is multi-dimensional and it can be 
divided into several tiers: prime contractors, subcontractors, and 
lower tiers that include suppliers of parts and raw materials. It 
consists of companies that provide facilities supporting air, land, 
and sea systems [Ref.2: p.184]. While the defense industry and 
technology base is often discussed as if it were an independent 
entity, it is really interwoven with the nation's civilian technology 
and industrial base and increasingly, with the global economy. 
Due to its multi-dimensional aspects and the varying degrees 
of dependence on defense sales, it is difficult to develop any 
comprehensive defense industry policy. Therefore, the defense 
industry should not be treated as a "single, homogeneous entity." 
11 
The three components of the defense industry are: technology, 
production, and maintenance. The technology component includes 
private industry, university, government laboratories, research 
facilities, and test centers that conduct research. The production 
component consists of private and public manufacturing facilities, 
including government-owned and contractor-operated, or 
government-owned and government-operated, or contractor-owned 
and contractor-operated facilities. The maintenance component 
consists of private and government facilities (such as arsenals and 
depots) that maintain and repair equipment [Ref. 1: p.5]. 
2.        Importance of the Defense Industry 
Nations have always placed great importance on the 
development of a domestic defense industry for several reasons. 
Firstly, a strong defense industry is deemed to be the key component 
of national power, providing the nations with the capability to 
respond to unforeseen contingencies, and to deter threats from other 
nations. The history of mankind has proven that well equipped and 
technologically superior forces are needed to prevent aggression. In 
addition, a defense dependent upon imported weapons and 
equipment is likely to lead to political subordination to the 
exporting   nation.    Moreover,   advanced   nations   are   increasingly 
12 
unwilling to transfer their military technology, so they can increase 
their control over sales. 
3.       Benefits of a Defense Industry 
There are several benefits of maintaining a strong defense 
industry; among the most significant are self-sufficiency, less 
reliance on foreign supply, leverage, economic benefits, and 
security. 
a. Self Sufficiency and Capabilities 
Self-sufficiency enables nations to maintain a capability 
that they believe they will need in the future, and enables them to 
avoid the cost and time required recreating it. On the other hand, it 
should be noted that no single nation is able to provide 100% of 
domestic materials and suppliers. 
b. Less Reliance on Foreign Supply 
A nation without a defense industry may have to rely 
upon foreign suppliers, which may leave the buyer vulnerable to 
such risks as unavailability during a crisis due to internal and/or 
external political pressures, monopoly price increases, weapons and 
equipment designed and manufactured for the originating country's 
needs rather than the threat facing the purchaser. 
On the other hand, a domestic defense industry can 
prevent a nation from becoming entirely locked in to the use of 
foreign suppliers, which might bear the above mentioned risks. 
c. Leverage 
A country with a strong defense industry can use that 
leverage when negotiating with foreign firms. A country with a 
small defense industry may just as easily threaten to go to a rival 
supplier on the world market. Countries can use this leverage to 
encourage suppliers to provide weapons and equipment with the 
latest technology or tailored to meet the purchasing country's needs. 
d. Economic Benefits 
According to Sandier, a domestic defense industry 
provides national economic benefits [Ref.3: p.185]. These benefits 
take the form of new jobs, technological advances, and exports. 
However, this line of thinking seems to ignore the fact that those 
same resources could possibly be used more efficiently in other 
sectors of the national industry. When looking at the nation as a 
whole, there is no evidence that money spent on defense creates 
more jobs or benefits the economy greater than the money spent in 
the private sector. 
e. Security 
It has been argued that there is a close relationship 
between national power and the nation's manufacturing  capability 
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[Ref.4: p.l]. "As the period between crises increases, the defense 
industry grows cold from neglect and the risk to national security 
increases correspondingly." [Ref.5: p.27] A strong defense industry 
can serve as a deterrent to potential adversaries. 
4.        Costs of a Defense Industry 
There is a lack of quantitative data on the cost of maintaining 
a domestic defense industry. The cost of maintaining national 
independence may be a lack of inter-operability with foreign 
suppliers in an alliance [Ref.2: p.185]. The cost of maintaining a 
capability which a nation believes will be required in the future 
could be measured in the purchase of an item not necessarily needed 
for defense but purchased to keep a production line "warm." 
There are other costs involved in not using foreign suppliers. 
The exclusion of foreign sources in order to promote self- 
sufficiency may result in monopoly prices from domestic suppliers 
and lack of efficiencies and innovation associated with a 
competitive marketplace, resulting in overall higher life cycle costs. 
Foreign suppliers may be members of a military alliance such as 
NATO where standardization and inter-operability are necessary. 
Members of the alliance could elect not to use a sole-source and 
there is a cost associated with inter-operability among several 
suppliers. 
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Moreover, for most or nearly all countries, maintaining a 
robust defense industry depends on the ability to sell military goods 
internationally. In the absence of international sales, a broad and 
robust defense sector is most likely unaffordable. 
5.        Characteristics of the Defense Industry 
The defense industry has different characteristics than the 
other types of civilian industries. In particular, the defense industry 
is a national industry, to ensure that the political, economical and 
social development of the nation and stability of national security is 
its first requirement. 
Second, the government is the only demander for defense 
industry products. These products are generally manufactured on a 
contract between the government and the industry. 
Third, highly precise production technologies and highly 
skilled technical manpower are required to produce defense industry 
products along with special quality standards. Extensive research 
and development (R&D) activities are inevitable requirements to 
keep abreast of the technology. 
Fourth, while it takes a longer time to prepare for military 
production and a return on the large amount of investment capital, 
new technology soon becomes outdated due to rapid changes in 
weapon systems. Not only are the defense choices complex, but they 
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have to be made in a world of uncertainty. No one can predict the 
future accurately. Today's threat might be tomorrow's ally; today's 
technology equipment might be tomorrow's dreadnought [Ref. 6:p. 
26]. 
Finally,   defense   industry   activities   have   a   secrecy   that   is 
inherent in military technology, so they should be kept classified. 
6.        Basic     Military     Criterion     for     Defense     Industry 
Products 
a. Secrecy 
The secrecy feature of the weapons system and other 
defense equipment requires that only the users know the strengths 
and weaknesses of these products. The frequency of the guidance 
system of a missile, firing rate of an artillery weapon or such 
features of defense products should be kept secret. Otherwise, the 
conflicting countries may develop countermeasures that may 
decrease the effectiveness of these systems. 
b. Security And Reliability 
It must be assured that weapon systems and other 
defense equipment will function when required. Therefore, utmost 
attention must be given to ensure the security of the computer 
systems and the communication systems to prevent the interference 
of adversaries. 
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c.        Flexibility and Survivability 
Defense industry products must have the capacity to be 
adaptable to the changing threats and developing technologies. It 
usually takes 5-10 years or even longer to fully develop and activate 
a weapons system. When activated, a weapons system is utilized for 
about 20 years. Combining these two facts, the systems must have 
the capability to encounter the threats for 25-30 years. Moreover, 
the ever-changing technological developments necessitate that 
defense systems be designed and developed with the flexibility to be 
adapted to new developments. 
d.       Standardization 
In order to provide the coordination between the military 
units, logistics, training support, and to decrease overall 
maintenance costs, the defense system in a nation's armed forces 
should have a high degree of standardization. 
7.        Characteristics of Defense Systems 
a.        Complex Configuration 
Most defense systems have complex configurations that 
comprise sub-systems like sensor systems and communication 
systems, all of which are particular defense products. The design 
and development of a defense system requires the close scrutiny of 
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all sub-systems and components to provide the effectiveness and the 
efficiency required of these systems. 
b. Intensive Use of High Technology 
The ability to design and develop high-tech defense 
systems has been one of the outstanding criteria in comparing the 
military strength of nations for the last' 50-60 years, just as more 
conventional technology has provided military advantage for many 
centuries. The use of electronic technology has become an important 
aspect of defense system production activities. The decreasing sizes 
of the circuit boards have enabled the industry to produce smaller, 
faster, more energy-efficient and highly capable defense products. 
Today, it is almost impossible not to use electronic components in 
assuring the functionality of defense systems. 
c. High Life-Cycle Cost 
The intensive use of the high technology, the complex 
configuration of the modern defense system, and the need to collect 
and to document the relevant data in a systematic way requires the 
use of highly skilled technical manpower and precise production 
technologies that demand an immense capital investment. All these 
factors increase the life-cycle costs of such systems, and bring forth 
the need to focus on the requirements of the buyers and the reliance 
of the financial support from them. 
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d. Long Operating Life 
Defense systems have a longer average operating life 
than any other commercial product in the world market. High life- 
cycle costs that include all the costs from design and development 
costs to user training, maintenance infrastructure, and technical 
staff costs have all contributed to the need to utilize such systems 
for longer periods of time that turn out to be more than 30 years for 
some systems. This time lag between the introduction of the new 
system and the ever-changing environment of threats and 
technological systems require the upgrade of defense systems at 
specific times. 
e. High Product Quality 
High quality standards and tests in all phases of the 
design, development, and the production of defense systems is 
another significant distinction of the defense industry products. 
Systems and the products must be in full compliance with the 
specifications determined by the procuring government. 
Some countries not only require the compliance of the 
systems and products with the standards, but obligate the 
establishment of quality assurance systems in accordance with the 
international standards in production facilities of the defense 
companies.  Accordingly, NATO  has  defined  the  quality  assurance 
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systems that the companies operating in the defense industry should 
establish in AQAP (Allied Quality Assurance Publications). 
/.        Endurance in Heavy Conditions 
Defense industry products must be able to operate under 
difficult environmental conditions such as desert, polar climates, 
and/or under intense dust. Systems should have the ability to 
properly function whatever the conditions are. This demanding 
characteristic requires the incorporation of different approaches in 
all phases of product conceptualization, design, development, 
inspection and maintenance. 
8.        Characteristics of Defense Industry Companies 
a. Company Size 
The companies in the defense industry 'stand out among 
the other companies in the national industry due to their capital 
intensity and human resources. As mentioned previously, production 
of the defense systems requires a large amount of capital 
investment, precise production technologies, highly skilled 
technical manpower and extensive R&D activities. All these factors 
increase the size of the defense companies. 
b. Organizational Structure 
The large companies that operate in the defense industry 
have some very unique design features. Among others, in order to 
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ensure the specialization and increase the motivation of the 
members, these companies generally consist of decentralized units, 
which have freedom in decision-making. For instance, companies 
like General Dynamics, Litton, and United Technologies are 
comprised of a corporate headquarters and several divisions, which 
help benefit from the consolidated financing, international 
marketing, and R&D functions as well as the dynamism of the 
smaller units. 
c. Human Resources 
The size and the quality of the human resources are 
another important feature of the defense companies. Defense 
industry activities are managed and conducted by highly educated 
key personnel. Moreover, defense projects require manpower, who 
have been educated in special areas such as systems engineering, 
contract administration, cost/price analysis, and integrated logistics 
systems. 
d. Project-Oriented Organization 
Project-oriented organization and management has been 
an important feature of the defense companies since the 1940s. 
Teams have been formed for a particular time and purpose to carry 
out defense projects. The Project Office, Project Manager, single 
coordination point, and such phenomenon often work within matrix 
organizations in defense companies. 
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B.       SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
In today's world, the competition for better products has taken 
the form of a quest to introduce more technologically and 
scientifically efficient products. In most industries, increased 
efforts in research and development, the use of modern 
communication networks and information technologies, know-how, 
and concentration on core competencies have replaced the classical 
factors of having a competitive edge such as cheap labor and 
excessive raw material. 
As the combination of such sub-industries, the defense 
industry has been creating value and contributing to the economical 
development and welfare of the nation by improving the scientific 
and technologic infrastructure of the country. 
1.        Technological Goals of The Defense Industry 
There is a close relationship between the effectiveness of the 
defense system and their level of technological development. 
Therefore, the goal of developing high technology has been the 
focal point of product development and production re-engineering 
processes in defense industries. In order to increase the 
effectiveness and self-sufficiency, countries have been heavily 
engaged in developing the required technologies instead of 
transferring them from other countries.  In this sense,  universities 
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and   research   institutions   have   been   granted   funds   to   conduct 
research and development activities for defense industries. 
2. Importance of R&D Centered Defense Industry for the 
Efficient Use of National Resources 
Compared to the commercial products and services, high-tech 
defense systems and products are produced in lesser quantities with 
higher development, production and operation costs and cannot be 
foregone due to the inevitability of defense needs. Since research 
and development expenditures constitute a significant part of the 
cost of a procured defense system or product, the design and 
development of such products domestically saves a great deal of 
national funds from going out of the country and helps fund the 
development of the national science and technology base. However, 
it consumes national resources that instead could be used for other 
national priorities. 
3. Contributions of The Defense Industry to National 
Science and Technology Base 
The   defense   industry   has   always   been   in   search   of   new 
products and systems that push the limit of the current technologies. 
Therefore, with the appropriate plans and policies, the defense 
industry can sometimes make big contributions to the improvement 
of a  nation's   science   and  technology   base.   The   accumulation   of 
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know how and technology, increases the qualified work force, and 
may lead to the development of other associated industries, 
providing the most significant contribution of the defense industry 
to the national science and technology base. 
C.      THE DEFENSE SECTOR AND THE ECONOMY 
The macro-economic consequences of the defense industry, 
that is the effect of its existence, and of the changes of the defense 
industry and defense expenditures in general on the economic 
performance of a country, has always been a rich topic for studies 
and discussions. 
The establishment of a domestic arms industry can have 
significant positive economic effects, through spin-offs, the 
provision of jobs and the development of human capital, the 
utilization of excess production capacities, and externality effects 
through the linkages with the rest of the economy. Some studies 
have highlighted the fact that domestic arms production can have a 
number of negative effects, such as the crowding out of resources, 
both investment and human capital, a reduction in civilian 
technological development, an externality effect on other companies 
and a reduction in industrial efficiency and international 
competitiveness. 
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The critics of the vast scale of defense expenditures have been 
tempted to look at this factor as a cause of many other economic and 
social ills. They have argued that the high level of defense 
expenditures, coupled with a chronically high rate of inflation and 
rising unemployment, has led to the poor performance of many 
countries worldwide. They have expressed their concern in terms of 
relations with defense expenditures and certain economic indicators. 
In the first place, the relationship between defense 
expenditures and inflation has been identified in terms of three 
outcomes of increased defense expenditures, which are the excess 
demand, 'bottleneck' inflation and budget deficit. Increased defense 
expenditures have been identified as the primary cause of excess 
demand and blamed for leading to inflation in that way. A big rise 
in defense expenditures can, of course, bring about excess demand 
in the economy, which subsequently can bring about inflation. The 
war is the prime example of such a phenomenon. Moreover, a sharp 
upswing in defense expenditures -particularly if it is concentrated 
on procurement- can cause some 'bottleneck' inflation [Ref 7, p.10]. 
This can arise from specific shortages of materials and/or skilled 
personnel needed for the new weapons programs. Finally, since it is 
government spending, defense expenditures are a component part of 
any central government budget deficit. Actually the question if 
budget deficits inevitably lead to  inflation- and if not inevitably, 
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under what circumstances do they happen, has been an area of 
controversy. If there is a central government budget deficit, then 
inevitably military expenditures are a part of that deficit. However, 
if the economy is at less than full employment (however defined), it 
cannot be categorically stated that the deficit is necessarily a cause 
of inflation. 
Second, the government's ability to increase employment or 
decrease unemployment by increasing defense expenditures and 
expanding the defense industry has been largely debated. In fact the 
issue has been examined, not in terms of military expenditures 
alone, but in terms of government expenditures in general. Though 
those individuals, who have political or economic reasons for 
wanting to see defense expenditures and arms production receive an 
important share of state resources, have argued that one result of 
less defense expenditures, particularly in the form of arms 
procurement, is higher levels of unemployment, possibly isolated in 
certain localities. Evidence has been provided that military 
expenditures are neither a particularly important source of 
employment in most countries nor the best means of increasing 
employment [Ref 7, p.10]. 
Third, the structural consequences of high military spending, 
whether the course of military spending can explain the general 
slowdown or upswing in economic growth, has been the focus of 
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many research studies. The most common argument here is to cite 
the comparison between Germany and Japan on the one hand, and 
the United States and Britain on the other. The latter have been low- 
growth countries with respect to the former. When other countries 
are brought into the comparison, the apparent relationship between 
high military expenditures and slow growth becomes clear. 
The final economic question concerning defense expenditures 
is the economic problem, which is posed in times of substantial 
disarmament. Some countries' economies may find the adjustment to 
disarmament and the reduction of their defense-industrial sector 
more difficult than others 
After all these discussions, the main point to make about 
defense expenditures is a very simple one; it uses up resources 
which might alternatively be employed to provide consumer 
satisfaction, either in the provision of private or of collective goods 
and services. In particular, if the skill and ingenuity devoted to 
weapons development were diverted to civil objectives, the process 
of technological advancement in the civil field could be appreciably 
accelerated. 
However, except when there are major trends in defense 
expenditures, it is a mistake to consider that the defense industry is 
responsible for such macro-economic developments as upswings in 
prices   or   unemployment.   In   particular,   the   worsening   economic 
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performance    in    the    industrial    economies    cannot    properly    be 
attributed to changes in defense expenditures alone. 
D.       DEFENSE MARKET 
1.       Factors Influencing Defense Expenditures 
A country's allocation for defense expenditures is sometimes 
driven by the result of an arbitrary political decision as to how to 
deal with the threat to its vital national interests. The personnel 
strength of the armed forces, numbers of weapon platforms, and 
equipment, as well as other defense components initially rely on 
military doctrine. This choice, in turn, is usually based on the 
politicians' or analysts' perception of current and/or expected 
threats, and their desire to achieve designated goals by projecting 
the country's military and economic power. The estimated military 
strength of a potential enemy (if any), the country's geographical 
neighbors, economic constraints, end of conflicts, forced 
disarmament (Iraq), and severe political changes must be taken into 
consideration. 
2.       Traditional Market Systems 
In a traditional market place, the seller of a product takes 
initiative in developing and producing a product. Funding required 
for development is obtained from retained earnings or through debt 
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or equity financing. Buyers then decide to purchase the new product 
or one offered by a competitor. The market is the interaction 
between the buyer and the seller. First, if a product does poorly 
against a competitor, the seller will use this information to lower 
prices, improve the product, or discontinue it. Secondly, the market 
serves as a reward and punishment system. Producers who anticipate 
consumer needs ahead of the competition and are efficient at 
keeping costs down may receive a better average return. A producer 
neglecting to adapt to consumer desires or with poor cost control 
makes below-average profits or suffers losses and may eventually be 
driven from the market. "Prices are determined by competition, not 
by costs incurred or determination of a fair level of profit." [Ref 8. 
p.55] 
3.        Free Market vs. the Market for Defense Products 
In a general sense the defense market is like any other market 
in that it brings together buyers and sellers. The parties are brought 
together through a legally binding contract by which the supplier, in 
return for goods or services, receives payment. 
The market for defense products differs from the traditional 
free market in several aspects. In the weapons market, the buyer 
decides what he wants developed. The buyer rather than the seller 
usually  finances the  weapons.  This  is  accomplished through  cost 
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invoices, loan guarantees, or advance payments. The buyer can 
supply government-owned property or equipment to further reduce 
the investment required by the seller. Competition between sellers 
is not always based solely on the price factor. During the early 
stages of a weapons acquisition program, competition may be 
centered on performance or best value while costs may be a 
secondary concern. 
The weapons acquisition market differs in how price is 
resolved. In a cost-plus-fixed fee or award-fee contract, the price is 
ascertained by determining costs, and then adding a "fair and 
reasonable" fee (profit). Even in a negotiated fixed-price 
arrangement, sellers may have to certify cost data as current, 
accurate, and complete. 
Through market research firms can estimate demand for their 
products and plan accordingly. The cancellation of a product line is 
usually an internal corporate decision. In contrast, the market for 
weapons is subject to annual changes in the budget that may 
increase, decrease, or eliminate a program due to a policy change 
(For a more detailed comparison, see Appendix-A). 
4.       International   Market   for   Military   Equipment   and 
Services 
After the strong growth during the Cold War era until 1988, 
with the peak in  1987, the world defense market shrank steadily 
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until 1996. Since 1996, world military expenditures have been 
fluctuating. However, behind this fluctuation is a general slight rise 
in most regions. Total world military expenditures have increased 
by a 2.1% in real terms and amounted to roughly $780 billion in 
1999 [Ref. 9 p.5]. 
Globally, military expenditures are highly concentrated in a 
few countries. The 15 major spenders accounted for 80 per cent of 
the world total in 1999, the USA accounts for 36 per cent, followed 
by Japan and France with 7 percent each and Germany and the UK 
with 5 and 4 percent, respectively. The next three in size — China, 
Italy, and Russia —account for 3 percent each of the world total. 
The rise in world military expenditures in 1999 is accounted for 
primarily by a few of these major spending countries, the USA, 
France, Russia, China, Brazil and Turkey. 
Most forecasts point to a renewed growth in defense spending 
in all regions of the world, although overall growth rates are 
expected to be moderate, with significant differences between 
countries. 
In the United States and Europe, the defense programs 
launched during the Cold War are now either in the production 
phase or just about to move into production. Some current programs 
could be canceled or postponed. Most of them are expected to go 
ahead,  but  often  at  a slower rate  or smaller volume.  In addition, 
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some in-service equipment now needs to be modernized, and this 
should help to partially support the recovery in defense markets. 
In the rest of the world, particularly in the Asian Pacific, 
certain countries are increasing their defense equipment budgets in 
line with efforts to consolidate their regional influence. The rise in 
East Asian military expenditures in 1999 is due primarily to the rise 
in the Chinese military expenditures. However, there was' a 
reduction in defense spending by the East Asian countries that were 
affected by the 1997 financial crisis. 
Other countries, particularly in Latin America, are facing the 
need to modernize their defense systems, some of which are now 
obsolete. 
In the Middle East military expenditures decreased in 1998 
and 1999, but from a high level. Although most of the Middle 
Eastern countries belong to the richer countries in the world, most 
belong to the group with the highest defense burden as measured by 
the share of military expenditures in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). 
The increases in military expenditures in Africa and South 
Asia add to the already heavy defense burden in many poor 
countries in these regions. In Africa many countries are involved in 
armed conflict, either directly, or indirectly. 
There is a tendency for procurement expenditures to rise more 
rapidly than total military expenditures in most countries, mostly 
for the wish to support the domestic defense industrial bases, which 
in many arms-producing countries have been significantly reduced 
during the 1990s due to the declining demand for weapons. 
Table II-l.Fifteen Major Spenders: Military Expenditures, 1995- 
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1 USA 278.9 263.7 262.2 256.1 259.9 36 
2 Japan 50.1 51.1 51.3 51.3 51.2 7 
3 France 47.8 46.6 46.8 45.5 46.8 7 
4 Germany 41.2 40.3 38.9 39.0 39.5 5 
5 UK 33.8 34.4 32.3 32.6 31.8 4 
6 Italy 19.4 21.4 22.4 23.1 23.5 3 
7 Russia 25.7 23.4 24.9 18.1 22.4 
8 China 12.5 13.7 14.9 16.9 18.4 j 
9 South Korea 14.4 15.5 15.6 15.2 15.0 2 
10 Saudi Arabia 13.2 13.2 17.9 16.4 14.5 2 
11 Brazil 10.9 9.4 11.5 10.9 14.3 2 
12 India 8.0 8.2 8.9 9.3 10.2 1 
13 Turkey 6.6 7.4 7.7 8.1 9.6 1 
14 Taiwan 9.9 10.2 10.5 10.6 9.3 1 
15 Spain 8.7 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.7 1 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2000 
E. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Driven by the desire to reduce the vulnerability inherent in 
their dependence upon foreign military hardware, and by the hope of 
economic gain, developing nations have been increasingly involved 
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in the process of developing their own defense industries. They 
believe that their domestic weapons programs will put away arms 
embargoes, interruptions in the flow of spare parts, restrictions on 
the use and resale of foreign weapons, and suppliers' attempts to 
influence their foreign and domestic policies firmly in the past. 
The developing countries' quest for domestic defense 
industries has generally followed five stages. At first, prefabricated 
components have been imported and simply assembled in-country. 
Second, actual production of weapon components under license 
agreements with foreign suppliers has taken place. In the third 
stage, complete foreign-designed weapons have been produced under 
license. By the fourth stage, national defense industries have gained 
the ability to modify, redesign, and reproduce foreign weapons, and 
in the fifth stage they finally have gained the ability to produce 
domestically designed arms. 
Today, developing nations are now producing not only small 
•arms and ammunitions but also sophisticated military aircraft, 
armored vehicles, naval vessels, and ballistic missiles. As early as 
1988, of the 16 Third World countries believed to possess ballistic 
missiles, 12 were actually developing or producing the weapons 
themselves [Ref 10. pp.18-19]. 
The percentage amount of major conventional weapon systems 
supplied by the developing countries has grown dramatically in the 
last four decades and reached a total of 10% during the period of 
1986-1997 [Ref 11 pp.15-16]. 
India, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, North Korea, 
Argentina, South Korea, and Egypt are the leading defense 
producers among the developing countries. They are able to design 
and produce all four types of major conventional weapons, as well 
as small arms and ammunition. Ten more countries, have started'to 
produce at least two or three of the four types of conventional arms, 
these countries are: Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Thailand, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 
Although many countries still depend heavily on foreign 
technology, that form of dependence is less burdensome than 
depending on imported weapons. Production technology cannot be 
easily withdrawn, controlled, or manipulated by suppliers. More 
importantly, technology can be built upon. Defense industries 
founded upon imported technology are already significantly 
reducing arms imports in a number of countries. 
Despite such progress, Third World countries continue to 
import arms. But that is true of industrial countries as well. Even 
the most advanced arms producers such as Great Britain and the 
United States manufacture some foreign weapons under license, and 
incorporate imported components into their own weapons systems in 
collaboration   with   other   countries   in   weapons   development   and 
manufacture. In a small way, arms procurement patterns in advanced 
and developing countries may be moving very slightly toward 
convergence. 
F.       ARMS PRODUCTION and GENERAL-TRADE TRENDS 
Following the sharp decline after 1988, overall world military 
expenditures have been fluctuating since 1996. Substantial cuts in 
defense spending have still been the driving factor of the lower 
demand for defense products, and have been troubling even the 
superb defense industries with remarkable capabilities and vast 
capacities. 
At the same time, the cost for R&D and manufacturing of 
weapon systems has increased significantly during the last decade. 
Since design and development costs are a such big part of the total 
cost, it has become more important for the defense industry to have 
long production runs in order to get the benefits of lower 
development costs per unit and to offer lower prices. 
Higher cost and shrinking market have made the problems 
related to economies of scale more and more emphasized. A 
reinforcing loop can describe this process: lower budgets, less 
demand, reduced production, higher costs per unit, less demand, 
reduced production. 
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1.   Excess Capacity 
One obvious result of both lower defense budgets and more 
expensive systems has been the declining order sizes, which have 
led to lower production rates and increased time between new 
systems. Another trend having negative impact on the defense 
industry output has been the increased emphasis put into the 
modification of older existing systems, increasing their life and 
capability as a means to save money [Ref 12.pl]. 
This has led to more and more defense industries with excess 
capacity. In the absence of any offsetting action, a reduction in 
capacity is inevitable. 
This collapse in international arms trade is primarily due to 
the ending of the cold war and a resolution of several Third World 
conflicts. The traditional arms exporters- the United States, Europe, 
and the former Soviet Union, must contend with an increasingly 
competitive -global arms market, as new suppliers, particularly in 
the developing world have emerged [Ref 12. p2]. 
2.        Globalization 
In nearly every country, arms production has traditionally 
been one of the most protected sectors of the national economy. 
Many    countries    would    prefer    to    be    self-sufficient    in    arms 
procurement and domestic defense industries have generally been 
perceived as the most secure source for defense equipment. Even in 
the "capitalistic' countries, weapons production is usually placed 
outside the boundaries of free market economics. Competition, 
efficiency, and profitability are secondary to guaranteeing the 
domestic resources needed for national defense [Ref 12. p.l]. The 
stable domestic market has been important in supporting the 
development of new weapons systems both financially and 
technically. 
Today a different trend is emerging, and the defense industry 
is becoming less and less domestic. This trend is often described 
with the term "globalization." The term globalization is used as an 
umbrella for a lot of different activities. Some of the different 
activities falling into this category are: 
■ Co-development: Transnational design, development, (and 
production) of weapons systems. 
■ Consortium: A formal but ad hoc industrial agreement to 
co-develop or co-produce. 
■ Family of Weapons: An international division of labor 
involving several related weapons systems, where 
participating countries separately develop a particular weapon 
within the group and then permit the other participants to 
produce that weapon for themselves. 
■ Joint Venture: An international company jointly owned 
and operated by defense firms in two or more countries in 
order to co-develop and co-produce a weapon system [Ref 12. 
p6]. 
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Globalization implies that development and co-production of a 
weapons system is made, at least in part, outside a country's border, 
and in most cases in cooperation with other nations. This is a big 
change, and it seems obvious that this trend is going to have 
implications for a variety of national security issues, including 
security and defense policy, arms control, regional security 
cooperation, and the future size, structure, and capabilities of a 
domestic defense industrial base [Ref 12. pi]. 
The reasons for globalization can be both military, political, 
and as mentioned above, economic. The most commonly described 
are some of the following: 
■ Sharing costs and by doing so reducing the risk of 
researching, developing, and manufacturing new weapons 
systems. 
■ Gaining access to foreign technologies. 
■ Helping to achieve economies of scale in the production of 
increasingly expensive weapon systems. 
■ Developing and penetrating foreign markets that might 
otherwise be closed to arms imports. 
■ Enhancing combat efficiency and effectiveness of military 
alliances by eliminating wasteful duplication in arms 
production, while promoting battlefield rationalization, 
standardization, and inter-operability. 
■ Fostering other types of international cooperation, such as 
NATO political solidarity or European integration [Ref 12. 
P.5]. 
3.        Restructuring 
All defense industries have been facing major challenges, 
which will certainly cause a need for structuring. A move towards 
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non-military production is one option. Consolidation, concentration 
in core competencies, and downsizing are other options available. 
These options can be used alone or together. 
Another trend that has been especially visible is the creation 
of a monopoly of suppliers through mergers and acquisitions. This 
can be done to reduce the number of competitors, control important 
resources (skilled workforce, technical edge, access to markets, 
capital and raw material, etc.) or take over customers. There are 
many examples where big British, French, German and American 
defense companies have bought out other producers of defense 
systems in both Europe and the US. The total size of the industries 
is reduced, and the power is becoming more concentrated to a few 
companies, often called National Champions. Some companies have 
decided to leave the defense market altogether. 
Strategic alliances, a loose industrial agreement between 
defense industries in two or more countries, is also something that 
has emerged 
4.        New Competition 
As mentioned earlier, the number of countries with developed 
defense industries has been increasing, and as they become more 
and more self-sufficient in the production of weapon systems, they 
are beginning to enter the arms market as exporters. 
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If this trend continues for another couple of years, some of 
these countries will not only be able to develop and produce weapon 
systems with substantial indigenous design, but will pose a serious 
threat to the established countries on the global arms market [Ref 
13,p.148]. 
5.        Other Measures 
There are two other trends that must be commented on. The 
first is that the increased competition forces the defense industries 
(or in some cases governments) to adopt new pricing policies, in 
order to get orders for their systems. Finding a way to lower prices 
is probably a necessity that most defense industries are forced into 
by the tough competition its industry is facing in the world market. 
The other trend is to re-evaluate and relax current export 
restrictions regarding arms and defense related technologies. This is 
not something the defense industry itself can do, but it can put 
political pressure on the government in order to gain access to a 
closed market. The government may feel a strong pressure, and see 
relaxed regulations as a quick and simple solution to some of the 
industries' problems, so they are ready to re-evaluate earlier 
limitations. 
But it is important to remember that new export policies will 
have to balance the defense industries'  economic concerns against 
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the countries' foreign policy goals such as arms control and non- 
proliferation. In this regard, some countries may find it necessary to 
keep the export restrictions on certain types of weapons and 
military technologies, while at the same time, remove other 
restrictions that damage the domestic defense industry. 
6.        Offset 
Defense related offset or "compensation" in the form of 
licensed production, domestic production or guaranteed import of 
goods from the recipient country, is almost a rule in today's 
marketplace. The reasons for offset are both economic and political. 
One important factor behind a request for offset is the 
political process. In many democratic countries, there is often a 
debate between different factions before a decision is made. In 
order to gain support for a decision to buy a weapons system 
abroad, the government wants to point out other benefits from the 
deal. Such benefits can be to license production domestically 
(creating jobs), and subcontract portions to the domestic industry, 
or other goals related to industrial policy. 
A buyer, primarily in the developed countries, normally has 
one or more of the following goals when demanding offset: 
■ Building domestic capital 
■ Restructuring the industrial base 
■ Subsidizing a region or an industry 
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■ Supporting its security policy 
■ Gaining political support for the deal. 
Offset is often tied to one single project, but can be spread out 
over several years. Offset activities can be related or unrelated to 
the imported system. These activities influence the defense industry 
in different ways. 
A percentage of the total project should be produced in the 
recipient country. This often makes parts of the defense industry in 
the recipient country subcontractors to the seller and can lead to 
abandonment of some of the normal subcontractors in the selling 
country. 
The seller may have to transfer technology, knowledge or 
capital to the recipient country. This usually involves the defense 
industry in the recipient country, but not always. The transfer can 
be unrelated to the imported system. As a rule, many countries want 
to gain the knowledge and the technology to support the system 
themselves. 
The selling country may promise to buy products from the 
recipient country for a percentage of the system value. This can in 
some cases be considered as a "payment," and be totally unrelated 
to the imported system. This will not affect the defense industry. 
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As   a   rule   of  thumb,   offset   is   almost   a   must   in   today's 
marketplace, and it is up to the recipient to decide how, and where 
to use it. 
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III.   TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
A.       THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1.        General 
The transfer of technology can be defined as the transmission 
of know-how to suit local conditions both within a country and from 
one country to another. The term technology indicates the sum of 
knowledge, experience, and skills necessary for manufacturing 
products and for establishing an enterprise [Ref 14. p. 119]. 
Before beginning to explain technology transfer, the term 
technology should be analyzed. To understand technology, current 
trends in the area of product development and production should be 
explained. These trends are: 
■ Innovation   is   more   rapid,   resulting   in   technology   and 
processes that are more widely applicable'. 
■ Shorter   life   cycles,   and   more   flexibility   in   response   to 
consumer needs are emphasized. 
■ Increased automation results in a smaller role for unskilled 
labor. 
■ A   strong   emphasis   is   placed   upon   quality   products   and 
quality management. 
In light of these trends, a wider definition of technology will 
be that technology is the knowledge, procedural methods, and 
organizational models used to transform input into high value 
added, and marketed output. Such a definition stresses knowledge, 
organizational models, and methods more than physical bulk. The 
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focus of technology is therefore moved away from physical objects. 
In this manner technology is embodied in people, their institutions 
and the management capability of those institutions. The acquisition 
of technological capability is therefore more a matter of building up 
skills and institutions. 
As a result technology transfer can be described as the process 
by which technology, knowledge, and information developed in one 
organization, in one area, for one purpose is applied and used in 
another organization or area for another purpose. 
In any type of technology transfer, the prime objective is to 
transfer production knowledge from one location to another. This 
transfer is made in order to undertake specific production activities. 
Therefore, the amount of output produced is one measure of success. 
In addition, it is obviously important to examine the efficiency 
achieved in the new production process. This efficiency examination 
can be made in terms of materials and energy used, the productivity 
of labor and machinery, and the relevant norms of best practice 
elsewhere (some kind of 'Benchmarking'). 
A technology transfer takes place when a group of people 
become capable of performing one or more functions attached to a 
specific technique in satisfactory conditions [Ref 15. p.16]. 
Technology transfer cannot be separated from technological 
innovation. Technology transfer is only one aspect of technological 
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innovation. It can be defined as a purposeful, conscious effort to 
move technical devices, materials, methods, and information from 
the point of discovery or development to new users. 
In management terms, technology transfer implies the 
management of change. This change consists of bringing new ideas, 
knowledge, processes, and products to the attention of the people 
who may use them. 
Technology license is the major form through which 
technology is transferred between countries. It confers the right to 
use patented technology for a manufacturer and to communicate 
related know-how on mutually agreed terms [Ref 14. p.120]. 
The large outflow of technology has been from the United 
States mostly because of its large multinational corporations having 
advanced technologies. At the same time, technology has flowed 
into the United States, mainly from other Western Countries and 
Japan. 
Technology transfer can help countries: 
■ Evaluate their technology requirements. 
■ Solve technical problems. 
■ Apply different technologies to their specific needs. 
■ Evaluate and improve their processes. 
■ Gain expert advice in a whole range of areas. 
However, there are some tasks that should be carried out while 
conducting a technology transfer: 
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a. Technology        Transfer       Requires       Transition 
Planning 
The   most   fragile   points    in   the   technology   transfer 
process occur during transition planning. The burden of transition 
planning in technology transfer falls most heavily on the party 
handing off the technology. 
b. Market Knowledge Drives Technical Development 
Market   analysis   justifies   movement   into   commercial 
technical  development.  For industry decision-makers in fact, only 
the    market    knowledge    can   justify    investment    in    commercial 
technical development.  Such knowledge includes documentation of 
user needs, market size, industry keys (market-specific purchasing 
decision  criteria).   Three  points  of product  differentiation  tied  to 
industry keys, pricing strategy, analysis of best practices and trend 
forecasts,    identification    of   market    barriers,    and    analysis    of 
competition and substitution options. 
c.        Technology     Transfer     Depends     On     Matched 
Capabilities 
Success in joint R&D ventures, technology licensing and 
direct technology transfer depends heavily on the 
"organizational/personal fits" that smooth transition. Successful 
hand-off occurs when partners complement each other in the 
following ways: Combined resources should marshal all the 
capabilities and personnel listed in the innovation process chart. All 
parties should agree on the thresholds for market size, pricing, and 
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product placement. The parties should arrange the transition through 
organizational units of similar scope and scale. All parties should 
share (or at least understand) the perceptions and assessments of 
risk, and all parties should agree on priorities and levels of 
commitment. 
d. Industry  Drivers   Control  Industrial   Technology 
Transfer 
"Business potential" offers the only acceptable rationale 
for industrial technical innovation. Market data (not technical data) 
justifies investment in technology development. Engineering 
success, field tests, and technology demonstrations can only produce 
commercial development after filtering through screens of market 
analysis and calculations of return on investment. Supplementing 
technical data with market information significantly improves the 
prospects for direct technology transfer. 
e. Technology Transfer Involves Human Barriers 
Technical   innovation  makes  changes  in  work patterns, 
supplier lists, training needs, customer bases, regulatory 
requirements, pay scales, and a host of other areas. Such human 
impact factors can erect major barriers to commercialization of new 
technology. Human impact and potential human impact barriers 
require definition and evaluation in the same way as technical 
development, market analysis, and infrastructure planning. 
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/. Technology Transfer Must Address Risks 
Addressing perceived risks furnishes the single most 
important task in promoting technical innovation. Market 
uncertainties pose the most critical risks for industry decision- 
makers. Market knowledge must justify any investment in 
commercial technical development. However, no engineering 
knowledge or technical data can reduce perceived risks that arise 
from market and business uncertainties. 
To evaluate the technology transferred is more difficult than 
to evaluate the capital inflow. The technology transfer is successful 
when: 
■ It is employed effectively in a new environment, even if 
the whole factory is operated by foreign experts, 
■ Workers in the host country obtain enough skills to operate 
the transferred machinery and managers can work out 
plans for operation and marketing (this is usually the case 
of joint ventures), 
■ It produces good effects on other economic concerns, 
■ Techniques originated from the transferred technology can 
be developed and improved in order to suit the local 
economic activities. 
Thus,   benefits   of  fhe   technology   transfer   to   the   recipient 
country depend on its suitability and effects on the local economy. 
2.        Technology Transfer Processes 
One definition for technology transfer is that it is the process 
by which existing research is transferred operationally into useful 
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processes, products, or programs that fulfill actual or potential 
public or private needs [Ref 16. p.l]. Jolly, Creighton, and George 
state that the term "research" should be interpreted in its broadest 
sense to include developments in many fields from Aerospace to 
Mental Health to education. Their concern is that of taking an 
existing idea or body of knowledge, from any of these fields, and 
using it in a different place, in a different way. 
a.       Simple Process Model 
The transfer mechanism represents the interaction of 
people, and need not be independent, but may be incorporated in 
either the supplier or user environment [Ref 16. p.2]. 
The transfer process of knowledge or information could 
be viewed as the. movement of information from source of 
knowledge to utilization of knowledge. Efficiency of the utilization 
of knowledge depends on how effective the mechanism is. The 
transfer mechanism could be further divided into two groups of 
organizational factors as formal and informal. 
Source of Knowledge Informal Factor; 
Formal Factors 
Utilization of Knowledge 
(Supplier) Transfer Mechanism (User/Receiver) 
Figure 3-1   Simple Process Model 
Formal    Factors    are    producers    for   dissemination    of 
storage   indexing   and  retrieval   of knowledge,  while  the   Informal 
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Factors   are   interpersonal   communications   and   contacts,   personal 
beliefs   and   feelings   about   knowledge   source,   perceptions   about 
one's organizational supervisors and peers [Ref 16. p.3]. 
b.       Discussion of Elements of the Model 
(1) Formal Factors. Formal factors are the methods 
of information documentation, distribution systems, formal 
organization of the user, and the selection process for projects. 
Documentation is the format, specifications, and 
presentation of the technology or information being transferred. 
Format and language relate directly to the understanding of the 
receiver. 
The distribution system is the physical channel 
through which technology flows. It involves the number of entries 
and the ease of access in to the channel, as well as the formal 
distribution plan. 
Formal organization of the user is the impact the 
formal organization of the potential technology user has on the 
transfer effort. Under this factor, we can consider such things as the 
rules, norms, and role structure of a specific company, business, or 
governmental agency. 
Selection processes for projects refers to the 
selection process for research and development undertaken by the 
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source and the receiver's contributions to that process [Ref 16. p.5- 
7]. 
(2) Informal Factors. Informal factors are the 
capacity of the receiver, informal "linkers" in the receiving 
organization, credibility as viewed by the receiver, the perceived 
reward to the receiver, and the willingness to be helped. 
The capacity of the receiver refers to the ability 
and capability of the potential user to utilize new ideas. 
Informal "linkers" in the receiving organization 
refer to the presence and the effects of the individuals in the 
receiving organization who link their organization to the larger 
environment. 
Credibility as viewed by the receiver is the 
receiver's assessment of the reliability of the information provided 
to him. 
The perceived reward to the receiver is defined as 
the perceived payback and the social system of which the individual 
is a member. 
Willingness to be helped relates to the individual's 
ability and/or desire to accept change in the organization in which 
he is a member [Ref 16. p.9-11]. 
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B.      FACTORS AFFECTING THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1.        Economic Factors 
Economy is the leading power in today's world. It affects the 
decisions that would be made about the diffusion and process of 
technology transfer. 
Some countries are economically more advanced than others. 
This situation causes the economically powerful countries to have 
the most advanced technologies while the economically less- 
developed countries do not. 
As discussed in "Technology Transfer" by A.C. Samli, there 
are three key situations regarding the technology transfer: 
■ The poor countries needs exceed their capability of 
transferring technology, 
■ Economically- advanced countries expand the economic gap 
between themselves and other countries by generating, 
adopting, and properly utilizing the most up-to-date 
technology. 
■ Regardless of the degree of economic development, the 
economy dictates, to a substantial extent, the 
appropriateness of the technology to be transferred [Ref 14. 
p.5]. 
Regardless of the size and power of the recipient country, 
there are some non-economic factors affecting the technology 
transfer. For example, prior technology drag can be a handicap that 
affects the transfer of technology. A prior technology transfer 
provides significant benefits because of large and installed bases. 
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In some cases, investments are irreversible. Adoption of 
technology requires irreversible investments in areas such as 
products, training, and accumulated project investments. 
Sponsorship can be a sub-factor affecting the technology 
transfer. A single entity (person, organization, and/or consortium) 
should exist to define the technology, set standards, and subsidize 
early adapters. In other words, this sponsor should promote the 
adoption of the new technology. 
There are expectations from a technology transfer. The 
technology transfer benefits from an extended period of widespread 
expectations that it would be pervasively adopted in the future. 
2.        Technical Factors 
Technology is the capability of applying science to economic 
activity or production. Therefore, it should include all the hardware, 
software, and other supporting activities [Ref 14. p.8]. 
In this case, there are a number of technical factors that 
should be taken into account. These are: transportation, 
infrastructure, communication infrastructure, availability of skilled 
labor, product counterfeiting, lack of cooperation of partners, cash 
flow/accounts receivable, trade malpractice, concepts of selling, and 
lack of openness to processes. 
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All the factors listed have their importance in the context of 
their usage. One factor may be important in one context while others 
may not. Each factor should be considered and studied according to 
the area where the technology transfer takes place. 
3. Political Factors 
Governments play important roles when a technology transfer 
takes place. Every government in the recipient country may itself 
transfer technology or specify some incentives for technology 
transfer by the private sector. In either case there are laws, both in 
the recipient country and in the country that is exporting the 
technology, concerning and keeping in order the transfer of 
technology. These laws and the rules specifying the technology 
transfer affect transfer by making it easy or making it hard. 
There are other political factors affecting the technology 
transfer. These are the issues related to international law and the 
rules asserted in the charters of the international organizations. 
These sub-factors can be human rights issues, political stability, and 
equal opportunity, and profit. Again, as in the case of technical 
factors, these should be considered in their own context of use. 
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C.      TYPES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES 
There are three types of technology transfer to foreign 
countries. These are Foreign Investment, R&D, and Technology 
License Agreements and Joint Ventures [Ref 14. p.160]. Most 
countries need capital as much as they need technology and 
management know-how. Direct foreign investment appears most 
attractive to some. This is because direct foreign investment has the 
characteristics of the other types of technology transfer. In some 
cases the country may only need some elements of the package. 
1.        Foreign Investment 
The flow of technology to different countries has been an 
integral part of direct foreign investments. The significant flow of 
new techniques and processes are made by multinational 
corporations, which prefer capital-intensive technology. These 
corporations may invest in other countries in order to protect the 
existing market, or to create new markets, to bypass prohibitive 
barriers and import restrictions, to take advantage of cheap labor 
and skills, and to discover or protect raw material sources. 
The issues of transfer of technology and foreign investment 
are inexplicably linked. Multinational or large foreign firms are 
investing very large proportions of their resources to the 
development of new products, technologies and processes. In recent 
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times, brand names have come to be identified with important and 
desirable characteristics such as quality and reliability. In some 
products, the technology is tied into the acquisition of the right to 
the brand name. Such products, technologies, and processes may be 
proprietary in nature. For the import of such proprietary technology, 
joint ventures may be required. If the country profile in 
international markets is attractive enough, multinationals will look 
favorably on such joint-venture deals with the domestic private 
sector. 
When a firm enters a developing country to introduce a new 
product or to manufacture some commodity, it will wish to bring in 
all that will enhance its profitability, including technical 
knowledge. However, in order to do so it must be able to rely on the 
availability of inexpensive or at least affordable domestic technical 
skills of acceptable quality. The issue of the transfer of technology 
is tied in with the desire to attract direct foreign investments. But a 
key link may be the development of domestic human skills in the 
recipient country. 
Many countries have been aware of the costs of the 
investments by foreign multinational corporations. The outflow of 
profits and dividends with the fees, royalties to patent companies, 
and payments for goods and components imported have been of a 
very high order. There has been a growing feeling in these countries 
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that ownership and control should be in the hands of the nationals 
of the country. Consequently, foreign equity holdings are often 
limited to a certain percentage [Ref 14. p.126]. 
Policies followed by technology transferring countries with 
respect to foreign investments have considerable impact on the form 
of technology acquired. For example, if foreign investments in 
industry are regulated and local free enterprise exists, technology 
licensing is increasingly being used. 
In many cases a significant degree of foreign capital 
ownership is a pre-condition for technology transfer. Highly 
technical processes and techniques may not be available to other 
countries unless the owner is allowed at least controlling capital 
ownership of the enterprise [Ref 14. p.126]. 
2.        Research and Development (R&D) 
In some cases, countries that want to transfer technology can 
take part in- the R&D projects undertaken by developed countries. 
This may occur by the participation in the costs and the work that 
will be carried out. 
Some countries, which need technology transfer for their 
industrial base, undertake R&D in some form, however, they should 
have well-defined and properly organized institutions for the 
management    and    coordination    of    such    work.    Research    and 
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Development have been lately recognized as an essential tool for the 
expansion of the national economy. Most technology transferring 
countries spend a very small portion of their GNPs on R&D. 
Nevertheless, it is essential that R&D institutions be properly 
planned and operated [Ref 14. p.127]. 
3.      Technology License Agreements and Joint Ventures 
Direct foreign investments in different countries have 
generally been in the form of wholly owned subsidiary corporations. 
However, an increasing number of new investments have been joint 
ventures involving shared ownership between local and foreign 
partners. There are various factors contributing to the growth of 
joint ventures [Ref 14. p.127]. Countries that want to transfer 
technology may pass legislation either prohibiting total foreign 
ownership or making incentives provisional upon a certain degree of 
local ownership. Depending on the overall investment capital in a 
country and on the size and profitability of the market, foreign 
investors are becoming increasingly willing to participate in equity 
capital on a majority basis. 
Joint ventures have been defined as a common project between 
legally and commercially independent companies in which the 
parties jointly bear both the responsibility for management and the 
financial risk [Ref 17. p.201]. They are also established as separate 
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corporations in which the ownership interest is split between two or 
more partners who, in the typical case, are corporate entities. 
However, all partners in the joint ventures are exposed to the same 
risks, although the way in which this responsibility is divided 
among the partners through their agreement is quite variable. 
The motivations for entering into a joint relationship must be 
strong for success to be assured. Although hard data on joint 
ventures successes and failures are scarce, the little information 
that is available suggests that this reputation is well deserved. For 
example, in the article written by Killing, he surveyed 37 
international joint ventures and found that participants rated 36 
percent of them as having performed unsatisfactorily, a high 
proportion indeed [Ref 18. p. 120-127]. In Killing's paper, the 
percentage of success was higher, but even here 27 percent 
estimated that the joint venture would not continue in its present 
form. Of those who saw their joint ventures continuing, one-third 
conditioned their affirmative answer in one way or another. Clearly, 
one should not become involved in joint ventures casually. 
The reality of global competition today is that few companies 
possess all of the competitive advantages that would enable them to 
be successful internationally. For firms in industrialized countries, 
prospects for future growth are increasingly seen as being 
disproportionately  in  developing parts  of the  world,  not  in  more 
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familiar markets in the developed nations. But, for a variety of 
reasons, doing business in developing countries is viewed as being 
considerably riskier, to be approached with much more caution. 
Similarly, developing countries' markets are becoming much more 
open to international competition, providing both opportunities and 
dangers for domestic companies. To meet these challenges, 
managers are attempting to position their firms to become more 
competitive. Thus, from the perspectives of both industrialized and 
developing countries' companies, the evolving global market calls 
for change from past competitive practices. 
For this reason, many company managers now attempt to 
complement their firms' strengths through alliances with other 
companies. These alliances, many of which are joint ventures, 
represent a complicated process of identifying one's own strengths 
and weaknesses, setting forth clear strategic directions, and then 
endeavoring to match these directions with those of another 
company. In the cases of interest here, these match-ups involve 
companies from countries with very different income levels. If joint 
ventures tend to be unstable when carried out within a country, as 
they seem to be, then one might anticipate that international 
alliances would be even more fragile. 
There  are  some  reasons  why  the   companies  from  developed 
regions choose to enter into joint venture relationships with local 
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companies in developing countries, instead of going it alone. Among 
the most obvious reasons is the fact that in some countries, 
investment regulations require a link with a local firm. In many 
cases, in fact, the regulations have called for foreign companies to 
limit their participation to minority status. India provides a clear 
example where foreign firms were required to be minority partners 
in a joint venture if they were to invest at all. For foreign 
companies that saw India as a potentially attractive market, 
investment as a minority joint venture partner was the only 
alternative to attempting to import over substantial barriers. 
Subsequently, this restriction has been relaxed, and many foreign 
companies have moved to become at least controlling partners in the 
joint ventures. There are, however, many other motivating factors 
that tempt company managers to seek joint venture partners. 
a.        Cost And Risk Sharing 
Even corporate managers with extensive international 
experience often see developing countries markets as inherently 
more risky than operations elsewhere in the world. These perceived 
risks, of course, are offset by prospects for long-term profit 
opportunities in those wider markets, typically a primary reason for 
investing in the first place. Still, joint ventures provide a 
mechanism   through   which   companies   can   limit   their   financial 
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exposure while at the same time gaining knowledge and experience 
in a new market. 
b. Lack of Country Familiarity 
For a foreign company seeking to deepen its 
understanding of local conditions in a country, a joint venture 
provides one way to shorten, what could be a lengthy and 
potentially expensive process. The lack of knowledge has several 
dimensions for all the participants; a local partner might be 
expected to make a contribution, pertaining to local product markets 
and distribution channel familiarity, knowledge of labor conditions, 
potential problems in managing the local environment, knowledge of 
the legal system, government regulations, and familiarity with local 
customs and conventions. 
c. Lack of Relevant Contacts Within the Government 
and Elsewhere 
Depending   on   the   developing   country,   the   ability   to 
navigate expeditiously through government bureaucracies can be 
critical to an enterprise's success. In the typical case, companies 
from industrialized countries cannot be expected to have any 
facility in such an activity, and they look to joint venture partners 
to provide guidance and expertise. 
d. Existing Facilities 
Local   companies   often   have   existing   production   and 
distribution facilities that can be of use to the joint ventures. Ford 
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in India provides an example, where the company has teamed up 
with Mahindra and Mahindra to produce vehicles and will use an 
existing Mahindra facility for start-up production. Local partners 
can provide a variety of such advantages. Some companies, for 
instance, have been successful in building established and well- 
known brand names, which are sold through already developed 
distribution channels. Without these facilities, a foreign company 
hoping to produce and sell locally would be faced with substantially 
higher costs and, possibly, much greater uncertainty. 
From the developing country side, it should not be 
surprising that the motivations for entering into a joint venture 
agreement are, on the whole, quite different. After all, in 
considering the possibility of a joint venture, company managers 
look for complementary areas with their existing operations. And 
for ways in which the hoped-for partner can provide attributes that 
are missing or are weak at home. One motivation is the desire to 
diversify by the financing of a joint enterprise. There are a number 
of other contributions that motivate developing countries firms to 
form joint ventures. 
e.       Access to Technology 
Technology availability is the single most important 
contribution   by   industrialized   countries   companies   to   the   joint 
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venture.   Because   of   this   attribute   of   the   developed   countries, 
developing countries tend to form joint ventures. 
f.        Access to Management Know-How 
It   is   a   general   feeling   in   developing   countries   that 
management techniques need substantial upgrading.  Joint ventures 
are   seen   as   a   vehicle   for   importing   knowledge   pertaining   to 
organization, strategy formulation, and implementation, marketing, 
manufacturing,  and  other management  functions.  The hope  is  that 
this   knowledge   can   be   learned   and   transferred   to   other   local 
operations. Yet, typical joint ventures in developing countries tend 
to split management functions, with the general manager's position 
more often than not going to a local. The reason for this tendency is 
the cost of maintaining foreign managers abroad, which from a joint 
ventures   point   of view   can   be   seen   as   very   expensive.   Another 
reason   is   that,   there   may   be   much   to   be   learned   from   local 
managers.  It is important that they learn about local customs and 
mores.   Thus,   the   actual   appointment   of joint   venture   managers 
represents a balancing of financial and cultural interests. 
g.       Access to Export Markets 
Joint ventures are often seen by the other partner as a 
convenient vehicle to open export markets. Although this motivation 
does not account for all the motivation of the developing countries, 
it nonetheless accounts for an important part of the motivation as 
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seen in the implication in the importance attached to the foreign 
company's international reputation in the relationship. However, 
many joint ventures are formed explicitly to do business in the local 
market, not in exporting. Only about half of the joint venture 
companies are expected to export more than 20 percent of their 
output. In fact, in many joint venture agreements, exporting has 
been severely restricted, a condition often set by the industrial 
country's partner. 
However, joint ventures tend to have difficulties, first, 
in coming up with a mutually satisfactory agreement and then 
joining together in operations. Operational difficulties can come 
from a wide variety of sources, some predictable at the time of the 
joint venture agreement, others unpredictable. Some of the 
difficulties are as follows. 
h. Problems Related with Multi-Nationality 
One major problem of multi-nationality is the issue of 
export rights. Exporting sometimes represents a fundamental 
difference between industrialized and developing country partners. 
It is an issue difficult to reconcile satisfactorily. For most of the 
joint ventures, the industrialized country-company is a 
multinational corporation with operations and sales in a variety of 
countries. Typically, it will not want to allow the joint venture to be 
free to export products into markets that may already be served from 
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other manufacturing point in the system. The industrialized country- 
company looks upon the joint venture as one piece of a complex 
global web, and it does not allow that single piece to dictate its own 
policies. The rule in such situations is to put strict limitations on 
the rights of the joint venture to export. 
The developing country partner, on the other hand, has 
much different ideas. The expectation is that as new technology is 
brought in and product and process technologies are absorbed by the 
joint venture, exports might provide a natural market for expansion. 
Indeed, increased exports might be a primary reason for the 
developing country to have entered into a joint venture agreement in 
the first place. 
One other issue that causes problems is the tax issue. 
Industrialized country-companies cover tax burdens that it wishes to 
minimize by the optimization process undertaken by the joint 
venture. Such tax minimization strategy can affect relations with the 
joint venture. Particularly when the joint venture either imports 
parts and components from the industrialized country-company or 
exports products through the parent company. The industrialized 
country-company would be very aware of transfer prices between 
joint venture and parent, and may attempt to manipulate the price to 
lower its taxes. For example, if taxes are higher in the joint 
venture's country  of operation than  in the  industrialized  country- 
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company's source country, then there would be a temptation for the 
industrial country-company to raise transfer prices to lower profits 
in the joint venture. 
i. Ownership and Control Problems 
Although the negotiations often provide tense moments 
and the disparate size and interests of the partners can cause 
difficulties, the major problems come over the longer term of the 
joint venture operations. The reasons for such problems are various, 
and the ones that will be explained are those problems that seem to 
arise repetitively among joint ventures. 
The desire of having the operational management of the 
joint venture independent of either partner is one problem that 
arises in negotiating joint venture agreements. When the joint 
venture is not established in a way that will allow for independence, 
one can expect that relationship problems will emerge fairly 
quickly. Often this happens when the industrialized country partner 
desires to limit the joint ventures operations in such a way that 
would make it roughly equivalent to a completely owned subsidiary. 
Unless such an arrangement has been agreed to early on, it will 
cause nearly inevitable problems between the partners later in the 
joint ventures life. 
The other problem is the issue of control. This problem 
is   related   to   ownership   problems,   but   in   some   ways   it   is   quite 
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distinctive. There are a series of difficulties that can occur in 
managing the enterprise. Mentioned here are only a few of those 
problems that happen most in joint ventures. 
Product line disputes are among the more common of 
these problems. These generally arise because of the changes of the 
conditions that existed when the joint venture was formed. Because 
of these changes, the perspectives of one or the other partner 
changes as well. As an example, a major appliance-producing joint 
venture might start out manufacturing small refrigerators and as 
time goes on, sees opportunities in other appliances, such as 
cooking ranges or clothes washers. However, the industrial country 
partner might not agree that beginning such production is within the 
long-range objectives of the joint venture. The industrial country 
partner may wish to limit the joint venture to only a narrow line of 
products. 
Another common source of disagreement is related to the 
sourcing of raw materials, parts, or components. In this case, the 
joint venture agreement can specify in detail that certain materials 
be sourced from the industrialized country partner. Aside from the 
transfer pricing issues that such sourcing raises, the original 
conditions that made the sourcing provision in the agreement seem 
logical can change. Over time and as economic development takes 
place, local sources may become available which would possibly be 
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lower in cost and at least as high in quality. These sources 
obviously would be attractive to the joint venture's management. 
But, the industrialized country partner's view could be different, 
because it could benefit more from retaining the original agreement 
and continuing to produce the materials for the joint venture. 
Similar disagreements take place in technology 
utilization. The joint venture might be contractually obliged to 
obtain all process (or product) technologies from the industrial 
country partner, a condition that probably appeared innocuous at the 
beginning. Yet, as operations continue, other sources of technology 
become available, some of which may be superior to the 
industrialized country's. Clearly, the interests of the industrialized 
country partner in such situations may not be identical to those of 
the joint venture or for that matter, of the developing country 
partner. 
Another technology-related problem sometimes occurs 
when the joint venture management partner believes that the 
industrialized country-company is not providing the joint venture 
with the latest or most appropriate technologies. The industrial 
country partner, of course, may have good reasons from its own 
perspectives for restricting technical information. Still, from the 
joint ventures viewpoint, restricting technologies is equal to 
treating the joint venture as a "poor cousin," and there are always 
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suspicions about the motivations of the action. This is particularly 
true,  when the joint  venture  management  finds  out  that  it  is  not 
receiving the latest data. 
There are also some cultural problems that arise when a 
joint   venture  is  established.   Partly,  the  problems  are   due  to  the 
obvious  fact that the two  (or more) partners  come  from  different 
cultural   backgrounds,   and   individuals   may   see   the   same   set   of 
circumstances in quite different perspectives.  But, there are other 
dimensions    to    this    cultural    gap    that    are    important    as    well. 
Corporations    themselves    have    "cultures"    which    condition   how 
people view their environment and how they interpret issues. This 
factor is one of the primary reasons why joint ventures established 
between   industrial   partners   from   the   same   country   and   even   the 
same industry often run into trouble. 
j.        Problems Related  With  the Dynamic  Changes  in 
the Relationship 
Joint   ventures  are  exposed  to  a  changing  panorama of 
forces that shape and direct outcomes. The changing environment 
within which the joint venture operates also alters the partners' 
relationship in ways which can sometimes cause stresses that are 
difficult, and at times impossible, to resolve. 
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D.  METHODS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The transfer of technology can take on different forms, 
depending on the kind of technological assistance needed. 
Technology can be transferred through four kinds of methods. These 
methods are Employment of Individual Foreign Experts, 
Arrangements for Supply of Machinery, Technology License 
Agreements, and Technological Expertise and Assistance in 
Different Stages of Project Implementation. A combination of two 
or more of these methods is often used, resulting in a transfer of 
composite technology [Ref 14. p.165]. 
1. Employment of Individual Foreign Experts 
This device is used quite often. If a competent individual 
expert can be found, he or she will transfer technology at a 
relatively low cost (nowadays, China's announcement that it will 
launch a spacecraft is. referenced to its use of Russian experts). 
Enterprises in different countries have been acquiring simple and 
unpatented manufacturing techniques and processes by employing an 
individual expert. This method is suitable only for small-scale and 
medium-sized projects in various industries. 
2. Arrangements for Supply of Machinery 
Contracts for the supply of machinery and equipment normally 
provide for the transfer of operational technology pertaining to such 
75 
equipment. This is adequate for manufacturing purposes, not only in 
small-scale projects but in large-scale industries as well. 
3.      Technology License Agreements 
Licensing is basically the transfer of less-than-full rights in 
intellectual property to a third party, to permit the third party to use 
the intellectual property. From a business point of view, you might 
think of intellectual property as real property, like real estate or a 
car. You can buy or sell, lease or rent, or otherwise transfer 
between parties. The rights to use and exploit intellectual property 
can and do move between business entities. Most often, intellectual 
property is transferred through licenses and contracts. 
The issuance of a license provides the licensee with the right 
to use the technology within the negotiated fields of use, and 
protection from infringement by other users if an exclusive license 
is granted. 
Licensing agreements are negotiated between parties and can 
be tailored to meet the needs of both parties. Licensing agreements 
may be exclusive or non-exclusive. 
Non-exclusive licenses are offered so multiple parties can be 
granted the rights to use the same intellectual property. Most 
commercially available software licenses, for example, are granted 
on   a   non-exclusive   basis.   Non-exclusive   licenses   are   generally 
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granted when the technology does not involve a great deal of further 
investment on the part of the licensee. The cost of a non-exclusive 
license is often substantially lower than the cost of an exclusive 
license. 
With an exclusive license, a party is given exclusive access to 
a particular intellectual property. Generally, an exclusive license is 
granted where substantial investment is required on the part of the 
investor to bring the product to market. Exclusivity can be limited 
in a variety of ways, however. Often an exclusive license is granted 
for a particular field of use or geographical area, for a limited 
period of time, or for US. or foreign usage. This allows the licenser 
to provide needed exclusivity to multiple licensees. 
Licensing covers permissions that are granted for the use of 
patents, technology, and trademarks, regardless of whether an equity 
relationship exists between the licensee and licensor. Licensing is 
the most versatile as it offers flexibility in choice and opportunities 
for the source firm and the receiving institution. 
Technology agreements enable a foreign licensor to reap 
substantial returns in the form of fees, royalties, and profits from 
the sales of components and intermediate products. In such cases, 
the developing country should carefully consider the provision of 
the technology agreement to ensure that the acquired technology is 
appropriate to its requirements. 
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Entrepreneurs in developing countries who want to acquire 
foreign technology must approach the foreign manufacturer when 
the manufacturing technology is covered by patents or is held 
confidentially. 
4.     Technological Expertise and Assistance in Different 
Stages of Project Implementation (Turnkey Contracts) 
In turnkey contracts,  one party of the technology transfer is 
responsible for setting up a plant and putting it into operation [Ref 
14. p.131]. Sometimes the recipient country or company wants to 
acquire new technologies by dealing with only one contractor. In 
this case, especially in constructing and implementing a new factory 
in the areas of petro-chemistry or the steel industry, the recipient of 
the new technology wants to deal with only one contractor. 
Turnkey contracts may be easy and useful for receiving 
parties; however, they are not cheap. As a result, most of the 
countries transferring technology have been using technology- 
licensing agreements to save money, which is already a constraint 
for them. 
E.       ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
There   are   many   arguments   in   both   developed   and   other 
countries  regarding  the  benefits  and  liabilities  of the  technology 
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transfer. One basic argument is that the transfer of technology is 
beneficial for both of the parties involved. However, there are some 
benefits and liabilities that should be considered while conducting a 
technology transfer. 
One benefit of the technology transfer is to prolong the life 
cycle of products that are becoming obsolete in the countries 
transferring the technology. Moreover, companies in countries 
transferring technology find new, growing markets. Additionally, 
companies in technology transferring countries can exploit the low 
wage rates in the less developed recipient countries. 
However, one can argue that national interests in the recipient 
countries should be protected, so the transfer of technology should 
be restricted. Their.claim is that in the long term, the technology 
transfer's effect is negative rather than positive. The technology 
transfer towards the recipient countries may damage domestic 
industries and cause unemployment. Moreover, the technology 
transfer causes the recipient countries to be dependent on the 
countries transferring the technology. 
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IV. TRANSFER OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 
Most of the military technology transfer takes place between 
the developed and developing countries. In these transactions, the 
nature of the military technology transfer causes the technology- 
transferring party to be generally a developing country. Because of 
the nature of this military technology transfer, this chapter, will 
discuss the transfer of military technology from developed towards 
developing countries. 
A.      THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE MILITARY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Deger [Ref 19. p.142-179] has introduced a.theoretical model 
to explain the military technology transfer for developing countries. 
In Figure 4.1, there is a military technology where the output 
of arms (D) is produced by two factors: capital (K) and labor (L). It 
is assumed that prior to technical change there is a high possibility 
of substitution between K and L. Therefore, a widely different range 
of capital-labor ratios can produce D. The usual shaped isoquant AB 
in Figure 3 represents current technology. 
If the technology is freely available, then a developed country 
with higher capital endowments will choose to produce output at Ed 
with the slope of CD. The factors will be Kd and Ld. However, an 
undeveloped country would choose to produce at point Eu.  It has 
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less   capital   and   cheaper   labor  than   the   developed   country.   Now 
undeveloped countries would use Ku and Lu. 
Given the  sophistication  and  the  costs  of military  research, 
most    of   the   technological   progress    takes    place    in   developed 
countries.   Therefore,   when   technology   is   induced   in   developed 
countries,   they   work   to   move   it   out   to   the   production   frontier 
around the point at which they are currently located. In the model, 
there   would   be   no   possibility   of   substitution   between   factors. 
Innovations come from the economies where the wage rates are high. 
Therefore, it is expected that the summit of the isoquant be at point 
Eu, which is the most efficient point. Thus, the technology would be 
useful for the country having low labor but high capital.  The total 
effect of developed country-induced innovation and the shrinking of 
the substitution possibility gives a new isoquant of the type GEdH 
[Ref   19.   p.178].   It   is   obvious   that   this   new   technology   is   not 
appropriate for developing countries. 
In order to use technology most efficiently, a developing 
country would either discard labor (therefore create unemployment) 
or at Lu, increase capital to reach the optimum point of the 
isoquants. Clearly, inappropriate technology is the nuisance of 
developing countries. This is especially true in military technology 
where technical progress is faster. 
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It may be optimal for developing countries to choose the most 
efficient technology from a purely efficient point of view. However, 
increasing expenditures in new technologies might cause the 
increasing obsolescence of the military technology, therefore 
causing the costs to increase and at the same time, the 
macroeconomic costs should be considered. As a result, the military 
technology transfer may have beneficial effects, although the costs 
will be high. 
K 
F     L 
Figure IV-1: Theoretical Model of Military Technology 
Transfer 
Source: Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure in Third World 
Countries: The Economic Effects 
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B.      REASONS FOR MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
There  are  three  reasons  why  a  developing  country  wants  to 
transfer military technology. These are: 
■ The Desire of Domestic Arms Production 
■ Economic Factors 
■ Technological Characteristics of the Arms Production 
1.        The Desire of Domestic Arms Production 
Developing countries account for a significant part of the 
world's conventional weapons market in international trade. Most of 
the developing countries order and buy billions of dollars worth of 
ammunition and weapon systems from arms producers. These 
weapons systems include tanks, self-propelled cannons, armored 
personnel carriers, combat aircraft, and surface-to1 air missiles. 
Although these arms transfers from developed countries to 
developing countries result in an important transfer of military 
technology in the form of hardware, there is a decline in these types 
of purchases. The reason for this decline is the desire to produce 
arms domestically in the developing countries. 
This desire to produce arms and weapons domestically leads to 
an increase in the annual value of the production of weapon systems 
in the developing countries. However, most developing countries 
continue to rely on the developed countries' sophisticated military 
systems, due to the lack of domestic manufacturing capabilities. In 
the end, developing countries have generally become relatively self- 
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sufficient only in small arms and ammunition [Ref 20. p.1267]. As a 
result of this situation there is a shift from direct arms sales to 
military technology transfer such as blueprints and technical 
information to produce arms in the name of self-sufficiency. It is 
not totally possible to achieve self-sufficiency in arms production in 
developing countries given the fact that these countries need capital 
and technical efficiency that they do not have for production. 
Domestic arms production is motivated by several factors; 
among the most noted is the desire to reduce the dependency on 
foreign arms suppliers. This fact has been especially seen for 
Turkey since the Cyprus Peace Intervention. The intervention there 
had been sanctions against Turkey by arms-supplying countries. The 
result has been increased efforts to establish a domestic defense 
industry that will be self-sufficient for Turkey. 
Despite the efforts made by developing countries to build their 
own defense industry and to be self-sufficient in domestic arms 
production, they lack the important parts of military technology 
such as blueprints, specialized machinery, and parts from developed 
countries in military technology. 
2.        Economic Factors 
One other motive for military technology transfer is the 
benefit of self-production that will affect the economies of the 
developing countries. 
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Investing and creating technologically advanced weapons in 
developing countries could help develop the national infrastructure 
that will help civilian sectors. Building a national infrastructure and 
producing weapons helps developing countries to compete in the 
international markets for arms sales. The South African Republic, 
after the 1980s, Turkey, after the 1990s, and especially Israel, after 
the 1970s are vivid examples for this type of competition. 
Moreover, investing in new technologies and developing an 
arms production sector to help developing countries reach their 
macroeconomic goals by increasing employment and causing them to 
evolve new helping side-sectors in civilian markets for military 
arms production. 
3.      Technological Characteristics of Arms Production 
Developing countries that are in the process of establishing 
arms-producing centers, feel the need for transferring military 
technology from developed countries. These establishments have 
certain characteristics [Ref 21. p.218]: 
■ Steadily increasing military R&D results in more complex 
weapon systems, 
■ A rising rate of weapon innovation leads to rapid 
technological obsolescence, 
■ Increasing complexity of weapon systems reduces the 
probability of copying and allows for effective control of 
the technology by the producer. 
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C.       SOURCES OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 
There are a small number of countries dominating the sale of 
military technology for major and sophisticated weapon systems. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, 
Israel and South Africa account for almost 90 percent of the 
military technology sold to developing countries in 1997 [Ref 11. p. 
11]. 
Licensed production is the clearest evidence of military 
technology transfer. With respect to the number of production 
licenses granted, The USA is the most diversified supplier. The 
main recipients of the USA military technology are South Korea and 
Taiwan. 
Most licenses are for aircraft production technology. The USA 
and France dominate this segment of military technology sales. 
D.      THE VINTAGE OF TRANSFERRED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 
There is a time lag between military design and military 
production. This time lag can be a relatively good measure of the 
technological level of the arms production process in developing 
countries. One measure that can be used instead of the time lag is 
the vintage of the technology being used [Ref 23. p.23]. 
Transferred technologies may be from different vintages and 
newer and obsolete technologies may be used side by side. Under 
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license agreements. This vintage gap neither increases, nor 
decreases. However, there may be differences if technological 
sophistication differs between types of technologies. If simple 
military technologies are under consideration, the vintage gap may 
be very short. However, if the complexity of the technology 
increases, vintage gap also increases. 
If the strategic efficiency is under consideration while 
deciding the sophistication of the military technology, the transfer 
of highly complex technologies may be optimal for developing 
countries. However, these technology-transferring countries should 
take into account the high cost of sophisticated and newer 
technologies. 
E.      MEASURES RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF MILITARY 
TECHNOLOGY 
There  are  a number  of control   measures  for the  transfer  of 
international arms and military technology. These control measures 
can be divided into three categories such as unilateral, bilateral, and 
multilateral [Ref 24. p.91-92]. 
1.        Unilateral Measures 
Unilateral measures occur only when there is a monopoly in 
arms sales in the international market. These measures are one 
country's (monopoly on arms sales) restriction and slowing down 
arms sales and aid for foreign countries. 
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Unilateral export controls are done by unilateral export 
restraints for restricting arms sales to foreign countries. Import 
controls are done by unilateral decisions to restrict imports from 
other countries. 
2. Bilateral Measures 
If there are two suppliers of any type of arms in the 
international market and these suppliers decide to control the 
weapon sales they export, then there is a bilateral measure to 
control arms sales. There may be a bilateral agreement between 
these two countries to control the export and import of the arms 
trade. These kinds of control measures are more effective, if these 
two countries account for a substantial amount of arms trade in any 
kind of weapons market. 
3. Multilateral Measures 
Multilateral measures are two kinds. Governments carry out 
one kind, and the other kind is carried out by international 
organizations. 
The measures are the same however, either the governments or 
the international organizations may decide to impose these measures 
on arms sales. For example, multilateral restrictions may apply 
through regional agreements to restrict or abolish the outflow of 
arms out of the region [Ref 24. p. 92]. 
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F.      STRATEGIES FOR MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
There are two major strategies for the transfer of military 
technology: Path strategy and engineering strategy [Ref 22. p.3-4]. 
1.        Path Strategy 
In this strategy, military technology transfer passes through 
six suggested steps. These are the learning steps that can be 
considered in the transfer of military technology. Countries may be 
at different steps depending on their usage of technology. For 
example, Turkey is more dependent on foreign technology for 
fighter-bomber production than on shipbuilding. The steps that can 
be considered are: 
■ Maintenance and repair of transferred systems, 
■ Assembly of subsystems from imported components, 
■ Final production of the weapon systems and production of 
basic components, 
■ Production using imported design, 
■ The capability to design weapon systems domestically, 
■ Production based on local research and the design of new 
systems. 
a.        Maintenance and Repair of Transferred Systems 
In this step, recipient countries develop their 
maintenance capabilities about technologies they transfer from other 
countries. These countries must learn how to fix, maintain, and 
rebuild the foreign equipment. Civilian sectors can be helpful by 
transferring this type of information.  Otherwise, foreign suppliers 
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may provide these skills either to develop them domestically or to 
control the technologies they export. 
b. Assembly       of      Subsystems       From      Imported 
Components 
In    this    step,    technology-transferring    countries    can 
assemble subsystems that they import from other countries. These 
countries have the capability of assembling manufactured parts 
imported from major suppliers. Licensed assembly in military 
production is dependent upon foreign design and foreign parts. 
c. Final   Production   of   the   Weapon   Systems   and 
Production of Basic Components 
The recipient country can provide final assembly of the 
weapon systems as well as the production of basic components of a 
weapon system designed by a foreign supplier. In this step, the 
recipient country needs foreign assistance for the establishment of 
organizations and facilities needed to assemble or produce. 
d. Production Using Imported Design 
Domestic arms production starts in this step by using the 
imported weapon designs from supplier countries. Recipient 
countries can produce weapon systems by using the reverse 
engineering process of foreign weapons. Technology-transferring 
countries can develop engineering abilities to modify the technology 
designed by a supplier. With the help of the developed engineering 
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ability,    production    knowledge,    and    foreign    design    assistance, 
technology transferring countries can produce weapon systems. 
e.        The     Capability     to     Design     Weapon     Systems 
Domestically 
In this step, it is assumed that the technology- 
transferring countries have the knowledge and the ability to produce 
major components of a weapons system. There is minimal 
dependence on foreign suppliers for design, organizational 
knowledge, technical skills, and components of the weapon system. 
However, the recipient countries need critical technical and 
organizational skills for the weapons system to be fully assembled. 
/. Production Based on Local Research  and Design 
of New Systems 
Technology-transferring  countries  can not  only  design, 
but manufacture weapon systems using domestic components and 
resources. In this stage, the true self-dependency in arms production 
can be viewed. For recipients of technology transfer, this may be 
the ultimate goal of the military technology transfer process. 
2.        Engineering Strategy 
There is a dominant view in military technology-transferring 
countries that they should be self-sufficient at the end of the 
technology transfer process of military equipment. However, there 
92 
are reasons that may undermine the path strategy, especially with 
respect to the last steps [Ref 25. p.283]. 
First, development in military technology is so fast that 
keeping up with the changes through research and development 
efforts is a heavy burden, even for many developed countries. This 
high rate of change in military technology leads to the technological 
obsolescence in military products. Technological obsolescence 
requires the countries to make frequent improvements in their 
military technology and equipment in order to compete with the 
other countries in deterrence. As a result, the problem of import 
substitution occurs. 
Increase in the sophistication of the imported know-how and 
materials cause an increased dependence on the exporting country. 
Efforts trying to decrease this dependency lead to an increase in the 
costs of arms production. 
Secondly, the goal of self-sufficiency in arms production has 
lost its allure during the past forty years. This situation is also true 
for most of the developed, military technology exporting countries. 
With the help of developing information technology and the 
globalization of economies there is a highly competitive market for 
all goods including military weapons. As a result, being dependent 
from one aspect to another is unavoidable for most of the countries. 
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Therefore, after applying path strategy to create an industrial 
and technological base, a developing country may replace the path 
strategy with engineering strategy. There are two types of 
engineering strategy: add-on engineering and add-up engineering. 
Add-on engineering refers to the adaptation of an existing 
weapons system to specific needs by changing components, adding 
features, or taking them away, while trying to incorporate as many 
domestic parts as possible [Ref 26. p.206]. It is an updating, and 
improving of existing military technologies. 
There are some examples with this kind of engineering 
strategy. The South African Republic produced the Eland armored 
cars by improving and upgrading the French AML vehicles. 
Moreover, Israel's combat aircraft Kfir and Nesher are a result of 
the use of this strategy with the help of the French Mirage 
blueprints. 
The other engineering strategy is add-up engineering. It is 
more demanding in terms of technical know-how and previous 
production experience. The idea behind this strategy is to increase 
the sources of supply from throughout the world and to integrate the 
imported components into new and well-functioning weapon systems 
[Ref 26. p.284]. 
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G.     CHANNELS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
In   the   literature   about   military   technology   transfer,   the 
channels of technology transfer have been classified according to 
different criteria. For the purpose of this study, we have classified 
them according to the degree of participation of the recipient 
country in the transfer process. We take into account the existence 
of a continuous relationship over time, involving a certain level of 
division of labor and risk sharing between the supplier and the 
recipient countries. According to this criteria, military technology 
transfer channels can be classified under five categories. 
- Offsets 
■ Licensed production agreements 
■ Co-production agreements 
■ Joint venture agreements 
■ Foreign design assistance 
Other channels of military technology transfer will not be 
separately discussed here. There are three reasons for this decision: 
first, channels such as training, education, and consulting are 
included under the headings of the channels that will be discussed. 
Secondly, as a result of economic considerations, military 
assistance programs are no longer as important as transfer channels 
of military technology. 
Although military technology transfer has beneficial effects, 
the   costs   are   extremely  high.   In  order  to   lessen  the   outflow  of 
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foreign currency required, some arrangements have to be made. The 
term "offset" is used, in this study, as a generic word to refer to all 
compensatory   arrangements   practiced   in   the   transfer   of  military 
technology   [Ref   27.   p.130-135].   Therefore,   each   of   the   above 
mentioned channels may be thought of as a direct offset. Moreover, 
these     mechanisms     are    not    mutually    exclusive    and    military 
technology transfer agreements may incorporate elements from each 
of   them.   In   fact   in   literature   the   terms   offset,   co-production, 
licensed production, joint venture, and foreign assistance are used 
interchangeably   [Ref   28.   p.183-185].   For   instance,   the   Turkish 
offset   agreement   with   General   Dynamics   was   a  joint   venture   in 
nature, but it constituted the co-production of the F-16 C/D combat 
aircraft. 
While licensed production, co-production, joint venture and 
foreign design assistance agreements, explicitly detail the 
transferring of military technology to the recipient country, other 
major offset types, subcontracting and counter-trade may not. The 
latter two are less likely to encourage the technological 
advancement of the recipient country. Therefore, in this study only 
the former four types of offsets are discussed as channels of 
military technology transfer. 
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1.       Offsets 
Offsets are commercial transactions in which the buyer 
demands, as a condition of the sale, that the seller compensate the 
buyer through a variety of non-monetary means [Ref 29. p.175]. 
According to the US Department of Defense, the first military 
offset program authorized the co-production of the F-104 aircraft 
and HAWK air defense system in Europe. Over time, the demand for 
military offsets that began in the developed countries such as 
NATO, Japan, Australia, and Switzerland spread to the developing 
nations, Korea, Israel, Taiwan, Singapore, India, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Argentina, Philippines, Brazil, and Turkey [Ref 30. p.21]. 
The existence of military offset programs stems from the 
inelastic demand for military hardware among governments, and the 
need to purchase equipment abroad, with the high prices of these 
goods [Ref 30. p.21 ]. In order to maintain and exercise their 
sovereignty, governments felt the need to have a standing military 
force that is prepared to defend the integrity of its borders. 
Most developing countries do not have economies large 
enough to support each country's arms industry needed to satisfy the 
demand for defense. Therefore, offsets are used for the targeted 
development of the military industry and the enhancement of 
domestic capabilities by the purchasing countries that are facing 
exchange earnings. 
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Offsets may include [Ref 27.   p. 132]: 
■ The transfer of military technology 
■ Subcontracting in the purchasing country for components 
and parts for the weapon 
■ The authority to market the weapon on behalf of the 
supplier 
■ Repair and maintenance contracts for weapons and imports 
of other industrial goods from the recipient by the 
supplying country. 
In offset arrangements, the offset is customarily split into two 
groups, direct and indirect. Direct offsets are those which are 
directly related to the product purchased such as its components. On 
the other hand, indirect offsets are contractual arrangements that 
involve goods and services unrelated to the exports referenced in 
the sales agreement [Ref 28. p. 185]. 
The sale of F-16 C/D fighters to Turkey has presented a 
classic case study in the way offsets work and the advantages to 
each party. The Turkish F-16s would be produced in part by a 
jointly owned aircraft manufacturing plant built in Turkey by a 
Turkish aerospace firm and by General Dynamics. It initially co- 
produced 124 General Dynamics F-16 combat aircraft. The total 
value of the project was $4.2 billion, $3 billion was provided by 
FMS credit and the balance by the Turkish government. 
The direct offset commitment included the establishment of a 
joint venture manufacturing plant to assemble the F-16 and to 
produce   its   components.   General   Dynamics   and   its   major   sub- 
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contractor, General Electric, were to aid the capitalization of the 
plant by the provision of 49% of the funds required, worth $34 
million. As a part of this agreement, General Dynamics undertook to 
export any excess component production from the Turkish plant [Ref 
31. p. 3-7]. 
This is an example of a direct offset, similar to arrangements 
made between the U.S. and European firms in NATO for a number of 
years during the 1980s and the 1990s. The aircraft or important sub- 
systems of it were jointly manufactured in the buyer's country to 
help offset the cost of the purchase by providing employment, 
technology transfer, and investment in new plants and equipment. 
Thus, Turkey would literally acquire an aircraft industry in addition 
to some extent of technology. 
The other aspect of the agreement was the indirect offset 
commitment agreed to by General Dynamics, of $1.27 billion. This 
would be achieved within 10 years. Otherwise the company would 
have to pay-a 1.5 % non-fulfillment penalty [Ref 32. p.169]. 
The indirect offset commitment was split into two categories. 
Group 1, which included capital investment, joint ventures, and 
technology transfer, was to account for 10% of the total. Group 2, 
which included the purchase for export of Turkish goods and 
services accounted for 90% of the commitment. 
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General  Dynamics  was  responsible  for marketing  a  complex 
list   of  Turkish   products   including   tourism,   power   projects,   and 
marble. Wasting efforts and resources on a low cost venture would 
not   significantly   reduce   the   offset   commitments.   Thus,   General 
Dynamics   is   in  the   business   of economic   development.   It  plans, 
designs, develops, and finances a product, industry,  or real estate 
development   that   provides   Turkey   with   the   cash  to   pay   General 
Dynamics for its product.  The multiplier effect on both the seller 
and the buyer are of great potential. This effect creates a situation 
in   which   the   ideas,   technology,   and   marketing   skills   of  a   U.S. 
defense contractor are placed at the service of a developing country 
that  has  little   of these   and   in  many   cases  neither  the  means  nor 
influence to obtain them readily. The result may be an unexpected 
arrangement of mutual advantage. 
For the purchasing country offset arrangements bring 
important benefits; they lessen the outflow of foreign currency, 
maintain or create domestic employment, lead to the acquisition of 
modern technology, create service capability for high technology 
equipment, and assist in local economic development. It is clear that 
it serves the interests of the supplier country by creating a healthy 
inter-dependence on its weaponry, increasing its exports and 
promoting ties between the supplier and the purchasing countries 
[Ref 33. p. 10]. 
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2.       Licensed Production 
A license is commonly used to describe situations, where the 
owner of a certain statutory right in technology, grants permission 
to another party to exercise some of those exclusive rights held by 
the owner of the technology [Ref 34. p.28]. 
Licensing agreements generally include a series of provisions 
regulating the rights of the recipient with regard to the use of the 
technology [Ref 35. p.30]. The oldest method of international 
production of weapon systems that were developed in another 
country is the bilateral licensing agreement [Ref 36. p. 4-14]. 
Moreover, these agreements have become very common in the 
international transfer of military technology, both among developed 
countries and between developed and developing countries. A highly 
competitive arms market has stimulated these agreements, because 
many arms receivers usually prefer license purchases as a channel of 
the military technology transfer [Ref 37. p.15]. 
The United States is the primary distributor of military 
technology by using licensed production. While the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia actively provide licenses to 
developing nations, they do not do so at a level equal to the United 
States. 
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The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia are the 
remaining basic suppliers for different major weapon systems to 
different developing recipients using licensed production. 
There are some suppliers of licenses to developing countries, 
of which the suppliers themselves are often categorized as 
developing nations. Brazil, Israel, and China are categorized as 
developing nations themselves supplying arms systems by using 
licensed production. 
Quite instructive is the competition among suppliers. While 
the U.S.A. is again the primary supplier of production licenses, it 
should be noted that eight nations having the same technology 
provide similar licenses. Significant competition exists among 
armored personnel carriers, fast attack craft, transport aircraft, 
helicopters, frigates, submarines and anti-tank missiles. In short, we 
can say that there are basically three types of military technology 
suppliers competing in the developing countries: 
■ The major suppliers include the United States of America, 
Great Britain, France, and Germany, and Russia 
■ Second type of competitors include Italy,  Switzerland and 
Israel 
■ Austria,    Spain,    Brazil,    China    and    Sweden    are    minor 
suppliers of military technology. 
There are different numbers of licenses for various equipment 
categories held by developing world nations. Developing countries 
most  commonly  produce  the  aircraft  systems  under  license.   Then 
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■ come the agreements to produce helicopters, fighters, and trainer 
agreements, transport aircraft agreements, light plane agreements, 
and counter-insurgency aircraft agreements. 
Sea equipment, ground equipment systems, and radar systems 
are produced under license among the developing nations. 
The United States licenses have been granted mainly for 
aircraft and sea weapon systems. The French military industry has 
been mainly involved in helicopters and guided missiles. The British 
and Germans have been particularly active in shipyards. 
In the last one-and-one-half decades, licensed production has 
expanded the Turkish Defense Industry's role in the production of 
the F-16 aircraft, frigates, submarines, G-3, MG-3 infantry weapons, 
ammunition, missiles, and artillery. 
All of the above data signals the growing phenomenon of the 
transfer of military technology to the developing countries through 
the instrument of licenses. 
3.       Co-production 
Co-production may be defined as any program where a 
government enables an eligible foreign government, international 
organization, or designated commercial producer to acquire the 
know-how to manufacture, assemble, repair, maintain and operate, 
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in whole or in part, a specific weapon, communication or support 
system, or an individual military item. 
The more sophisticated the weapons system is, the higher the 
share of foreign parts and know-how. Multilateral and bilateral co- 
production forms are arranged either vertically or horizontally [Ref 
38. p. 139]. 
Vertical co-production means that the industry of the 
purchasing country not only produces components for the particular 
weapon system bought by the country, but also produces those 
components for all the systems, which are constructed abroad. These 
components can be totally or partially indigenous. 
Horizontal co-production in turn contains only the production 
of components for those weapons acquired by the country. It i.s self- 
evident that vertical co-production is more profitable to the 
producer of the components than horizontal, because in the vertical 
arrangement, the factors reducing unit costs are more visible-. From 
the standpoint of the seller, the vertical version would be more 
useful since the cost reduction is beneficial to him. The economic 
factor may be the main explanation of the fact that vertical co- 
production projects have been recently on the increase. 
There are especially aircraft manufacturers that seem to be 
most internationalized both in terms of exports, direct investments 
and   co-production   patterns.   There   are   more   joint   projects   with 
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governments    and    manufacturers    from    developed    rather    than 
developing countries. 
4.       Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures can be defined as the development and 
manufacturing of military system involving more than one military- 
industrial firm and a significant level of inter-firm cooperation in 
the areas of research, design, production, and marketing as well as 
significant contributions by all partners to develop funds and risk 
capital [Ref 39. p.3]. 
An increasing number of new investments have been joint 
ventures involving ownership between local and foreign partners. 
There are various factors contributing to the growth of-joint 
ventures as a transfer channel of military technology. Developing 
countries may pass legislation either prohibiting total foreign 
ownership or making incentives conditional upon certain degrees of 
local ownership. On the other hand, technology suppliers have 
become increasingly aware of the benefits of sharing ownership with 
local partners. These include land, capital, trained personnel, and 
familiarity with local markets [Ref 14. p. 127]. 
The two types of joint ventures are equity and contractual [Ref 
35. p.18-24]. 
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Legislation of the recipient countries encourages the 
formation of equity joint ventures on the basis of requirements 
related to the share of equity in local hands and its effects on the 
decision-making system of the enterprise. 
In general the participation share of the local party in joint 
ventures is at least 15 percent. In the Turkish joint venture example, 
the Turkish Aerospace Industry, Inc (TUSAS) holds 15 percent of 
capitalization as a participation share. The foreign partner, General 
Dynamics with its major subcontractor General Electric is to aid the 
capitalization of the plant by the provision of 49 percent of the 
funds required. 
Equity joint ventures normally imply the combined transfer of 
other resources of the foreign enterprises, such as capital and 
management, so that they cannot be considered as a specific 
mechanism exclusively for technology transfer. 
However, equity joint ventures have an important incidence on 
the way and conditions in which technology can be transferred from 
abroad. The main implications concern [Ref 35. p.19]: 
■ The strategies of technology suppliers--i.e., international 
corporations and other firms in comparison with the supply 
of technology through this mechanism, 
■ The procedures of technology transfer, 
■ The capacity of the military-industrial firm to ensure an 
effective transfer. 
The other type of joint venture is contractual. The transfer of 
technology could be the central basic objective of these contracts or 
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just an aspect of a more complex arrangement. But the essential 
characteristic of contractual joint ventures is that there is a 
complete transfer of the resource and the equity ownership of the 
foreign supplier of the technology. The foreign suppliers are 
granted rights for only a specified time. In this sense they appear in 
principle to be a more contractual way of technology transfer than 
the equity-based arrangements [Ref 35. p.23]. 
5.       Foreign Design Assistance 
Foreign  design  assistance  has  become  an  important  type  of 
technology transfer. 
The supplier country transfers information that may be 
classified and thus difficult to obtain for designing an indigenous 
weapons system. 
These alternative channels of military technology transfer are 
not clearly differentiated and thus often overlap. In this sense there 
are two main points to be considered in the selection of the channel 
[Ref 35. p.36]. First, generally the terms and conditions negotiated 
within each form are more important than the forms as such. 
Second, the correct choice of the channel depends on the type of 
weapons project, internal capacity of the recipient military- 
industrial firm, and a constellation of external factors, ranging from 
legislation to external finance. 
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From the efficiency point of view it is generally assumed that 
joint ventures are better than other transfer channels. The first 
reason is that the technology supplier, who shares the risks and 
profits of the project will be directly interested in the success of the 
enterprise. The second reason is that there is a continuous 
association in responsibility and division of labor between the 
partners [Ref 35.   p.21]. 
Throughout the network of licenses, co-production, joint 
ventures and foreign design assistance agreements, today's military 
technology receiver becomes a producer. 
H.     THE RESULTS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The  transfer  of military  technology  to  developing  countries 
affects the military and the civilian sectors. Moreover, the transfer 
has benefits and drawbacks to both supplier and receiving countries. 
1.       The Effects on the Civilian Sector of the Society 
The   military   technology   transfer   process   begins   when   the 
policy makers of a developing country decide on the basis of their 
available   resources,   security,   and   development   goals   to   obtain 
military   technology   from   abroad.    After   negotiations   with   the 
supplier country are  complete  and the  requirements  of the  buyer 
country   established,   the   formal   transfer   of  military   technology 
begins.   Before   receiving   the   military   technology,   the   military 
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derives benefits from this transfer such as increased technical, 
management, and language training; perhaps higher morale, travel 
abroad; and a larger budget outlay. 
However,   as   the   military   technology   begins   to   arrive   the 
picture becomes more complicated. Negative spin-offs affect some 
parts of the society although this can vary with the amount and type 
of military technology  received.  For example,  increased  military 
demand may create  a drain on already  scarce  human  and natural 
resources,   overload   insufficient   communications   networks,   and 
infrastructure  facilities.   On the  other hand,  some  civilian  sectors 
may    derive    many    unanticipated    benefits    from    these    military 
activities.       The       housing,       communications,       transportation, 
educational, and health sectors are often the first to be mobilized to 
meet military requests associated with imported military technology. 
Bases   must   be   built   to   store,   operate,   and   maintain   new 
weapons.  Housing,   roads,  railroads,  parts,  telephones,  electricity, 
water supplies, schools, and hospitals must be established to serve 
them.  In turn these  bases, often located in remote regions of the 
country,   stimulate   the  growth  of satellite   cities,   which  leads  to 
further change. 
The industrial sector also becomes involved. A larger, better- 
educated military creates a larger, more sophisticated domestic 
market. In addition, more food, uniforms, medicines, supplies, and 
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technical equipment (ranging from batteries to buses) must be 
purchased by the military from the civilian economy. In this way, 
not only profits but also large amounts of technical and management 
know-how, are transferred into the civilian sector. Thus, local 
manufacturers gear up their production lines for a bigger market and 
are encouraged to produce a better product. 
As the capabilities of the country increase, feedback from the 
civilian sector influences arms-procurement policies. Security and 
development goals change as the country grows. Competing pressure 
groups vie for foreign-exchange resources, domestic industries, and 
educational institutions provide more of the needed resources so 
that foreign military equipment and training becomes less necessary 
and the circle is complete [Ref 40. p.236]. 
2.       The Effects on the Armed Forces 
It is becoming increasingly evident that military technology is 
a powerful factor in shaping military doctrine. Military technologies 
and doctrine mutually reinforce each other within a political 
environment [Ref 38. p.254]. 
When developing countries transfer military technology at the 
same time, they acquire specific modes of organization and military 
doctrine from the developed countries. 
110 
This is not necessarily bad; however, it cannot help but 
confuse military planning and raise questions about operational 
effectiveness. Possession of a new technology is not equivalent to 
the possession of a new military capability. This technology must be 
incorporated into the existing military structure. If it cannot, then 
the structure must be changed (which could entail considerable 
disruption) or the technology should be abandoned [Ref 41. p.41- 
42]. 
As a result of military technology transfer, mainly the 
structure of the armed forces of a country should change towards a 
professional organization in order to use the technological 
development efficiently. 
3.       Advantages and Disadvantages of Military Technology 
Transfer: 
Military technology transfer has both benefits and drawbacks 
for recipient countries as well as supplier countries. 
a.       For the Recipient Country 
Through the technology transfer process, the recipient 
country acquires the necessary military technology, which has been 
proven technically without an unacceptably high degree of risk on a 
fast timetable. Moreover, the recipient country can supplement its 
own development programs, and acquire spare parts and components 
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easily.   However,   there   are  possible   disadvantages   in  becoming   a 
recipient of military technology [Ref 34. p. 8]: 
■ The recipient could become locked into a particular 
technology, 
■ The recipient may assume the obligation to purchase 
tied-in products, such as spare parts and associated 
elements while utilizing technology, 
■ The recipient can be forced to accept restrictions in 
its marketing and policies relating to the licensed 
military technology, such as restrictions on export. 
b.       For the Supplier Country 
There   are   several   benefits   to   suppliers   of   military 
technology [Ref 42. p.31]. These include: 
■ Maintaining reasonable, friendly relations with 
recipient nations, 
■ Retaining a share of the market in recipient countries, 
■ Decreasing the balance-of-payment deficits, 
■ Establishing the recipient country as a market for 
both the supplier's spare parts and maintenance 
services for the transferred technology and, finally, 
■ Permitting the supplier to acquire a part-interest in 
the recipient company in return for supplying the 
technology, such as in a joint venture. 
On the other hand, the recipient country could become a 
competitor and threaten the lead of the supplier's technology. 
Therefore, the supplier may choose, not to supply its military 
technology. Moreover, the supplier country has the concern that the 
technology supplied to unstable regimes may someday fall into the 
hands of hostile forces. Finally, the growing arms production in the 
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developing countries will reduce the supplier's control over some of 
its more ambitious and independent-minded clients. 
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V. TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL BASE 
A.      REASONS FOR A TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Despite the fact that Turkish Armed Forces (TAFs) is the 
second largest armed forces in NATO, Turkey failed to build up a 
self-sufficient defense industry that can provide its armed forces 
with major defense systems. This led the country to heavily rely on 
its allies in NATO, mostly on U.S. 
Reduced military support from the allied countries due to 
different disputes with Ankara and lessons learned from the 
embargoes against Turkey, especially the US embargo after 
country's peace operation in Cyprus in 1974, urged the country to 
develop its defense industry. 
Caught at the intersection of three points of regional 
instability formed by Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, 
Turkey strongly feels the need to maintain its own defense capacity 
and expand its national defense industry to support the armed 
forces. 
Military sources have indicated that USD 150 billion will be 
needed for the next 25 years to fund the modernization program of 
the Turkish Armed Forces, which has a total approximate size of 
566,600 personnel, divided between the Army (450,000), the Navy 
(51,600) and the Air Force (65,000).[Ref 43 p.18] As a percentage 
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of  GNP   (approximately   4   percent)   and   the   Consolidated   Budget 
(approximately 15 percent), Turkish defense spending is one of the 
highest in NATO and, also on a worldwide scale. However, Turkey 
obtains 79 percent of its defense equipment through imports, with 
only   21   percent   produced   by   domestic   industries.   The   level   of 
domestic production is very low considering the size of the armed 
forces   and   the   level   of   defense   expenditures.   Majority   of  the 
domestic production projects involve the transfer of technology and 
production of at least partial units in Turkey. 
In a quest to reach at a high level of self-sufficiency in 
supplying its armed forces with state-of-the-art technology, Turkey 
recently has accelerated efforts to ready itself for the 21st century 
by setting up effective and productive defense industry projects 
with maximum local input. Emphasis has shifted from direct 
procurement to co-production of weapon systems, thereby 
developing a sustainable defense industrial base. 
To gain access to first-rate technology that other countries 
are reluctant to export without restriction (e.g., electronic warfare 
equipment, sensors, encryption equipment, etc.), both military and 
governmental authorities believe it is necessary to build up and 
maintain capability in the restricted technologies. Such efforts are 
expected to prevent it from lagging behind in the 21st century's 
rapidly growing defense sector. 
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B.       EVOLUTION OF TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Turkish defense industry activities have a history dating back 
to the years when the Ottoman Empire was founded. In this era, 
during the reign of Conqueror Sultan Mehmet, a foundry (Tophane-i 
Humayun (Imperial Arsenal)) was built to cast cannon, along with 
the first shipbuilding facility in Istanbul. In spite of the incremental 
developments in production of weapons, the defense industrial 
capacity lagged behind developments in Europe during the final 
periods of the Empire. 
The new republic inherited a very weak infrastructure from the 
Ottomans. Grasping the importance of a domestic defense industry 
in support of the armed forces, new steps were taken to create a 
local production capacity. Shortly after the establishment of the-new 
state, the Golcuk shipyard commenced naval shipbuilding.In 1926 
Tayyare ve Motor Turk A.S. (Airplane and Engine Turkish Inc.) was 
established through an agreement between the Turkish government 
and Junkers. This company produced 112 aircraft of different types 
over a 15-year period. In 1943, the Turkkusu Aicraft Factory was 
founded to manufacture airplane and glider fuselages, some of 
which in later years were sold to the Netherlands. Due to the lack of 
orders, and some other political and economical reasons, the factory 
was shut down in late 1940s [Ref 44 pp. 10-38]. Despite the massive 
117 
efforts to set up a domestic defense industry in the early years of 
the Republic, satisfactory progress was not made. 
In 1950, the General Directorate of Military Factories was 
transformed into a public enterprise, Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi 
Kurumu (MKEK) (General Directorate of Machine and Chemical 
Industry), which became the country's principal manufacturer of 
munitions, explosives, small arms and rocket ordnance. 
With the exception of MKEK, until 1970s, Turkish Defense 
Industry (TDI) was predominantly in the maintenance and 
manufacturing capabilities of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAFs): 
repair/overhaul centers, ordnance factories, shipyards, supply and 
maintenance centers. 
A new era started in the history of TDI after Turkey's 
intervention in Cyprus. In consequence of an embargo that came as a 
repercussion of the Cyprus Peace Operation, Turkey decided to 
develop its own defense industry, endeavoring to reach a high level 
of self-sufficiency in supporting its armed forces. 
The immediate response to the aftermath of the embargo was 
the foundation of the military electronics concern or ASELSAN as it 
is better known today, which was established as the local Mil-Spec 
communication systems house. 
The catalyst for the contemporary Turkish defense 
industrialization occurred through the enactment of Law No. 3238, 
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which went into effect in 1985. The law introduced a number of 
important conditioning factors for the future development of TDI. It 
decreed the establishment of the Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industries (SSM), which gave a boost to Turkey's domestic defense 
industry. 
As a result of the increased efforts to establish a self-sufficient 
domestic defense industry in the last decade and a half, TDI has 
successfully carried out several production and modernization 
projects. 
C.       TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY TODAY 
1.        General 
In recent years, TDI has developed substantially with the 
contribution of local and foreign private sector companies. Turkey 
has come to a point where it can produce the most modern arms and 
defense equipment. However, although it is self-sufficient in certain 
fields and has a certain export capacity, it couldn't reach the 
desired level in foreign markets. 
Turkey has been gradually implementing a program to improve 
defense capabilities and force readiness. The defense-related 
modernization program began in early 1980s involving co- 
production of F-16 fighter aircraft, and continued with armored 
infantry fighting vehicles, frigates, submarines and light transport 
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aircraft. Emphasis has shifted from direct procurement to co- 
production of weapon systems. Many of the weapon systems 
produced in Turkey are licensed or co-produced by foreign 
industries. The largest joint ventures have been the production of F- 
16 fighter aircraft, Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles 
and armored combat vehicles. Other examples of joint production 
include: 
■ The Turkish company ASELSAN collaborating with 
PHILIPS (Netherlands), TEXAS INSTRUMENTS (USA) and 
LITTON (USA), producing components for F-16 fighter and 
night vision equipment for infantry vehicles; 
■ The Arifiye Tank Upgrading plant collaborating with 
ZEISS, RHEINMETALL, MTU and GLS (all in Germany) 
on M-48 tanks 
■ Baris assembling M-72 rocket launchers 
■ ENKA assembling the Black Hawk helicopter in a joint 
venture with UNITED TECHNOLOGIES     ' 
■ TEI collaborating with ROLLS ROYCE (U.K.) producing 
aircraft engines 
■ Kayseri Wekplaats is engaged in joint ventures with SIAI- 
AUGUST (Italy) and MBB(Germany) in upgrading M-113s 
■ MKEK produces anti-aircraft artillery, rocket launchers, 
machine guns and ammunition, working with OERLIKON 
CONTRAVES (Switzerland), HECKLER & KOCH 
(Germany), GENERAL DEFENSE CORPORATION (USA), 
RHEINMETALL (Germany), EUROMETAAL (Netherlands) 
and GIAT (France). [Ref 45.p.61] 
Major areas of TDI concentration include, but not limited to, 
the following fields: 
Defense Electronics 
Ammunition, Barrels and Explosives 
Armored Fighting Vehicles and Main Battle Tanks 
Rocket and Missiles 
Conventional Submarine Construction 
Ship Construction 
Military Aircraft and Helicopters   [Ref 46] 
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2.        Current Defense Industrial Structure 
Almost all of the defense organizations that form the TDI, 
especially the companies that have been set up after the foundation 
of SSM in the last fifteen years, have been established for the 
purpose of operating in selected areas to compensate for the 
deficiencies in TDI, and with a structure open to further 
development. As a result of this approach, the facilities have 
created significant employment opportunities under the dynamics of 
free competition. Through the business they provide to supporting 
industries, they have created an important potential for the defense 
industry that can provide tangible support when necessary. 
All facilities that began production have reached a healthy, 
self-sufficient level on the foreign and domestic markets. By this 
growth they have begun to lessen the pressure of defense 
expenditures on the budget by providing the national economy with 
considerable input in terms of value-creation. 
a.       Public Institutions 
(1) Public Enterprises. The major defense 
establishment in this category is MKEK, which operates as a 
holding company with 19 subsidiaries. MKEK owns military 
factories that produce a wide range of ammunition, small arms, 105 
mm tank guns, rockets, mortars, blasting caps, grenades, mines and 
batteries. 
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(2) Military Facilities. This category includes 
maintenance facilities that repair/overhaul major weapon systems 
(e.g. Arifiye and Kayseri tank modernization facilities; Air Force 
overhaul, repair and maintenance facility in Eskisehir) and 
shipyards of TAFs (the two principal shipyards of Golcuk and 
Taskizak represent substantial shipbuilding and repair facilities. 
Ship programs include MEKO 200 frigates, Type 209 submarines 
and fast patrol boat programs that been under way throughout the 
1990s). 
(3) Foundation Establishments. The Turkish 
Armed Forces Foundation (TAFF) was established in 1987, by the 
unification of Army, Navy and Air Force Foundations. These 
foundations had been established in early 1970s with the purposes 
of strengthening the TAFs and minimizing the dependence on other 
nations by establishing a national defense industry. 
Financed mainly through the donations by the 
Turkish people, TAFF currently has ownership interest in 13 
establishments and enterprises (such as, Aselsan, Havelsan, Isbir, 
Aspilsan, Ditas, Tusas, Tai, Tei, Roketsan, Kansas, Neta§, 
Mercedes-Benz Turk, Sidas, Testas and Petlas) that are involved in 
defense production. 
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Major  companies,  which  are  primarily  owned  by 
TAFF are the following: 
ASELSAN   (Military   Electronic   Industries,   Inc.) 
was founded at the end of 1975 to produce tactical military radios 
and   defense   electronic   systems   for  the   Turkish  Army.   Since   its 
foundation,   ASELSAN   has   expanded   its   product   and   customer 
spectrum,      and      organized      into      three      main      divisions:The 
Communications      (HC)      Division,      Microwave      and      System 
Technologies (MST) Division, and Microelectronics, Guidance and 
Electro-Optics (MGEO) Division. The main products manufactured 
by   ASELSAN   are   Data   Terminals,   VHF/FM   Frequency   Hopping 
Military Radios, Surveillance and Fire Adjustment Radars, Muzzle 
Velocity    Radars,    Training    Simulators,    Man-Portable    DF    and 
Pedestal Mounted Air Defense Systems. ASELSAN's quality systems 
comply with NATO Publication AQAP-110, Military  Specification. 
MIL-Q-9858, and International  Standards ISO-9001.  The company 
has   been  exporting   its  high  technology   products  to   23   different 
countries including USA, Germany and Switzerland. Recently, the 
company has managed to gain a place on the inventory list of the 
French-German Helicopter Consortium's Eurocopter. The consortium 
will use ASELSAN's FLIR wireless system in helicopters, which are 
produced by them. TAFF holds 83% of ASELSAN's shares. 
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HAVELSAN (Aviation Electronics Industries, Inc.) 
was   founded   in   1982.   The   main   interest   areas   of  Havelsan   are 
avionics,      simulations,      electronic      warfare      and      information 
management systems in the defense industry in particular, and other 
related sectors in general.  Moreover,  software  system  integration, 
modification and test program development studies are being carried 
out as regards the  aforementioned fields.  Being the  first and the 
foremost software house in Turkey, the company has extended its 
capabilities   to   abroad   with   the   AQAP    150   Industrial   Quality 
Assurance Certificate of NATO. Havelsan also realizes software and 
system  integration  projects  in  the  automation  and  security  fields. 
Havelsan's 98.7 % shares belong to TAFF. 
ASPILSAN (Military        Battery        Production 
Industries, Inc.) was established in 1981 with the donations of the 
people of Kayseri city. Originally established to manufacture 
rechargeable Nickel-Cadmium batteries to be used in various 
telecommunication equipment owned by TAFs, the company 
currently manufactures Nickel-Cadmium batteries, battery packs, 
aircraft/helicopter cells and batteries, and charging devices within 
the NATO qualification system AQAP 120. TAFF holds 95 % of 
ASPILSAN's shares. 
ISBIR  (Electronics  Industries,   Inc.)  has  been  in 
operation since   1977,  in order to produce  synchronous  alternator 
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and diesel-generating sets. The company has been producing several 
electrical components in compliance with NATO Manufacturer Code 
Nr. T 0528, AQAP 120 and ISO 9002 Quality Assurance System 
certificates. 
b.       Private Companies 
(1) Aviation and Space Industry. TAI 
(Turkish Aerospace Industries) is a joint venture company, which 
was established in 1984, between Turkish Aircraft Industries Inc. 
(TUSA>) (49%) and Lockheed Martin (42%). It has a modern 
aircraft facility, furnished with high technology machinery and 
equipment that provide extensive manufacturing capabilities. 
Quality systems of TAI meet the stringent world standards including 
NATO AQAP-120, ISO-9001, MIL-Q-9858A and BOEING Dl-9.000. 
With its proven experience in aircraft and aero 
structures manufacturing business, TAI is a uniquely qualified 
supplier for Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, Lockheed 
Martin Systems (LMVS), Boeing, Sikorsky, Northrop Grumman, 
Airbus, MD Helicopters, CASA, Agusta, Eurocopter, Sonaca, and 
many more companies domestically and worldwide. As a full 
member of the Airbus Military Company, TAI is engaged in the 
development activities of the Future Large Aircraft (transportation) 
(A400M) with major European aerospace companies and, also aims 
to get supply contracts for Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in exchange 
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for     Turkey's      (expected)     participation     in     engineering     and 
development phases of the program. 
TAI's experience includes co-production of F-16 
fighters (exported 46 aircraft to Egypt), CN-235 light transportation 
planes, SF-260 trainers, Cougar AS-532 helicopters, as well as 
design and development of unmanned aerial vehicles, target drones 
and agricultural aircraft. Furthermore, the company is the prime 
contractor of the Turkish Armed Forces ATAK Helicopter and 
Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Production programs. 
TAI's  core  business  also  includes  modernization, 
modification and systems integration programs and sales support. 
TEI (Tusas Engine Industries, Inc.) was set up in 
1985 as a joint venture between Turk Ucak Sanayii A.S. (TUSA§) 
and General Electric Company. The company focused initially on 
manufacturing engine components and assembling engines for the F- 
16 military aircraft. Since 1990, however, it has become involved 
with the production, assembly, testing and overhaul of a wide 
variety of engines and engine components for use in commercial as 
well as military aircraft. Producing about 200 different parts for 
overseas buyers and carrying out about two-thirds of its total sales 
in the form of exports, TEI is one of the largest engine producers in 
Europe, competing directly with companies such as Snecma, Pratt & 
Whitney, and Rolls Royce. 
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PETLAS (Tire Industry & Trade Co.) was 
established in 1976, and until 1997 continued its activities as a 
state-owned public enterprise. Petlas produces a rich range of tire 
products for military and commercial vehicles, as well as airplanes. 
(2) Rockets and Missile Industry. ROKETSAN 
(Missile Industries Inc) was established in June 1988 with the 
participation of several domestic companies to realize missile and 
rocket programs in Turkey. ROKETSAN is involved in integrating 
and producing surface-to-air precision-guided munitions, anti-tank 
weapons, air defense systems and produces launch and flight motors 
for European Stingers. The company plays an important role in 
international technology development programs and is the second 
largest manufacturer in the Stinger co-productions program. 
Through both the Stinger Program and the new rocket systems it 
developed through its own capabilities and experience, ROKETSAN 
has gone a long way to design, develop and manufacture artillery 
rocket systems at 122 and 107 mms. with remarkably extended 
ranges for the TAFs. As well as that, ROKETSAN works on air-to- 
ground munitions, anti-tank missiles, low-level air defense 
programs. The company is certified with AQAP-110 certificate and 
also complies with internationally accepted standards such as MIL- 
STD-810 on environmental tests and DOD 4145.26-M on safety. 
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BARIS ELEKTRIK was established in 1979 for 
the production of epoxy resin current and voltage transformers. The 
firm, which has been involved in defense industry since 1986, 
produces Stinger launcher tubes and gyro activators, composite 
parts and systems, electro-mechanical assembly and harnesses. The 
firm is capable of designing and producing composite parts and 
assemblies by making use of the materials laboratory, composite 
production systems (CNC filament winding machines, RTM system, 
etc.) and laser cutting center. The Firm has the AQAP-110 
certificate and Industrial Security Clearance. 
KALEKALIP and CAMIS are the other companies, 
which contribute to the defense industry by producing components 
for rockets and missiles. 
(3) Military Electronics Industry. MIKES 
(Microvave Electronics Systems Incl.) is a joint venture company 
between various Turkish shareholders and Lockheed Martin, which 
was initially established for the delivery of integrated electronic 
warfare (EW) systems for the Turkish F-16 Program (Peace Onyx). 
Today, MIKES has been primarily engaged in the field of EW, 
including design, manufacturing, testing (laboratory and field) and 
complete Integrated Logistics Support. 
MARKONI KOMINIKASYON (communications) 
is a joint venture between Marconi and two local contractors, which 
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was established to support the modernization of TAFs. The company 
operates not only in the production of frequency-hopping HF/SSB 
radios but also in the TASMUS (Tactical Area Communication 
System) and similar projects. MARKONI, which has become its 
parent company's sole producer of HF/SSB radios, has also made its 
first exports in an active search for external markets. MARKONI 
KOMINIKASYON will also assume the depot-level maintenance and 
repair activities for the radios in TAFs and, in this way, continue 
creating real added value for the country. 
THOMPSON-TEKFEN was established in 1985, to 
ensure the production in of mobile radars, which are purchased at a 
price substantially lower than NATO's direct purchase prices. 
Considering that its long-term objective is to assume the 
maintenance and repair of the mobile radars procured, it will be 
possible to better appreciate the contribution that this firm makes to 
the Turkish economy and industry. The exports of mobile radars that 
were made to FRANCE in May 1997 are the clearest sign that 
significant results can be obtained even from investments carried 
out with modest objectives. 
AYESAS (Aydin Software and Electronics, Inc), 
which was formed in 1990 for the Turkish Mobile Radar Complex 
(TMRC) contract, is a high technology software and electronics 
company, with its most distinctive expertise in the field of real time 
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software engineering and integration. The company has not confined 
its   activities   to   command,   control   and   communication   systems 
projects   for  TAFs.   It  has   expanded   its   area  of activity  through 
contracts obtained from NATO. AYESAS also has major business in 
custom   manufacturing   involving   electronic   assembly,   metalwork 
fabrication,  communications hardware, radar data integration, real 
time   C3   Systems,   data   fusion,   and   command   center   design   and 
installation.   AYESAS   designs,   manufactures,   tests,   installs,   and 
markets high technology digital products in accordance with NATO- 
certified  production  and  design  Quality  Assurance  at  competitive 
costs.   The   company   is   licensed   to   manufacture   the   electronic 
equipment      and      products      of      a      major      shareholder,      L-3 
Communications,   benefiting   from   its   research   and   development 
department and overall capabilities. 
NETAS, one of the Turkey's main technology 
exporter with a broad customer base in more than 20 countries, 
manufactures and delivers switching, communications, data 
networks, transmission and power systems to telephone operating 
companies and private institutions. While continuing to deliver 
under a thorough modernization program, the company is an 
inseparable part of all new platform and sensor programs. Netas also 
co-leads  the   TASMUS/TACS   project   together  with  Aselsan.   The 
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company   won   European   Quality   Prize   given   by   the   European 
Foundation for Quality Management in 1996 and 1997. 
TRANSVARO (electro-optical night vision 
goggles, mine detectors), STFA-SAVRONIK (secure communication 
systems, firing control systems), ALCATEL TELETAS 
(communication systems), AREMSAN (frequency converter, 
uninterrupted power supply, mobile lightning), INTER 
ENGINEERING (night vision goggles and components), AKSA 
(custom generators), STM (E/W , C3I Systems Development) are the 
other major companies in this segment of the TDI. 
(4)      Military Shipbuilding. As mentioned 
previously,    the    Turkish    Naval    Forces    shipyards    that    have 
successfully   produced   frigates,   submarines,   landing   vessels   and 
various other naval vessels, dominate shipbuilding activities. 
SEDEF was founded in 1990 in the Tuzla Private 
Sector Shipyards Zone and has been rendering services at its 
facilities covering 134.000 square meter area. The firm is capable of 
building containers, tugboats, freighters and tankers, and 
manufacturing floating barges, cranes and various steel 
constructions (Gantry cranes, bridges, towers, sliding fixtures etc.) 
The firm has the AQAP-4 certificate. 
PKM was established in 1974 at Golden Horn. At 
the    time,    the    company    was    only    specializing    in    steel    hull 
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constructions. PKM started to build fiberglass hulls in cooperation 
with the Italian company Plaver in 1978, and the production of 
aluminum-constructed vessels was initiated in 1991. PKM has built 
in 1988 coastal protection boats for NCTR. In 1998 the company 
started to build two Navy Supply Ships for the Turkish Navy. 
(5)      Military Vehicles and Armored Carriers. 
FMC-NUROL   (FNSS)   was   established   as   a   Turkish   based  joint 
venture   between   United   Defense   of USA   and   NUROL   Group   of 
Turkey to manufacture 1698 Armored Combat Vehicles for Turkish 
Army.   Based   on   the   well-known   field-proven   Ml 13    Personnel 
Carriers, FNSS  has  developed  a broad family of Armored  Combat 
Vehicles and currently produces four versions: Advanced Armored 
Personnel Carrier (AAPC); Armored TOW Vehicle (ATV); Armored 
Mortar Vehicle and Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV), each 
version   being   available   with   varied   weapon   stations.   Armored 
Mortar Vehicle and AIFV are the newest vehicles in this class and 
incorporate the latest warfare technologies to meet the requirements 
and   operational  needs" of most  modern   armies.   FNSS   has   placed 
great   importance   on   developing   the   local   defense   industry   by 
providing training and funding to  small businesses through which 
local participation has reached 80% during the course of six years. 
In addition to producing tracked armored vehicles for the Turkish 
Armed Forces, FMC-NUROL (FNNS) also sold armored vehicles to 
132 
United Arab Emirates, thus leaving world-leading companies in the 
West behind. This shows the distance that Turkish Defense Industry 
has accomplished within a short period of time. While continuing to 
meet the requirements of the TAFs, FNNS is also trying hard to 
promote its range of military vehicles in line with the needs of 
defense sectors from the Middle East to the Far East. 
OTOKAR carries out production primarily for 
civilian needs. Already well established in a niche market of multi- 
purpose minibuses for the civilian user as well as armoring of those 
for specific purposes, the company went into the licensed 
production of the Land Rover tactical vehicle in Turkey. In addition 
to meeting the domestic demand, the firm - with the support of SSM 
- has succeeded in marketing the wheeled armored vehicles it has 
developed (Akrep-Scorpio, Cobra) to a wide range of customers 
from Pakistan to Algeria. 
NUROL MACHINERY, which first produced sub- 
systems for FNSS, has developed a new model of wheeled armored 
vehicle at NATO standards, by working with a Romanian firm and 
using the know-how and experience it gained from the turret 
production project. 
MERCEDES - BENZ TURK INC. has been 
producing commercial and military vehicles, buses and trucks, to 
the Turkish market with Mercedes-Benz license. 
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BMC (tactical vehicles, diesel engine and 
modernization projects (BTR-60 and BTR-80)), MAN (military 
trucks), ASMAS (components for tank modernization), BURCELIK 
(artillery components), HEMA (components for hydraulic systems), 
IBRAHIM ORS (mechanical parts for military vehicles), TURSAV 
(transmission for armored vehicles), HISAR CELIK are other 
significant participants in this part of local defense industry. 
3.       Basic Facts 
a. Capital Turnover 
The total value of material produced by major domestic 
producers in 1999 was approximately $ 2.2 billion, of which 80 to 
83 percent was for equipment to TAFs. 
b. Exports 
Seventeen to twenty percent of the material produced 
was exported. Export growth is expected in the Turkish defense 
products in response to the following initiatives. 
There is an intensive campaign for the promotion of 
Turkish defense industry products. Turkish defense products are 
being promoted in two different ways. The first is the promotion of 
Turkish defense industrial products and production capabilities by 
the firms themselves. Turkish firms demonstrate their products in 
foreign countries, and also invite foreign officials to Turkey where 
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they visit production lines. Similarly, they demonstrate their 
products in Turkey, participate in national and international fairs, 
advertise in the media and open representative offices abroad. 
Promotions undertaken by SSM and other related 
institutions are multidimensional. The Undersecretariat supports 
Turkish firms in acquiring information about foreign markets. It 
also aids in the promotion of products at home and abroad, and 
contributes both financially and administratively. Promotion 
activities of the Undersecretariat also continue via the Turkish 
representative offices and military attaches abroad. 
c. Manpower 
The total number of the employees amounts to about 
25000. The number of the employees with high-level technical 
qualifications is approximately 43 percent of the total. 
d. Market Share 
The domestic industry is normally awarded 
approximately 21 percent of the Turkish defense contracts. Of the 
remainder, largest part goes to the US and European firms. 
e. Competition 
Although the development of the TDI has not reached the 
desired level as yet, Turkey has been able to export her products to 
every corner of the earth in the fields of defense electronics, 
rockets,     aviation    and     armored    vehicles.     Turkish    frequency 
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radiotelegraphy and radar are way ahead of their giant competitors 
in the Far East. There is now a vast market for Turkish armored 
vehicles in North Africa and in the Middle East, which previously 
had been taken by Turkey's competitors in this field. The sale of 46 
F-16 aircraft produced in the Turkish Aircraft Industry (TAI) to 
Egypt and armored personnel carriers to United Arab Emirates show 
Turkish firms' competitiveness in their fields. 
f.        Capabilities 
The industry has been developing in most areas. 
Generally the defense sector makes use of state-of-the-art- 
technology and is a sector often described as the "locomotive 
power" of the industry. ASELSAN and TAI are two such 
establishments, which also produce for civilian purposes. 
4. International Cooperation 
The need for self-dependent defense industry forces Turkey to 
participate in projects that will be carried out in future to transfer 
technology and constitute its defense industry base. 
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Table.V-l Turkish Defense In dustry: Principa 1 Producers* 
Producer Production (USD/S) 
Exports 
(USD/S) Work Force 
TAI 72,558,000 1,000,000 1,996 
TEI 50,188,000 44,629,000 524 
PETLAS 45,404,000 11,969,000 686 
ROKETSAN 40,309,000 12,732,000 193 
MKEK 460,000,000 6,466,000 8,744 
KALEKALIP 15,000,000 576,834 350 
ASELSAN 196,518,000 23,596,000 2,849 
HAVELSAN 11,429,000 91,000 562 
MIKES 10,225,000 N/A** 199 
AYESAS 17,300,000 266,000 203 
TRANSVARO 18,000,000 440,000 100 
STFASAV. 9,700,000 N/A 65 
NETAS 223,781,000 54,867,000 1,233 
AKSA 50,220,000 7,837,000 N/A 
STM 4,651,160 93,000 189 
COSKUNOZ 22,300,000 4,600,000 691 
HEMA 45,416,000 N/A 800 
PARSAN 18,000,923 10,000,000 454 
OTOKAR 117,223,000 3,607,000 502 
BMC 129,974,880 16,000 152 
MERCEDES- 
BENZ TURK 490,697,000 163,000,000 2,868 
FNSS 81,395,000 21,000,000 378 
NUROL 14,507,000 N/A 131 
HISAR 20,983,000 12,600,000 254 
Includes the largest private companies listed by Defense White 
Book 2000 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Defense, Defense White Book 2000 
Defense cooperation activities are conducted mostly within the 
framework of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU 
Armament Group). In addition, defense industry activities are 
carried out on a bilateral basis with many friendly countries. To 
support its armed forces modernization, Turkey has also established 
a policy of acquiring new equipment through a variety of channels 
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including the Southern Region Amendment (SRA), the Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and direct commercial sales 
(DCS). 
France   has   been   one   of the   countries   that   have   supported 
Turkey's defense equipment modernization effort. There has been a 
steady   growth   of   bilateral   cooperation   since   the   early    1980s. 
Cooperation   has   been   formalized   through   a   general   agreement 
concluded in 1991  for defense equipment and followed by specific 
agreements    on   radar,    light   armored    vehicles,    helicopters    and 
missiles. Further joint ventures were created: Thomson- Tekfen for 
the   production   of  3D   long-range   surveillance   radar,   the   French 
GIAT Industries and Turkish Nurol Company partnership to produce 
light armored vehicles equipped with 25mm cannon turrets and more 
recently, an agreement between Eurocopter and Turkish Aerospace 
Industry  to   produce   30   transport   Cougar  helicopters.   France   has 
confirmed its willingness to increase cooperation in other defense 
industry  areas,  in  particular  in  the  field  of short-range  anti-tank 
missiles and by encouraging productive exchanges between Turkish 
and French small manufacturers. 
Israel has invested considerably in research and development 
to establish cooperation with Turkish industries on a large-scale of 
activities. Recent projects have included: F-5 upgrade, Russian- 
Israeli   team   (Kamov   Company   and   Israel   Aircraft   Industries— 
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IAI/Lahav) for a 145 combat helicopter bid, Israel Military 
Industries Ltd. (IMI) retrofit and upgrade program of the Turkish 
M60 MBT offer, the NEGEV machine-gun, Python-4 (short-range 
air-to-air missile), Elop's electro-optical surveillance and 
reconnaissance systems and UAV aircraft. In addition, Soltam Ltd. 
has been active in the sector. 
Some of the other third country suppliers that have been 
active in Turkey are: Lurssen Werft, Sei Defense Systems, CAE 
Elektronik GmbH, Diehl Ammunition, Voith Hydro, Aeromaritime 
Systembau GmbH (Germany), Eurometaal (Netherlands), CASA 
(Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A.) (Spain), Marconi Electronic 
Systems, Underwater Weapons Division (U.K.) and Avia Baltika 
Aviation, Ltd.   (Lithuania). 
D.       MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMME AND THE 
CURRENT DEFENSE PROJECTS 
The roots of Turkey's modernization program go back to the 
reorganization of the defense industry ordered by Act No. 3238 in 
November 1985. The act was designed to help Turkey respond better 
to   the   rapid   technological   changes   in   the   defense   industry   and 
provide   its   armed   forces   with   modern   defense   equipment.   The 
objective  of the  was  "to  bring  her  domestic  industry  to  a  level 
which    will    produce    economically    feasible    military    products 
necessary for the modernization of TAFs, with the ability to follow 
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and easily adapt to the latest technological changes. This will 
provide deterrence." [Ref. 47 p. 18] The act did provide a systematic 
process for linking Turkish national strategy to defense acquisition 
and put in place a threat-driven defense programming process, 
which called for a fundamental reassessment of the underlying 
justification for acquiring military equipment only once every 
decade. 
During a briefing in 1996, the General Staff announced that 
US$ 150 billion would be needed to fund arms procurement and 
operations of TAFs for the next 25 years. The bulk of the funds will 
be allocated to the Army. The main staples of the procurement plan 
are the purchase of 145 attack helicopters and 1000 main battle 
tanks. During that period the Navy will require $25 billion, and the 
Air Force $65 billion in arms and equipment. [Ref. 48 p.3] 
Accordingly, Turkey had planned to spend $31 billion between 1996 
and 2007 on the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces under 
the Ten-Year Acquisition Program (OYTEP) concept. 
The main programs covered in the modernization program 
focused on the development of advanced weapon platforms, 
missiles, and aerospace capabilities required by the NATO air-land 
battle doctrine. 
During the next 25 to 30 years, a significant percentage of the 
combat weapons and equipment existing in the TAFs' inventory will 
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be modernized or replaced with systems that incorporate new 
technology. Some of the modernization projects currently conducted 
and/or planned by the Turkish Armed Forces are: 
■ Joint Projects: TAFs Integrated Communication System 
(TAFICS); TAFs Command & Control Information 
System; Tactical Area Communication System; 
Frequency-Hopping Secure Radio; Unmanned Aircraft; 
Local Manufacturing Of Rocket And Missile Systems; 
Satellite Surveillance System 
■ Major Projects Of The Army: Various Radar Systems; 
Electronic Warfare Ranging, Listening And Jamming 
Systems; Various Radio, Encryption And Computer 
Systems; Modern Anti-Tank Weapons; Low-Altitude Air 
Defense Systems; Armored Personnel Carriers; Self- 
Propelled Howitzer Modernization; Third-Generation 
Main Battle Tank; All Types Of Helicopters With 
Priority For Assault/Attack 
■ Major Projects Of The Navy: Long Horizon (Uzun 
Ufuk) Project (Observation/Reconnaissance); Maritime 
Patrol And Surveillance Aircraft; Turkish Frigate 
Program; Procurement And Modernization Of 
Surveillance Radars; Procurement Of New Type Of Mine 
Hunting And Mine Countermeasures Vessels, 
Procurement Of New Type Of Patrol Vessels, 
Procurement, Modernization And Production Of Various 
Terminals 
■ Major Projects Of The Air Force: F-16 Project; F-5 
Modernization; Aircraft And Helicopter Electronic 
Warfare Systems; Modern Air-To-Air And Air-To- 
Ground Rockets; Air Defense Missile Systems; 
Reconnaissance System With The Capability Of Real- 
Time Data Transmission And Evaluation; Command And 
Control And Intelligence Satellite Systems; Tanker 
Aircraft; Future Combat Aircraft Project; Airborne 
Warning And Control System (AWACS) Aircraft 
■ Projects Conducted Within NATO: Research And 
Technologies Projects; NATO Identification System; 
Battlefield Intelligence Collection And Evaluation 
System (BICES); Global Positioning System 
(NAVSTAR/GPS); Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) 
System; Extended Air Defense; Continuous Acquisition 
And Life Cycle Cost (CALS); Short-And Very Short- 
Range   Air   Defense    Systems    (SHORADS/VSHRADS); 
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Post-2000  Tactical   Combat  Systems  (TAC-OMS  POST- 
2000) 
E.       CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES IN DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Until 1980s, Turkish defense industry base and especially its 
technological capacity were very restricted to the production of 
conventional weapons such as light guns and their ammunition. 
After 1985, with the advance of ASELSAN in production of military 
electronics systems and the establishment of TAI for the production 
of F-16s helped Turkish Defense Industry shape itself with the 
needs of military. However, because of the small size of the defense 
industry, the change has not been on a large scale. 
In 1985, Undersecretariat for Defense Industry has been 
established. This change in the bureaucracy increased the private 
sector participation in defense industry. Private sector began to take 
part in the defense-related activities and has helped shape the 
continuous improvements in the defense industry. With respect to 
projects carried out from 1985, almost all the goals of the projects 
have been reached except the ones that needed restricted technology 
transfer or the ones that lacked the sufficient resources. 
There have been large amounts of resource allocation to the 
research and development activities between 1985 and 1997. The 
amount of the resources is 2000 times the amount allocated between 
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1923   and   1985.   After   1985,   universities,   research   institutes   and 
defense industry firms began to share. 
The technologies developed or worked on up to now cannot 
fully satisfy the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. Moreover, they 
cannot make the defense industry independent from foreign sources. 
The main reason for this is the limited financial resources of the 
government. There are some imminent operational and support needs 
that should be met in a short period; the resources, which should be 
allocated to new weapons development activities that will help gain 
the military critical technology, may be used for those current 
needs. Moreover, the resources allocated to the activities could be 
instead provided from private sector. This misuse of resources 
undermines the achievements needed in military technology transfer. 
Despite its limited resources, Undersecretariat of the Defense 
Ministry has been working on a project that would shape the 21st 
century of the Turkish Defense Industry with its technological 
goals. 
Today the Turkish Defense Industry, if allocated enough 
funds, should be capable of meeting a significant part of the 
requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces. Both systems produced 
for the TAFs and the success of Turkish companies on the 
international market reveal that Turkish defense technology is 
advanced and can compete in international markets. 
143 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
144 
VI. AN ASSESMENT OF THE TURKISH DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
A.       FACTORS THAT OBSTRUCTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
1.     The Lack of Defense Strategies and Policies 
Until recently there has not been a document that would 
support the development of the domestic defense industrial base and 
direct the country's defense industry policies. The lack of such a 
document has caused inconsistency in the approaches of the 
government and the private sector toward the national defense 
industry and resulted in: 
■ No established healthy defense structure, 
■ No defense system grouping, 
■ No defense contractor grouping, 
■ Lack of the implementation of offsets. 
2.     Deficiencies in R&D Directed Acquisitions 
Most of the weapon systems and defense equipment that were 
provided by the domestic companies have not been the product of a 
healthy R&D activity. Foreign contractors generally have made all 
the research and development for the products and local firms have 
only put together the production part of the domestically-produced 
military equipment. This approach has caused the dependency of the 
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national companies to the foreign firms for the critical part of the 
systems design and development. 
3. Deficiencies in Science and Technology Infrastructure 
The Turkish science and technology base has not been 
developed satisfactorily to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed 
Forces. Due to the lack of R&D activities, the country has been 
suffering from the lack of scientists and engineers as well as 
laboratories and R&D centers for the production of military 
equipment. 
However, the important point is to transfer scientific 
knowledge into product development and produce technology. It is 
important to have the ability to produce technology-development 
capabilities. This is especially true in the transfer of production 
technology in the case of Turkey. If the trend goes on to transfer 
only production technologies, there will not be a technological 
infrastructure that supports national defense industrial base. 
4. Lack of Long Term Planning 
The companies working in the defense industry should be 
informed in advance of the long-term requirements of the armed 
forces. Otherwise, when the military wishes to buy a weapons 
system, it must wait for industry to put infrastructure in place to 
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support development and actual production of the weapons system. 
This situation delays the availability of the weapon systems that the 
military requires . Until the 1990s, there was no long-term military 
acquisition planning in Turkey and the armed forces only contracted 
on a short-term basis. 
In recent years, however, the defense requirements have been 
planned on a future-ten-year basis and feasibility studies are now 
conducted with the arms-producing contractors. 
5. The Lack of Qualified Human Resources 
The number and the capacity of the universities in Turkey is 
not sufficient to provide the nation with the desired quantity and 
quality of technical personnel. Moreover, as a result of this lack of 
research and development activities and the tendency to deal with 
only production not with R&D causes the qualified people to leave 
for other countries to further develop themselves and take part in 
research. 
6. Search for the Perfect Competition in the Defense 
Industry 
Competition  is  needed  for the  effective  use  of the  already 
constrained resources. It encourages both the firms to be able to 
introduce new technologies and nations to strive for the most- 
advanced technologies. 
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Competition may be both national and international. For a 
country like Turkey, international competition may not be the best 
case, because in Turkey, there is a lack of technologically advanced 
military contractors. In each case of weapon acquisition, foreign or 
international firms may have the advantage over the national ones. 
The result may then be the loss of existing national companies. 
Encouraging the national firms to cooperate with each other 
can be an effective way of reaching a more independent defense 
industrial base. Then, we may conclude that a totally independent 
industrial base is not a practical way of achieving national freedom 
of action. 
B.  UNDER-SECRETARIAT FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
To overcome the obstacles which hindered the development of 
the local defense industry, The Under-secretariat for the Defense 
Industry (SSM) was set up by a special law in 1985. In this way, a 
single institution, which has the adequate financial and 
administrative capabilities, would undertake the ambitious task of 
coordinating efforts for modernization of the TAFs and for setting 
up the infrastructure of a modern defense industry. Another 
important goal to be pursued by this institution is to direct the 
process of industrialization and to set up an infrastructure which 
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will benefit from the dynamism of the Turkish and foreign private 
sectors, consistent with national will. 
SSM is a subordinate organization of MoND having a 
corporate body with a special budget. It has been set up as a part of 
a five-part national defense industry organization. Its main 
functions are: 
■ to execute the decisions made by the Defense Industry 
Executive Committee, which is formed by the Chief of 
General Staff, Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, 
■ to reorganize and integrate the defense industry with 
national industry in accordance with the needs of the 
defense industry, 
■ to encourage the new private, public and mixed investments 
with other economical and financial measures, if necessary, 
■ to prepare production programs relating to the projects for 
ensuring procurement, 
■ to monitor that the contract items are fulfilled, 
■ to ensure quality controls, 
■ to research and develop modern combat weapons and 
equipment, including the production of prototypes, 
■ to coordinate the export of the defense industry products 
and the offset trade issues. [Ref 49 p.25]. 
As a result of the activities of SSM during the 15-year period 
since the promulgation of the law, a relatively short period of time 
from the aspect of defense industry, noteworthy achievements have 
been made. Defense equipment produced domestically and the level 
of  domestically   produced   weapons,   vehicles   and   other   military 
equipment in TAFs'  inventory has increased substantially and the 
public interest in the sector has gradually increased. 
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Despite the fact that Undersecretariat was established for the 
sake of improving the infrastructure of the defense industry in 
Turkey, it takes into account the needs of the public sector for 
carrying out the projects. The possible needs of other state 
institutions are being taken into account as well as the commercial 
requirements. 
C.       THE  ROLE  AND  MISSION  OF  THE  TURKISH DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY IN SUPPORTING TURKISH ARMED FORCES 
There are various laws that constitute the defense industry 
policies. In those laws, the role and mission of the defense industry 
in supporting the Turkish Armed Forces has been defined. Moreover, 
the policies and strategies that the Ministry of National Defense 
should follow concerning the future of the armed forces and its 
needs have been written in the laws. 
The main mission of the defense industry is to continuously 
evaluate itself and develop the weapon systems that the armed 
forces need. The companies should keep in contact with the armed 
forces to find out their requirements and continue their work in 
close coordination with them. They should not only produce weapon 
systems but work on research and development activities as well. 
To achieve the mission, the services should plan the future 
and   design   their   needs   in   coordination   with   companies   in   the 
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defense industry and implement the results. The armed forces should 
carefully plan its strategies for the future and then design its needs 
with respect to its strategies. The military should give priority to 
national companies. 
The main government agency for acquiring weapon systems is 
the Ministry of National Defense. With respect to its role in 
acquisition process, it should always keep in contact with the 
military and determine the armed forces' needs. To help develop the 
national defense industry, the defense ministry should give priority 
and incentives to indigenous firms. 
All the three components of the weapons acquisition --that is 
MoND, the services, and defense contractors-- process need to work 
and plan together. 
D.       DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Among its NATO allies, Turkey has consistently been one of 
the biggest spenders on weapon systems and military equipment. 
Since the end of the Cold War most of the Western European 
countries have cut defense spending to levels sufficient for little 
more than maintenance of the existing forces. Western European 
NATO members spend on the average 60 percent of their defense 
budget  on personnel  and  only   16  percent on new equipment.  By 
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NATO estimates, Turkey spends nearly twice the NATO average -- 
around 30 percent -- of its defense budget on new weapons. 
The sources of funds to meet the Turkish military expenditures 
include the Ministry of National Defense budget; income from the 
Turkish Armed Forces Foundation; the Turkish Defense Industry 
Fund; income derived from the sale of surplus equipment, services, 
or other goods earmarked for the Ministry of National Defense; as 
well as funds allocated by the Under secretariat of Treasury for loan 
payments, plus the General Command of Gendarmerie budget and the 
Coast Guard Command budget. 
Table VI-1 provides a picture of the funding sources of 
Turkey's defense expenditures for the 10-year period between 1988- 
1997. The table shows that Turkey spent a total of US$ 27.8 billion 
during this period. The list also shows that Turkey met its defense 
spending needs through 'the Defense Industry Support Fund, foreign- 
based state and company credits, foreign military sales credits, as 
well as the Defense Ministry's yearly budgets. 
Turkey's defense expenditures during the period from January 
1 to December 31,1999 amounted to US$ 6.3 billion which was a 1.8 
percent increase in real terms from 1998 [Ref 44. p.18]. However, 
these figures represent funding for the Ministry of National Defense 
only and with the adjustment to reflect the contributions from the 
Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and other sources, it reached to 
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US$ 9.6 billion. An early figure of $5.4 billion for defense 
expenditure in 2000, was pronounced by the Turkish Military 
attache to Washington. "Of that amount, $1 billion went to 
modernization efforts, such as upgrades in avionics and other 
electronic warfare systems for Turkey's fighter aircraft," he said. 
T able VI-1. Sources of Turkish Military Expenditure 
ETAILED PICTURE OF FUNDING SOURCES FOR THE TURKISH ARMED FC THED )RCES 
DEFENCE NEEDS (INCLUDING AMMUNITION) (1988-1997) MILLION S 
Year Defence Defence US German foreign NATO Turkish Special TAF Total 





Fund Fund cations dation 
19S8 610.4 2.0 490.0 25.5 114.0 326.9 - 69,2 1S.0 1656.0 
1989 665.4 105.0 500.0 15.5 113,9 290.0 -. 199,4 14,7 1913.9 
1990 905,9 424,0 497.0 25.5 114.0 341.9 - 693 14,6 2392J2 
1991 934.6 46X.0 5S2.0 25.5 113.9 318.7 550,0 154.1 12.1 3.158,9 
1992 878.3 530.0 500.0 25.5 114.0 494.7 525.0 70.4 11.1 3149,0 
1993 13943 600.0 450.0 25,5 113,9 3293 475.0 119,3 0,4 3513.9 
1994 859,9 495.0 405.0 - .  114,0 155.0 475,0 91,0 4,6 2599.5 
1995 820.: 714.0 32J5.5 - 186.0 207,0 475,0 70.9 9.4 2811,0 
1996 1296.0 883.G .120.0 - 498,4 116,0 150.0 79,4 15.7 3359,1 
1997iE«HMfci   14S2.7 S7I.6 175,0 - 120.0 148,1 350.0 102,0 9.0 325S.4 
TOTAL 9847,7 S093.2 4247,5 153,0 1602,! 2727.8 3000,0 1025,0 115,6 278115 
Share >.%) 35,4 18.3 15.5 0,6 5,8 9,8 10,7 3,7 0,4 99.9 
Source:    Aris,    Hakki,    NATO'S    Sixteen    Nations    &    Partners    for    Peace, 
Uithoorn,1998, p.68-72 
Due to its security needs and burden-sharing responsibilities 
against NATO, Turkey is not likely to achieve significant reductions 
in its  defense expenditures  over the next  5 to   10 years,  although 
there is planning to reduce the size of the armed forces significantly 
over the next five years.  In fact, Turkey has been 'encouraged to 
modernize  its   forces  and  promote  inter-operability   of equipment 
through  the  purchase   of US   and   other  NATO   countries'   defense 
goods. 
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Foreign Military Sales credits were used to finance the early 
co-production programs, however, commercial joint ventures are 
now providing the necessary capital. 
E.       ECONOMIC    EFFECTS    OF    THE    TURKISH    DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
Compared with the rest of the world, Turkey's expenditures on 
military systems depend mostly on imports. This dependence causes the 
opportunity costs of acquiring highly complex systems to be very high. 
After the late 1980s, most countries' defense expenditures 
declined, however, Turkey's increased. What geo-political and geo- 
strategic issues caused this increase is not relevant to the scope of this 
study. However, the terrorist activities in the southeastern part of the 
country and tensions with its neighbors affected this dramatic increase in 
spending on military systems. Moreover, the modernization efforts caused 
and required large spending. With respect to the activities mentioned 
above, having a national defense industry base can at least remove the 
dependency to the foreigners and reduce the opportunity costs of 
acquiring weapon systems. 
Compared with other sectors, defense companies have relatively 
larger value-added than service and agriculture companies. Having a 
larger value-added shows the efficiency of the defense sector companies. 
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This reality implies one more significance of having a national defense 
industrial base. 
The defense industry has positive effects on employment and 
subordinate sectors. Increasing participation of companies in the defense 
sector causes the unemployment rate to be low with respect to the size of 
the industry and helps the establishment of new companies producing the 
needed parts and components by larger firms. 
The new age is about technology and information. There should be 
more expenditure on research and development than ever to compete with 
the rest of the world. Companies working in the defense industry share 
most of the spending in research and development compared with the 
overall industry. This situation helps Turkey to develop new systems in 
every aspect of industrial life capable of maintaining itself without help 
of foreign assistance for the future. 
Producing its own technological base and defense industry helps to 
sustain macroeconomic balances by reducing imports and increasing 
exports. First, acquiring weapon systems from inside of the country 
reduces the expenditures on imports. Moreover, sale of those systems for 
other countries increases the GDP and improves the balance of payments 
to foreign countries. 
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VII.     FUTURE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS OF TURKEY 
A.      TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION 
Turkey's strategic importance stems from the country's unique 
geopolitical position, where Turkey is at the junction of Europe, 
Russia, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and the Middle East. 
Turkey remains the southern anchor of NATO, positioned in 
the heart of one of the most volatile and vital regions for 
international political and economic security. The country likewise 
remains the hub where Europe, Russia, Central Asia, Gulf States, 
and Middle East come together. 
Taking its geographical location, Turkey is at the center of a 
potential crisis triangle as well in a position offering golden 
opportunities. With its geographical structure, including 8210 km of 
coastline and Turkish straits, Turkey holds a very important 
position for both the Black Sea countries and international sea 
transportation: this location, controlling the eastern Mediterranean 
and the Suez Canal, Turkey maintains a window to the west for the 
Middle East, Iran, the Caucasus and Central Asia. With these 
features, it is a unique country in the region. 
Turkey is located in a very close geographical proximity to the 
Balkans. In addition, it has historical, cultural and economic ties 
with all the region's countries. It is self-evident that Turkey has a 
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key role to play in ensuring the stability and security of the Balkans 
and of the entire Euro-Atlantic area. 
Moreover, Turkey has the same cultural, historical and social 
ties indicated in relation to the Balkans with people living in 
Caucasus area. A friendly and Western-oriented Turkey represents 
the best avenue for the transport of oil from the Caspian Sea. 
Indeed, Turkey could become the gatekeeper of the huge reserves of 
the Caspian Basin. A pipeline through Turkey would represent an 
alternative or a complement to either a Russian or an Iranian/Iraqi 
route. This would help guarantee unimpeded access to a vital energy 
source. Revenues from Caspian Sea oil also could provide 
desperately needed capital and revenue to some of the nations of 
this region and contribute to their domestic stability. In doing so, it 
would assist these nations emerging from communism and nurture 
healthy relations with the western countries. 
In many ways, water is as precious a resource as oil in this 
part of the world. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers originate in 
Turkey. Their water flows are critical for the agricultural needs of 
the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean countries. This makes Turkey a 
gatekeeper for water too. How it exercises this power can be of 
immense importance to western countries' interests. 
Turkey  has  the  potential  to  become  a  key  regional   leader. 
Turkey has made clear an interest in developing the natural cultural, 
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religious, political and economic ties with the Turkish language 
states of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Tadgikistan, and Azerbaijan. 
Turkey finds itself caught at the intersection of three points of 
regional instability formed by the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the 
Middle East. Whereas Turkish strategists once saw themselves 
living in a bad neighborhood surrounded by a ring of fire with only 
NATO to guarantee to deter Soviet adventurism, they now find 
Turkey encircled by the ashes of failed or failing states. From being 
on the strategic defensive since the 1940s, decision-makers in 
Ankara should now grapple with more assertive security policies. 
They should seek to take advantage of new opportunities and 
preserve Turkish interests in the face of an uncertain future. 
At the same time, Turkey is confident in the dynamic structure 
of its people. The strategy can be summarized as follows: on the one 
hand, it will preserve its humanitarian and moral values; and on the 
other, it will work on the technological infrastructure of the 
information age. Its main targets are to complete the economic and 
technological development of the Turkish nation and attain the same 
level as the western countries, and to play a decisive role in the 
strengthening of the peace and stability environment of its region in 
cooperation with the international community. 
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B.       TURKEY'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
1.       General 
The developments in the geography of the Balkans, Caucasia, 
and the Middle East (the most sensitive regions of the world after 
the Cold War), have brought new dimensions to the activities and 
roles of Turkey. The developments in those regions will play a 
determining role in the future of Europe and the world. Turkey is 
trying to fulfill its responsibilities and to benefit from new 
opportunities. It is obliged to continue its effectiveness and 
determining role in such an important geography. It is not possible 
to integrate Europe and Asia as long as peace and stability are not 
provided in those regions. Turkey's contributions to initiatives to 
stop the conflicts in those regions are directed to the realization of 
this integration. 
Turkey is a center of attraction and can become a driving 
force of change for peace, stability, and prosperity in the troubled 
geography mentioned above. With its abundant resources, 
demographic structure, democratic and secular regime based on the 
supremacy of law, Turkey is an exemplary country in the region. Its 
importance is gradually increasing due to its geo-political and geo- 
strategic location in the changing world conjuncture. 
Turkey believes that an environment of peace and security in a 
region confronted with various problems could be possible by the 
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activation of political and economic cooperation potentials. For this 
reason, it directs its efforts towards contributing to peace and 
security in the regional and global plan. It plays a leading role for 
the best utilization of the historical and political opportunities 
emerging after the Cold War [Ref 50. p.7]. 
2.       Turkey's Strategy 
Turkey is a country that is powerful in its region and in the 
world. It directs its efforts towards taking under control the 
existing and potential disputes in her surroundings. The basic 
philosophy of the role Turkey plays is the development of economic 
relations, establishment of political stability and providing for the 
integration of the countries in its region and in the world [Ref 50. 
p. 10]. Within this context, Turkey reflects democracy, tolerance and 
the attributes of a legal state to its surroundings. 
Turkey's vision in the 21st century is to bring the regional 
resources to-Europe and to the rest of the world. It wants to advance 
globalization, and emerge as a country having a principal role in 
this movement. Moreover, it wants to be a leading country and side 
by peace and development and cooperation efforts for progress [Ref 
50. p. 22]. 
Turkey opens itself and reaches out to the present world where 
geographical distances are not important. It seeks friends, markets 
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and new relations within a broad spectrum extending from the Far 
East to Latin America. It wants to advance on the course of 
becoming a global state. 
As a result, Turkey prepares itself for the role it will assume 
in the 21st century. It is aware of its responsibilities and will 
continue more effectively its function of being a bridge between the 
east and the west. 
3.       Security Objectives 
During the process of worldwide rapid change in late 1980s, a 
new international system emerged and Soviet Union and Eastern 
Bloc collapsed. Within the new international system, Turkey is 
situated at the center of the Eurasian region that has become the 
focal point of the globe. During this process, Europe has ceased to 
be divided and the central and Eastern European countries have 
integrated with their western counterparts. 
Turkey is situated at an important geographical location, 
where Europe and Asia meet. Its geographical location enables 
Turkey to include all the characteristics of Europe, Middle East, 
Balkans, Caucasian, Mediterranean, and the Black Sea regions. Its 
location at the crossroads of an East-West and North-South axis 
enhances Turkey's geopolitical importance since it is a natural route 
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for the transfer of the rich energy resources from the Middle East 
and Eurasian regions to Europe and world markets. 
Turkey's historical background and its delicate geo-strategic 
position require a global approach to national, regional, and 
international developments. For a country like Turkey to ensure its 
optimum state of development within a safe environment, the 
determination of Turkey's medium and long-term security objectives 
is a scientific problem. In this respect, strategy and national 
security are bound together. Turkey must determine its strategies 
and security objectives in a very broad context. Thus, Turkey should 
solve the issue of determining medium and long-term strategies and 
security objectives, not only according to the conditions in the 
country, but also according to the global conditions. 
One security objective may be Turkey's enhanced 
effectiveness within the existing system of interaction in its own 
region and in the international arena. To reach this objective, 
Turkey should follow the economic and international relations 
developments. It should follow the developments of culture, arts, 
science and technology, and developments in all fields. As a result 
of this pursuit, Turkey should adapt its economic and social capital 
and human resources to the process of rapid change in the global 
arena. 
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In a system established under this objective of global 
interaction in an active way, there may be some conditions for 
determining the area of movement. There would be problems for 
Turkey to solve while pursuing its security objectives and Turkey 
should solve them on the basis of technological knowledge. This 
kind of solution requires scientific and technological infrastructure 
with minimum cost and maximum efficiency and effectiveness. 
4.       Strategic Alternatives 
Turkey's foreign and security policy undergoes revision and 
redefinition according to the changes in Turkey's security 
environment. Aware of the conjuncture in the world politics and 
Turkey's geo-strategic importance, there are five options that 
Turkey may pursue in the world arena of politics and military [Ref 
51. p. 48]: the European option, Eurasian option, Middle Eastern 
option, a strategic partnership with the USA, and multi-dimensional 
policy options. 
In the first option, Turkey may strengthen its ties to Europe. 
European Union membership has been a top priority for Turkey 
since 1960s and Turkey may accelerate efforts to achieve it. 
In the Eurasian option, Turkey may concentrate on 
strengthening ties to the Turkish states in the Central Asia and in 
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Caucasus. While not breaking ties with the West, Turkey may define 
itself more as a Eurasian power. 
In the third option, Turkey may emphasize its Islamic heritage 
and seek ways to strengthen ties to the Islamic countries of the 
Middle East and Asia. However, this option is the least likely one to 
be followed. 
Strategic partnership with the USA may be the centerpiece in 
Turkey's strategy for the beginning of the 21st century as a fourth 
option. However, it is known that, despite the state of alliance 
between the two states, both countries have different point of views 
on certain points in the world politics. 
In the multi-dimensional policy option, Turkey may pursue a 
strategy based more on national interests. It may still seek good 
relations with Europe and follow European membership, however it 
should not be an obsession. In the option with USA, it may maintain 
strong ties with USA; however, at the same time it should seek a 
broad-based partnership. 
Regardless of which option is chosen, Turkey should pursue a 
more active policy in the future. Such a policy would be in keeping 
up with the changes with the security environment of Turkey. 
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5.       Nature of Future Military Threats 
In the last decades of the 20th century, high technology has 
been the defining character of the warfare in industrialized 
countries. However, high technology has not been always the central 
ingredient of TAFs. After 1980s, TAFs began to realize the 
importance of technologically advanced weapon systems. Then, it 
began to emphasize the projects giving importance to the 
requirements of the new kind of warfare that may be seen in 21st 
century. 
There are five kinds of military threats that may be seen in the 
21st century: long-range precision strikes, information warfare, 
dominating maneuver, space warfare [Ref 52. p. 38], weapons of 
mass destruction including nuclear warfare, and asymmetric threats. 
a.        Precision Strike 
Precision strike is the ability to sense the enemy at 
operational and strategic depth. It is the ability to recognize 
enemy's operational concept and strategic plan, and select and 
prioritize attacks on enemy targets of value. Precision strike is 
intended to achieve decisive impact on the outcome of the 
campaign. To be most effective, precision strike attacks should be 
synchronized in time and space. 
The revolutionary potential of precision strike derives 
from   the   technologies    that   provided    a    glimpse    of   their   own 
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potential. Technologies related to precision strike concept enable 
commanders to have continuous wide-area surveillance and target 
acquisition, near-real-time responsiveness, and highly accurate, 
long-range weapons at their disposal. 
Advances in technology are currently driving this area of 
warfare. The key improvements now are occurring in broadening the 
environmental conditions for wide area surveillance and precision 
targeting; security and counter-measures; data processing and 
communications; delivery platforms; precision munitions; and 
positioning/locating devices [Ref 52. p.74]. 
b.        Information Warfare 
The second military threat comes from the revolution in 
information systems. It is this warfare threat that is associated with 
information systems, their associated capabilities, and their effects 
on military organizations and operations. This new area of warfare 
is called information warfare. It is defined as the struggle between 
two or more opponents for control of the battlefield information. 
At the national level, information warfare could be 
viewed as a new form of strategic warfare. One of the key issues is 
the vulnerability of socio-economic systems. In this context, the 
important question to be answered is the issue of attacking the 
enemy's system while protecting one's own. At the military 
operational   level,   information   warfare   may   contribute   to   major 
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changes in the conduct of warfare. Therefore, one of the key issues 
is the vulnerability of command, control, communications, and 
intelligence systems. The problem goes beyond the armed forces to 
the entire national security infrastructure. As the international 
information infrastructure grows and elaborates, its reach is beyond 
the control of any single entity or any single nation. 
c.        Dominating Maneuver 
One of the more recently identified potential warfare 
areas is dominating maneuver. Maneuver has always been an 
essential element in warfare, and the ability to conduct maneuver on 
a global scale, on a much-compressed time scale, and with greatly 
reduced forces will always be an important element in the 
battlefields in the 21st century. 
Dominating maneuver is the positioning of forces, 
integrated with precision strikes, space warfare, and information 
war operations, to attack decisive points, defeat the enemy center of 
gravity, and accomplish campaign or war objectives [Ref 52. p.81]. 
While precision strike and information warfare destroys 
enemy assets and disrupts its situational awareness, dominating 
maneuver strikes at the enemy center of gravity. Its aim is to put the 
enemy in an untenable position, leaving him with no choice but to 
accept defeat or accede to the demands placed on him. 
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d.       Space Warfare 
Space warfare is defined as the exploitation of the space 
environment to conduct full-spectrum, near-real-time, global 
military operations. It includes facets of the other three warfare 
areas but has the potential to become a qualitatively distinct warfare 
area in its own right [Ref 52. p.88]. 
If properly placed and employed, space assets may 
perform missions in much less time than state-of-the-art aircraft, 
one possible mission is to use space forces to directly achieve 
national objectives (operational or strategic) in a particular theater. 
Space strike systems based on satellites or on atmospheric vehicles 
enable precision strikes, whose quantitative advantage in speed 
would result in a qualitative difference in capability. 
The altitude advantages provided by space greatly 
improve surveillance and reconnaissance coverage of the earth. As a 
result, space assets may offer the means to command and control 
operations in theaters where distance and terrain complicate or 
confound terrestrially based systems. 
However, space has limiting factors that could constrain 
its military use. First, space is not amenable to human life. It limits . 
the manned presence in future space operations. As a result, most of 
the improvements in future space operations will most likely come 
through unmanned technologies. In addition, the speeds associated 
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with space flight and the amounts of fuel required to maneuver in 
orbit using current technologies and energy sources greatly limit the 
flexibility of spacecraft in orbit. 
e. Nuclear Threat 
The nuclear threat should be taken into account as a fifth 
alternative threat in the 21st century. Most military planners have 
judged that the most plausible route to nuclear war is the escalation 
from conventional war [Ref 53. p.22]. However, even if there is a 
situation where the risk of conventional war has declined, there is 
always a possibility that nuclear war may exist, given that all the 
surrounding countries of Turkey want to achieve nuclear capability 
and other types of weapons of mass destruction. In short, this point 
should be understood that nuclear war might be so horrible that no 
one can easily imagine a provocation strong enough to start one. 
Discussion  of asymmetric  threats  is  addressed  later in 
the thesis. 
6.       Possible Future Force Structure 
Turkey is located in the middle of the unstable triangle (the 
Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East) in the world. For this 
reason, it is unable to relax the way many countries can. It is faced 
with complex and variable security problems. 
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The existing conflicts and instabilities around Turkey directly 
affect its political, economic, and social balance. It is vitally 
important not only for its security but also for regional, European, 
and global peace that Turkey should be able to maintain its position 
as an island of stability. 
For this reason, in spite of all its economic difficulties, 
Turkey must have a national defense industry and strong and 
effective armed forces. TAFs must be able to remove any threats 
and/or risks, which could originate from adjacent countries and from 
the environment of internal threat supported by external powers. 
Despite all the adverse developments around Turkey, the 
traditional defense policy pursued by Turkey is and should be based 
on the principles of peace at home, peace abroad, protecting and 
maintaining the independence and territorial ' integrity of the 
republic. 
In addition, taking part in cooperative defensive weapon 
systems and contributing to regional and global peace by 
participating in international forces are and should be the principles 
of Turkey's defense policy. The clearest expression of this approach 
is the exemplary practices of the TAFs in the Republics of Central 
Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans under the Partnership for Peace. 
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For the reasons mentioned above, the structure of TAFs that 
should carry out the defense policies of the 21st century should have 
the following: 
TAF should possess modern weapon systems, based on its use 
in joint operations. It should have modern target acquisition, 
identification, warning and command and control instruments. 
It should respond to the present and future defense 
requirements and can be maintained economically in peacetime. 
It should be capable of providing deterrence, going rapidly 
from a peacetime-mode into a war-mode, rapidly shifting forces 
from one area to the other and concentrating on another and 
supported by high firepower. 
7.       Characteristics of Future Turkish Armed Forces 
In order to overcome against external and internal threats that 
target Turkey's territorial integrity and the republic regime, such as 
regional and ethnic conflicts, and the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, religious fanaticism, drug trafficking, and international 
terrorism, TAFs must become a force having the capabilities not 
only of deterrence and strategic defense, but also of the rapid 
deployment to the distant places of vital importance in view of the 
new threats and the risks. Therefore in addition to deterrence and 
collective security, Turkey should develop operational capabilities 
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for "forward engagement" and "forward defense" and be prepared to 
preempt threats to Turkish interests before they cross into Turkish 
territory. 
In light of these TAF should have several characteristics. 
First, it should be increasingly agile. Not only it should be able to 
move very quickly over great distances, but also equally capable of 
rapid operations at the tactical level once in the theater of conflict. 
Secondly, as a modern force, it should have extensive 
command and control networks allowing communications over great 
distances that extend down to the lowest levels of the force. 
Furthermore, these communications should rely on encryption and 
other new technologies making them difficult to intercept and jam. 
Thirdly, TAFs should have elegant intelligence and 
surveillance assets that make the battlefield increasingly 
transparent. Use of space-based assets, increasingly sophisticated 
unmanned systems, technologically advanced aircraft, and even 
highly capable robots and remote sensors should give the 
commanders capability to see their forces and those of their enemy 
with unprecedented clarity in almost real time. When combined with 
the ability to precisely locate one's own position and that of the 
opposition, this will create an exceptional degree of situational 
awareness which will free military leaders from wondering what is 
happening on the other side. 
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Finally, TAFs should have the ability to operate at great 
distances and deliver precision munitions while doing so. It is vital 
that it should have precision munitions that have a wide search area, 
automatic target recognition, and the ability to attack moving 
targets with the same accuracy currently seen in attacks against 
fixed targets. 
C.     TURKEY'S DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY 
STRATEGY 
The  threats  and  risks  of Turkey's  security  in  the  post-Cold 
War era are different from those in the past. At the end of the Cold 
War, there was a search for new-world order. Most of the risks and 
threats have changed since then. However, the concept of threat is 
obviously evident and it has become multi-directional, multi- 
dimensional, and variable and instabilities dominate the 
environment. The traditional concept of threat started to emerge in 
the form of [Ref 50. p.45]: 
■ Regional and ethnic conflicts, 
■ Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the 
countries, 
■ Proliferation   of  weapons   of  mass   destruction   and   long- 
range missiles, 
■ Religious fundamentalism, 
■ Smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons, 
■ International terrorism. 
As mentioned before, Turkey is located at the center of the 
triangle of the Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasus. In this region, 
there   are   new   threats   and   risks.   This   is   the   region   where   the 
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interests of the global powers and formations intersect. This 
situation has not changed and will not change in the 21st century. 
The importance and the role of Turkey will become more 
strengthened in the new-world order. 
Turkey's defense policy is directed at defense due to its 
natural characteristics. It is prepared to protect and preserve 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and vital interests 
of the country. For this reason, the following are the targets of 
Turkish National Defense Policy at the beginning of the 21st century 
as a requirement of this new century [Ref 50. p. 48]: 
■ To contribute to peace and security in the region and to 
spread this to large areas, 
■ To become a country producing strategy and security that 
could influence all the strategies aimed at its region and 
beyond, 
■ To become an element of power and balance in her region, 
■ To make use of every opportunity and take initiatives for 
co-operation, becoming closer and developing positive 
relations. 
Turkey is subject to multifaceted threats due to its geo- 
political and geo-strategic position. For this reason, the formation 
of a military force structure is of great importance to Turkey. 
Turkey should maintain and develop this force according to the 
conditions and periods. As a result, attaining the military power, 
which has the resources and capabilities of supporting the National 
Security Policy, constitutes the basis for Turkey's National Defense 
Policy and strategy in the 21st century. 
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Turkey's military strategy consists of the following four 
important matters that support the specified defense policy [Ref 50. 
p. 55]: 
■ Deterrence, 
■ Military contribution to crisis management and intervention 
in crises, 
■ Forward defense, 
■ Collective security. 
Maintaining a military force that provides a deterrent 
influence on the risks and threats is the foundation of the National 
Military Strategy. 
In the crises concerning Turkey, the peaceful solution of the 
disagreements through diplomatic, economic, and other crises 
management measures is one of the most important elements of the 
military strategy. 
The contribution of TAFs to the international efforts for the 
solutions of crises is one element of the military strategy that 
cannot be relinquished. 
When subjected to an external aggression, stopping it as soon 
as possible constitutes the foundation of forward defense. 
D.  INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE INTERESTS 
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
disintegration of the former Soviet Union have created a new set of 
strategic    challenges   facing   the   USA    and   its    European   allies, 
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including Turkey. The focus of strategic threats and challenges has 
changed and poses new policy dilemmas for the US and European 
policy makers. How well western powers and Turkey succeed in 
addressing those challenges will have a significant impact on the 
future of security, especially in Europe. This is particularly true in 
the case of the Caspian Basin and the Middle East. Both areas are 
emerging as critically important in the effort to create a stable post- 
Cold War security order. Indeed, the energy-rich Caspian region 
could become the focus of a rivalry between Russia, Iran, and 
Turkey. 
While Turkey's strategic importance is understood by the 
USA, Turkey's relations with Europe has been more difficult and 
problematic. As long as the Soviet Union was perceived as a major 
threat, European powers gave Turkey a high priority in Europe's 
relations with Turkey. 
The end of the Cold War has reduced Turkey's strategic 
importance for Europe. At the same time, economic, political, and 
cultural issues have become more important in Europe's relations 
with Turkey. Today, the main European concern is not deterring the 
Soviet threat, but creating an economic and monetary union and 
forging a common European foreign and security policy [Ref 54. 
p.158]. 
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Moreover, European efforts to create a distinct European 
security and defense identity threaten Turkey's isolation from 
Europe. Turkey is a member of NATO but not a member of the 
European Union. Thus, it does not directly participate in the debate 
on European defense and security policy. 
Turkey had always been considered an important US ally. 
However, with the end of the Cold War, the focus of US interests 
has changed, too. During the cold war, Turkey was important 
because it served as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet 
power into the Southern Region (the Mediterrenian Basin). Turkey 
is important in the post-cold war period because it plays a critical 
geo-political role in three areas that are of increasing strategic 
importance to the USA: the Middle East, the Balkans, and the 
Caspian Basin (the Caucasus and the newly-independent Turkish 
Republics). In each of these areas, Turkey's cooperation is critical 
to the achievement of broader US strategic objectives [Ref 54. 
p.151]. 
The US-Turkish agenda has changed since the end of the Cold 
War. During the Cold War, it centered primarily on Turkey's role in 
Europe, in containing the expansion of Soviet power into the 
Mediterrenian and tying down Soviet troops that might otherwise be 
used on the German Front. After the end of the Cold War, the key 
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issues focus on Operation Provide Comfort and Northern Iraq, the 
Caspian pipeline, the Balkans, and Iran. 
E.       CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION 
Improved civil-military co-operation is vital to the success of 
future joint operations of civilian and military sector. Coordination 
and cooperation are dependent on a series of key factors, including 
proper communication and consultation, and/or understanding of 
each other's cultures, and organizational structures. 
Various cultures and ideologies of different organizations 
even in the same country have a significant impact on the degree of 
civil-military cooperation. This is a problem, which has been 
emphasized by past, and present civilian sector people and by 
military personnel. 
Different organizational structures hamper cooperation and 
coordination on several grounds. 
Communication breakdowns including incompatible equipment 
or lack of agreed communications procedures within both the 
civilian and the military sectors damage the operations carried out 
mutually by civilian and military sector. The use of incompatible 
communications equipment (field phones, satellite phones, short 
wave radios) may be a prevalent problem for cooperation. For 
example, military sector has more technically advanced equipment 
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than civilian sector in Turkey and this affects the efficiency level of 
the cooperation. 
There are many targets for expansion of cooperation between 
the civilian and the military sector. For Turkey, targets of the 
Turkish civil-military cooperation are mentioned in the White Book 
published by Turkish Ministry of Defense [Ref 50. p.63]: 
■ To  continue the  functions of the government in times of 
crisis and war, 
■ To perpetuate the social and economic life, 
■ To  provide  for the  protection  of the  people  against  the 
threats and risks stemming from war and disasters, 
■ To facilitate reconstructing after attacks, 
■ To   contribute  to   the  efforts   of NATO/European-Atlantic 
Partnership Council continued at an international level, 
■ To provide for the rehabilitation of the disaster regions. 
In natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, avalanches, 
landslides, and large fires, military sector supports the civilian 
sectors. There are many examples of these kinds of supports. The 
best and up-to-date example is the earthquake in 1999. Military 
units were the first and foremost ones from government sector for 
help to the people of the damaged areas. 
In case of mobilization or war for Turkey, the civilian sector 
would support the military sector. At times of security crises or 
war, all kinds of communications and transport equipment that 
belong to the public and private organizations would be given to the 
military sector. 
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The cooperation between the civilian and military sectors in 
Turkey includes various fields. These extend from local to central 
authority. One possible field would be the preparation of plans, 
procedures and principles related to mobilization and preparation of 
war. The determination of priorities in the planning of the natural 
resources related to the needs of the TAFs, public and private sector 
could be a field for cooperation. 
Several steps could be taken to improve future joint missions. 
There are comprehensive and various administrative instruments in 
Turkey facilitating joint missions that are in effect now. Moreover, 
greater cooperation, coordination and reduced negative perceptions 
could be achieved through cultural sensitivity training, reforms to 
present coordination mechanisms, and greater understanding and 
respect for the differing organizational structures and cultures 
involved. One specific reform could include the creation of joint or 
linked training manuals. 
F.  DEFENSE INDUSTRY POLICY AND STRATEGY 
The Turkish defense industry has made significant progress in 
restructuring the domestic defense industry. Based on this concept, 
a "Defense Industry Policy and Strategy" was prepared that 
envisioned all the defense industry and procurement activities to be 
conducted according to a comprehensive plan. The objective of the 
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policy was to  form  a defense  industry  infrastructure  that has the 
following characteristics: 
■ Open to the foreign sector as well as the local sector, 
■ Having     a     dynamic     character,     export     potential     and 
international competitiveness, 
■ Easy adaptation of new technologies, 
■ Making maximum use of the existing capabilities, 
■ Capable of production for civilian purposes. 
During the next 20 to 30 years, a great part of the combat 
weapons and equipment in the TAFs' inventory should be 
modernized or replaced with systems that incorporate new 
technology. The cost of all these systems including their operation 
and maintenance is very high. Turkey's objective in modernizing the 
TAFs is to raise the Turkish Defense Industry to the level where it 
can produce the high technology weaponry and equipment needed by 
TAFs. Domestic production should be used to the maximum extent 
possible. In case of foreign procurement, priority should be given to 
those countries who advocate Turkey's long-term political interests 
in the international arena of equity, and who facilitate sales to third 
parties. ' 
In defense industry sector, Turkey is engaged in cooperating 
on bilateral or multilateral basis with a wide range of countries 
including NATO members, Middle East, and Far East countries. For 
example, Israel is one of the partners. Israel is a country with a vast 
experience in defense industry. It possesses advanced technology 
that results in the production of the state-of-the-art weapon systems. 
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Moreover,  it  is ready to  share  its  experience  and  expertise  with 
Turkey [Ref 55. p.3]. 
In short, while preparing the TAFs for the challenges of the 
21st century, Turkey's basic objective should be to have a defense 
industry that has a national character to the maximum extent 
possible and that enables Turkey to compete with modern countries 
in its area. 
G.      TURKISH ARMED FORCES' TEN-YEAR PROCUREMENT 
PROGRAM 
In 1997, the Turkish Defense Ministry revealed a $31 billion 
defense modernization and procurement program for the next 
decade, in an attempt to strengthen its armed forces. 
Defense Ministry planned to spend $31 billion between 1996 
and 2007 on the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces under 
the Ten-year Acquisition Program concept [Ref 56]. 
The program foresees the acquisition of thousands of armored 
combat and wheeled tactical vehicles, more than 100 attack 
helicopters, a tank-project, air-refueling and early-warning aircraft, 
warships, missile systems, communication and satellite systems, and 
modernization programs for fighter jets. 
It was the first time that such a detailed and complicated 
defense program had been announced. The Ministry of National 
Defense pointed out that they would present this program to the 
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private   sector   and   to   entrepreneurs   in   an   effort   to   draw   their 
attention to the defense sector. 
The Ministry of National Defense indicated that by means of 
such presentations, the private sector could be made aware of 
projects setting up investment policies for involvement in Turkey's 
defense industry. In this way, the domestic companies' share from 
Turkey's defense projects would increase. 
Defense Ministry stated that they would provide financial 
support as an incentive for local companies, who were willing to 
become involved in these projects. 
All the projects would be started with the aim of meeting the 
needs of TAFs from within Turkey trough technology transfer. 
However, because of the latest economic crises in Turkey, the 
Turkish Armed Forces have begun reviewing the projects included in 
the ten-year-procurement program [Ref 57]. 
TAFs were already negotiating with US-based Bell-Textron on 
a $4 billion contract for attack helicopters. TAFs were also 
discussing the purchase of six AWACS from Boeing, and planning to 
buy 1,000 tanks. 
In April 2001, TAFs have announced that most of the projects 
that would be carried out in the program would be cancelled until 
the    success    of   the    latest    economic    program.    However,    TAFs 
184 
continue to consider and plan to carry out the projects as possible in 
the foreseeable future. 
H.  EFFECTS OF TURKISH NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 
ON DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
As   mentioned   before,   the   threats   and   risks   to   Turkey's 
security in the post Cold War have changed. At the end of the Cold 
War, there was a search for new-world order. Unlike the Cold War 
period, Turkey now faces with a different set of security threats, 
risks, and challenges, which require new thinking and new 
approaches. 
Turkey is in a place that can be virtually called a "Bermuda 
Triangle," with the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East [Ref 
58]. Because of the needs of its position in such a place and the 
threats and risks it faces, Turkey has different sets of national 
defense strategies. For this reason, the formation of a military 
force structure is of great importance for Turkey. Turkey should 
maintain and develop this force according to the conditions and 
periods. As a result, attaining military power, which has the 
resources and capabilities of supporting the National Security 
Policy, constitute the basis for Turkey's Defense Policy and 
strategy in the 21st century. 
For the reasons mentioned above, the modernization of the 
TAFs  is  imminent  and  this modernization would be  set  up  by  a 
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construction   of the   infrastructure   of  a  modern   domestic   defense 
industry. 
After the establishment of the Under-Secretariat For The 
Defense Industry, the task of coordinating efforts for the 
modernization process has accelerated, and defense equipment has 
been produced domestically to some certain extent. The level of 
inventory of TAFs with respect to weapons, vehicles, and other 
military equipment are powerful illustrations of the operations 
undertaken by the national defense industry. 
If allocated enough funds today, Turkish defense industry is 
capable of meeting a significant part of the requirements of the 
TAFs. Systems produced for TAFs and the success of the Turkish 
companies on the international market reveal that Turkish defense 
industry is advanced and can compete in international markets [Ref 
55.P.4]. 
However, it should be pointed out that development of highly 
advanced military systems is currently beyond the capabilities of 
the national defense industry. This problem could be solved only by 
investing in research and development and making technology 
transfer by using offsets or joint ventures from advanced countries 
in defense industry such as Israel and USA. Defense industry 
cooperation with other countries is of the utmost importance to 
Turkey's national interests. 
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The Under-Secretariat For The Defense Industry is established 
for the sake of improving the infrastructure of defense industry in 
Turkey. However, it also takes into account the needs of the public 
sector and the needs of other state institutions. 
Even though the development of the national defense industry 
has not reached its desired level, the path covered in 16 years is a 
reason to be proud for the nation as a whole. Within the past 16 
years, Turkey has been able to export its products to every corner of 
the world in the fields of defense electronics, rockets, aviation, and 
armored vehicles [Ref 55. p. 4]. 
The agenda of the defense industry increases with the new 
projects parallel to the requirements of the TAFs. Moreover, the 
quality and the low cost of the products have a positive effect on 
the economy as a whole. It is obvious that this positive atmosphere 
will continue in the middle and long run. 
I.        DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF FUTURE DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
In   the   future   TAFs   must   be   engaged   in   the   areas   where 
Turkey's interests are. For this reason, it should be sufficiently 
mobile and capable of supporting operations both within and outside 
of Turkey in case of need. Turkish security planners should stress 
emphasis on high-performance weapons. 
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For the reasons mentioned above, TAFs should preserve and 
gain   the   following   characteristics   for   the  new   century   [Ref  53. 
p.81]: 
Smaller, active and ready reserve forces, 
Less forward basing, greater strategic mobility, 
Having and continuing weapons performance advantage, 
Substantial nuclear, chemical, and biological capability, 
Chemical, and biological defense capabilities, 
Greater dependence on mobilization. 
After pointing the future characteristics of TAFs, future 
characteristics of a national defense industry should be determined. 
These characteristics should be in relation with and supporting the 
needs of TAFs in the 21st century. Future defense industry should be 
affordable in development and peacetime acquisition of high- 
performance weapons. Moreover, it should be responsive in 
production of weapons and supporting equipment for use in any 
crisis or war. National defense industry characteristics should be as 
follows [Ref 53. p.81]: 
■ Advanced research and development capability, 
■ Ready access to civilian technology, 
■ Continuous design and prototyping capability, 
■ Limited,   efficient   peacetime   engineering   and   production 
capabilities in key defense sectors, 
■ Responsive     production     of     ammunition,     spares,     and 
consumables for theater conflict, ■ Healthy, mobilizable civilian production capability, 
■ Robust maintenance and overhaul capability, 
■ Good, integrated management. 
Constructing    and    having    a   nationally    advanced   research 
capability should be the highest priority. The need to have high- 
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performance weapons and guard against technological surprise 
necessitates a robust research and development capability. The 
research and development component of the defense industry should 
consist of some combination of private and public sector funding. 
The future defense industry base should be flexible and 
research-intensive. It should be integrated with the civilian sector 
and industry. It should retain its orientation towards high 
technology and high-performance weapons. 
Moreover, Turkish policy makers should give importance to 
constructing an autonomous defense industrial base within 
affordability constraints. This defense industry base should be 
capable of furnishing the full range of materials required by TAFs. 
Those military systems that would be produced internally should be 
at affordable cost. 
J.       EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
In the framing of a common defense policy, Treaty of the 
European Union allows for the Member States to cooperate in the 
field of armaments. But other rules exempt defense industries from 
the (Europe Union) EU laws that regulate competition in other 
sectors of the common marketplace [Ref 60]. This means that EU 
countries can enact measures that will protect their domestic 
defense companies from external competition. In addition to this, 
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procurement is undertaken on a national basis, from national 
defense budgets. As a result, fragmented procurement polices, 
redundant research and development (R&D) programs, and widely 
varying export control standards contribute to an overall level of 
inefficiency, which ultimately makes it difficult for European 
defense companies to compete with American products. 
Unless Europe coordinates its defense acquisitions, American 
defense companies will continue to dominate the European market 
and will eventually push European companies out of business [Ref 
61]. Moreover, the attempts by European governments to protect 
their indigenous industries through preventing the adoption of a 
single European market in defense has increased the threat of 
European companies becoming sub-contractors to the American 
defense industry companies. Because of the large US defense budget 
and because the US government is able to fund large acquisition 
packages, it is able to support longer production runs and achieve 
an economy of scale that would be otherwise impossible in Europe. 
The adverse result of the disjointed acquisition practices in Europe 
means that it is even more difficult for European governments and 
industries to cope with the rising costs of advanced technology. 
Thus, European defense companies are unable to compete with 
American companies that are able to offer cheaper and more cost 
efficient products for export. When all of these elements are added 
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together,   it   is   ultimately  more   expensive  to   fill   in  the   defense 
capabilities gap. 
TAFs is dependent upon the foreign contractors especially for 
the advanced weapon systems. Up to 2000, Turkey acquired most of 
the military systems from the companies usually working in USA. 
The dominance of those companies in the technological advance and 
cost of the systems usually caused such an inclination in weapons 
acquisition of TAFs. However, European countries and their defense 
sector companies has been an important partner in the acquisition 
process. If the Europe based companies achieve a better way of 
competition with their US counterparts, Turkey could shift its arms 
procurement process from US dominance towards Europe. 
The membership of the European Union has been an important 
issue for Turkey since 1960s. After entering the Customs Union in 
1994, it continuously pursued that goal. However, it is not likely 
that Turkey will achieve that goal in a short period of time. What 
Turkey wants to achieve with EU is to be technologically advanced 
and competitive in every field of economy, including the defense 
sector. 
Turkey's involvement in the projects carried out by the 
European defense contractors help it advance in the technology 
field. However, Turkey also continues to interact with the USA- 
based companies and with Israel. What Turkey should do is to use 
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the weakness of competition of the European defense market with 
respect to US companies and Israel and to continue its efforts to 
build a national defense industry. The consolidation and the 
competition weakness of European-based defense contractors should 
not affect Turkey's goal of optimizing its national defense 
industrial base. 
Turkey should acquire the advanced weapon systems in a cost 
effective way. It should follow a policy that would allow the easiest 
way of technology transfer from abroad. This kind of technology 
could be either in EU or in USA. Then, to have the best systems in 
use, the origin of the companies is not a matter to be considered: 
only the cooperation and the technology. 
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VIII. ARMING THE FUTURE 
A.       STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR THE FUTURE BASE 
To accomplish the desired characteristics of the future Turkish 
Defense Industry and Technology Base (TDITB) outlined in the 
previous chapter, Turkey should generate a long-term defense 
industry and technology strategy for identifying, developing and 
maintaining the critical facilities, technological know-how, and 
people needed to develop, manufacture and maintain future systems 
and to provide a core for resurgence of production in any future 
emergency. 
At the national government level, resource allocation 
involves choices between competing national priorities. Rolicy- 
makers must choose between allocating money for defense or for 
competing social needs such as health care, the old dichotomy of 
"guns versus butter." Having decided on the allocation of 
resources, decision-makers must then structure the use of defense 
funds by developing an overall strategy for the various government 
agencies with national-security responsibilities. 
There   are   three   broad   strategic    choices   that    should   be 
carefully   evaluated   to   define   a   well-reasoned   defense-industrial 
strategy for arming the future of Turkey: 
■   The degree of international interdependence versus national 
autonomy 
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■ The degree of reliance on the integration of civilian and 
military sectors versus an arsenal approach, and 
■ The allocation of resources between maximizing short-term 
military power versus acquiring the potential to develop 
and produce new weapons and defense equipment when 
needed. 
Improvised decisions, made in the place of a strategy, will 
most likely result in a weak TDITB that will weaken Turkey's 
defense. In practice, Turkey should not pursue any one strategic 
choice to the complete exclusion of the others. Instead, the various 
defense industrial sectors should be positioned along a continuum 
according to a weighing of the risks and benefits of applying a 
particular strategy. 
1. International Interdependence vs. National Autonomy 
If Turkey remains weak in a critical military technology, the 
purchase of a weapon system or component from the best available 
foreign source creates a dilemma, since in making the purchase 
Turkey might improve its short-term military power but may weaken 
its long-term defense technological potential. From a standpoint of 
being concerned about the health of the domestic defense-industrial 
base and increasing Turkish international industrial 
competitiveness, adopting a "buy national" strategy that 
concentrates Turkey's limited funds on domestic industry might 
look like a feasible solution. This is due to the fact that foreign- 
sourcing can wear away the current capabilities of the TDITB and 
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delay Turkey's efforts to gain new capabilities. It also makes it 
more difficult to shift resources from the civilian to the defense 
sectors as domestic firms might go out of business. Moreover, 
foreign-sourcing can weaken Turkey's defense capability if foreign 
firms are less responsive to Turkish defense needs than are domestic 
producers. On the other hand, procuring most or all weapon systems 
and defense material from domestic producers can reduce the risk of 
supply cutoffs during a crisis, free domestic suppliers of services 
and equipment from the threat of unfair foreign competition, and 
increase the demand for domestic defense products, thus potentially 
increasing the national industrial productivity through larger 
production runs and more funding for technology development. 
However, the key national-security consideration should not 
be total foreign content, but foreign vulnerability related to critical 
technologies or products [Ref 62 pp.1-15] 
The alternative strategic choice will be the increased 
interdependence with allies, especially the U.S. and other NATO 
members. This strategy recognizes both the ongoing globalization of 
the technology and industrial base and the increasing cost of 
developing new weapon systems. The inauguration of industrial 
globalization implies an interdependence of allied nations for the 
technologies and even the components of defense systems. Given the 
constraints on defense spending and Turkey's crucial need for funds 
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to revive the domestic economy, Turkey should consider 
concentrating on developing and manufacturing critical weapon 
systems domestically while exploiting the benefits of collaboration 
with foreign sources for some of its requirements in other areas. 
Advantages of international interdependence might be to 
create a more competitive environment, ultimately decreasing the 
price of military products; to facilitate standardization and 
interoperability of weapons with allies; and, to assure access to the 
best technologies as new scientific developments take place around 
the world. Even with an increased international interdependency, 
Turkey should develop and preserve selected critical technologies 
for reasons of national security or industrial competitiveness. 
Especially, the capability to design and produce, if necessary, the 
major weapon systems should be attained and maintained, even if 
current economic conditions might favor foreign-sourcing. Major 
weapon systems include fighter planes, ships, submarines and 
armored combat vehicles/tanks. 
2.       Arsenal System vs. Civil-Military Integration 
A second choice relates to the internal structure of the base. 
There are two alternatives: On one hand, Turkey can rely on 
arsenals, either government or privately owned, that might be sole- 
source   producers   of   particular   military   systems.    (Arsenals   are 
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usually considered to be government-owned facilities that 
manufacture military material. However, the arsenal system is 
composed of either government facilities such as MKEK, or private 
firms that might be sole-source producers of a particular defense 
technology, such as TAI). On the other hand, Turkey can modify its 
military requirements to match what might be available from the 
commercial sector and move toward a more integrated national 
industrial and technological base. 
An arsenal system, composed of a combination of government- 
owned facilities and sole-source private firms, might allow efficient 
development and manufacturing of military-unique equipment. Such 
a strategy will concentrate on establishing and maintaining a limited 
number of expert sources of weapons and equipment and will 
restrict competition for government contracts to those firms and 
public facilities with recognized skills. The French defense industry 
is one example of an arsenal system in which companies, referred to 
as National Champions, have been the sole producer of defense-only 
products. An arsenal system might allow Turkey to develop and 
conserve needed expertise that can then be expanded in a crisis; to 
improve the efficiency of bid and proposal for contracts; and, to 
increase the stability of the production. However, in the absence of 
full and open competition, this strategy will require different ways 
to be considered to control costs and foster innovation. 
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The   alternative   choice   is   to   place   greater   reliance   on  the 
integration of civil  and military sectors, buying civilian parts off 
the shelf and using more civilian technology and procedures. This 
strategy   might   lower   costs   of  weapon   system   development   and 
production by using readily available technologies and products; it 
could result in an improved and increased mobilization  capability 
against     a     major     threat.     Eliminating     unnecessary     military 
specifications   might   result   in   lower   costs   for   parts   purchased 
directly    from    commercial    suppliers,    and    might    attract    more 
companies   into   the   defense   work.   On   the   other   hand,   increased 
reliance   on   the   civilian  base   might   include  reduced  performance 
edge   of weapons   over   those   of potential   adversaries.   Moreover, 
commercial   parts   might   not   be   capable   of performing   with  high 
reliability under severe combat conditions. 
Civil-military integration should be pursued on a case-by-case 
basis. The choice of an arsenal system or civil integration is also 
highly dependent on the industrial sector in question. For example, 
nuclear weapon systems will always have to be built in arsenals. 
Major weapon systems such as armored vehicles, tanks, fighter 
aircrafts, ships and submarines might also be built in arsenals as 
well, but electronic components and a host of other components 
might be better sourced from, the civil sector. More diversification 
into   civilian   markets   and   more   integration   between   civilian   and 
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military products might also help defense firms withstand 
fluctuations in defense spending. 
The future is likely to bring out an environment in which 
nations maintain only a very few defense-unique sectors in the 
economy for technologies that are specific to defense, such as 
nuclear weaponry. For most defense needs, they would have to 
cooperatively link up with the commercial sector for research and 
development and for acquisitions of materials, components, and 
equipment. 
In Turkey's case, it is very unlikely that the Turkish domestic 
market for major weapon systems will be large enough to support 
more than one producer in each of the major sectors. Therefore, it 
might be a very good strategy to create arsenals at the prime 
contractor level for major weapon systems, which will dominate the 
domestic defense business in their sectors, and each should be the 
sole depository of design and systems-integration know-how for an 
entire category of defense equipment. In such a structure, the 
Undersecratariat for Defense Industry should be responsible for 
imposing administrative controls on price and quality, while 
simultaneously cooperating with industry to maintain profits, 
employment, and investment in new technologies. The effective 
administrative controls must help ensure that the lack of domestic 
competition at the prime-contractor level does not result in out of 
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control costs. Since the TAFs are the single dominant customer for 
defense products, administrative controls on quality and costs will 
be more appropriate than relying on market mechanisms such as 
competition. These arsenals should be closely monitored and 
encouraged to stay in close touch with the rest of the national 
industrial base and to employ the new technologies and the readily 
available commercial products in developing and producing the so- 
called weapon systems. The arsenals should be encouraged to 
compete in commercial ventures or international defense 
competition to encourage them to aggressively control costs. 
3.        Short-Term Military Might vs. Potential Capability 
Another choice concerns the allocation of resources between 
expanding current military capabilities and future defense potential. 
Decisions must be made between procuring current weapons and 
spending more on research to develop technology and industrial 
infrastructure, which will provide Turkey with capabilities for 
future weapons, without any commitment to full production, and 
ultimately between spending on the military and other national 
needs. 
While it may be necessary in a fiscally constrained 
environment to retain only the potential for manufacturing enough 
sophisticated  platforms,   such   as  the   most  advanced   aircraft  and 
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armored vehicles needed to fight a major conflict, there is still a 
requirement to have sufficient fielded weapons, including aircraft 
and tanks, to support warfare contingencies. These deployed 
weapons will be a product of the limited peacetime defense 
production base and they will be upgraded with new components as 
necessary until a new technological breakthrough or aging of the 
systems prompts modernization. 
The approach of maintaining future military potential in the 
face of sharply reduced defense budget is currently termed as 
"research strategy." Such a strategy covers a range of possibilities. 
In the simplest terms, it means spending proportionally more on 
R&D and less on production. But increasingly radical approaches 
are also imaginable. An alternative might be to build a limited 
number of demonstration models with hard tooling (stamps and dies 
designed to serve for a long production run of one particular part) 
on an actual production line to prove manufacturing concepts and 
allow field testing -after limited production, the line will be shut 
down, whereas, another strategy might call for the production of 
demonstration models with soft tooling (less durable and 
specialized, but enough for making only a few items), without 
proceeding to develop an actual production line. Yet another 
extreme case of research strategy might involve no prototype be 
built.    Instead,    designers    might    develop    components    and    use 
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computer-aided design techniques to test concepts and develop 
technical data packages that can subsequently be produced when 
needed. While this type of "research strategy' is many years from 
being a practical reality, manufacturing technology is moving in 
that direction. Computer-aided design, computer simulation of 
operational environments, a design philosophy emphasizing high 
reliability and ease of maintenance, and automated flexible 
manufacturing will all make this type of research strategy a more 
practical alternative. 
Each of the research strategy alternatives has certain 
limitations. Moving along the spectrum from production to pure 
research lower costs but increases risk and uncertainty. Without 
actually working out the manufacturing process, it might not be 
possible to foresee all the roadblocks standing between an idea and 
the actual production" run. Thus, while building prototypes can 
reduce unforeseen problems with systems integration, building one 
or two prototypes might tell very little about serial or large-scale 
production, operational use, maintenance, and reliability. 
Moreover, the potential of many past weapon systems and 
logistics support were not fully appreciated until enough of them 
had been deployed to allow military commanders to experiment with 
them in field exercises or on the battlefield. A process that 
generates   a   continuous   flow   of hypothetical   weapons   will   never 
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allow military commanders to develop optimal tactics for using 
them, nor provide logisticians the capability to support them, nor 
will it allow the military bureaucracy to assimilate new weapon 
systems prior to a major conflict. 
Currently, the weapon systems and other defense equipment in 
TAFs inventory are one of the oldest among the allies in NATO and 
the   costs   to   maintain   these   systems   and   equipment   has   been 
increasing   exponentially.   Therefore,   Turkey   is   in   dire   need   of 
replacing or at least upgrading its current inventory of weapons and 
military    equipment.    Apparently,    some    might    argue    that    the 
escalating insecurity in the environment surrounding Turkey and its 
national  interests  necessitates  the  immediate  foreign-sourcing  of 
new    systems    and   equipment.    Even    in    doing    so,    the    Turkish 
government should require the potential sellers to set up production 
facilities   in   Turkey   and   transfer   technology.   Foreign   producers 
should be asked to establish laboratories and training centers as part 
of the production facilities to educate and involve domestic work 
force and engineers in designing and producing future systems. A 
plain purchase  of weapons  and  other  defense  equipment will  not 
only hinder Turkey's gaining of military technology, but also will 
waste the nation's already limited resources with no future benefits. 
Another option to respond to the immediate needs of the armed 
forces might be to skip the current generation of the systems, by 
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only upgrading the current systems in its inventory. This can extend 
the service lives of these systems for another 7-10 years, and allow 
the country to channel the funds to R&D programs. These programs 
should    be    aimed    to    develop    the    technology    and    production 
infrastructure, which will  be used to  design and produce the next 
generation of weapon systems and defense equipment. This option 
can   accelerate   Turkey's   efforts   to   close   the   gap   between   its 
domestic   defense-industrial   capabilities   and   world-class   defense 
sectors.  Moreover,  the  level  of funding,  created  by  deferring the 
acquisition   of   new   systems,   might   also   contribute   to   national 
industrial base by using dual-use technologies and increased civil- 
military integration. 
B.       TACTICAL DECISIONS 
Having decided on the strategic issues, Turkish policy-makers 
will need to elaborate on the following tactical decisions involved 
in achieving the desirable characteristics of the future base. These 
decisions will occur within the context of the broad strategies 
discussed above. 
1.        Shifting    Emphasis    From    Production    to    Advanced 
Research and Development 
A   robust   domestic   defense   industrial   base   will   require   an 
advanced R&D  capability that can  1) maintain qualitative weapon 
204 
performance superiority against potential adversaries; 2) create 
opportunities for innovation and hedge against technological 
breakthroughs by opponents; and 3) support Turkey's overall 
economic strength and industrial development, which is ultimately 
the source of its military strength. 
An advanced defense R&D capability includes world-class 
personnel (individuals and teams); cutting-edge research that guards 
against technological surprise; vigorous efforts in critical 
technologies; a balance between the near-term technology needs and 
long-term national defense needs; strong links to manufacturing, so 
that proposed weapon systems are producible; and integration with 
civilian R&D. 
The advanced R&D capability of the base should be embodied 
in the dedicated defense base and the larger civilian base. 
Expanding and maintaining this capability requires the retention and 
replacement of skilled R&D personnel; the identification of core 
competencies; and the development of new ways to discipline, 
guide, and evaluate R&D within a streamlined defense R&D 
establishment. 
a.       Organizations and Activities 
The   research   and   development   component   of   TDITB 
might  include   industry   laboratories,   government  laboratories  and 
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test   facilities,   and   ultimately,   university   research   centers   that 
conduct research relevant to defense. 
As    a   very    rough    rule,    universities    might    tend    to 
concentrate on basic research, government laboratories on applied 
research,    and    industry    on    development    and    engineering.    The 
research phase involves investigating new technologies that have a 
variety   of applications;   when   a  specific  application  is   in   sight, 
development  and  engineering  work  is  required to  incorporate  the 
technology   into   a   product.   The   purpose   of the   exploratory   and 
advanced   development   stage   is   to   obtain   information   about   the 
design and engineering of a new system so that a decision can be 
made to enter production with adequate confidence about schedule, 
performance, and cost. 
b. Funding Research and Development 
The resource requirement for research and development 
can be funded through different ways. Industry firms can fund their 
activities either from direct government R&D contracts or from 
company profits generated through sales of goods and services. For 
example, while the government may provide a company with a 
contract for the development of a system, the company may also 
contribute substantial amounts of its own money, which can be 
justified if the development leads to a profitable production 
contract.    Government    can   also   allow   contractors   charge    some 
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fraction   of  their   R&D   expenses   against   ongoing   contracts,   i.e. 
companies    can    charge    some    of   their   R&D    as    an    allowable 
reimbursable expense, an element of overhead necessary to stay in 
business.   By   doing   so,   however,   Government   must   define   and 
approve the general research areas and amounts as to which R&D. 
expenses  will  be  reimbursed.   Government  should  also   encourage 
universities to  be involved in defense  related R&D by providing 
them with funds to set up advanced laboratories, and by granting 
research funds to universities, which can also contribute to national 
science and technology base. Finally, it should be remembered that 
there    is    a    close    link    between    R&D    and    production.    If   the 
government wants to maintain R&D in spite of reduced procurement 
level, then R&D must be made profitable in its  own right.  If the 
government opts to continue R&D in its own laboratories, it has to 
make the results of R&D widely available to the industry in order 
not to exacerbate the separation of research and production. 
c.        Managerial Guidance 
Currently, there is no organization, governmental or 
non-governmental, that manages the R&D component, which is very 
small in size, of TDITB. In fact, there is very little R&D in defense 
field. However, it is of vital importance to establish an agency that 
will direct the research and development component of TDITB by 
monitoring and coordinating the nation-wide defense-related R&D 
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activities,   establishing   priorities,    funding   research   carried   out 
either    in    government    or    industry    laboratories    and    managing 
collaboration  with  the  armed  forces.   It  should  monitor  the  other 
research by the national laboratories in non-defense fields (energy, 
electronics, etc.) to maintain a pool of scientific and engineering 
talent   and   knowledge   that   could   be   helpful   for   meeting   future, 
military needs. The new agency, like DRET of France, DTI of South 
Africa   or   DARPA   of US,   should   be   responsible   for  monitoring 
defense-related  developments   in   science  and  technology  not  only 
within the country, but also outside Turkey, and bringing them to 
the   attention   of technical   directorates,   users   and   contractors.   It 
should   encourage   the   defense   industry   firms   to   engage   in   R&D 
activities    that    (1)    strengthen    TDITB,    (2)    enhance    Turkey's 
industrial  competitiveness,  (3) promote  critical  technologies,  and 
(4)   support  dual-use  technologies.   It   should   also   define  nation's 
defense   research  priorities   on   an   annual   basis.   The   new   agency 
should   have   the   flexibility   and   responsiveness   to   shift   defense- 
research priorities  to  the  emerging  security  environment.  Defense 
Industries Research and Development Institute (SAGE), which is an 
affiliate   of  The   Scientific   and   Technical   Research   Council   of 
Turkey  (TUBITAK), might be the best candidate for this mission. 
Even   though   it  has   very   limited   resources   and   capabilities,   this 
institution might easily be transformed into such an agency and, if 
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funded sufficiently, could easily carry out the above mentioned 
requirements, with its close ties with Turkish R&D community in 
general and limited experience in defense R&D. 
d.       Human Resources 
An advanced R&D capability requires qualified human 
resources, which are the key to a nation's defense R&D capability. 
Strategies for attracting and retaining good research and 
development personnel should include higher pay, a challenging 
work environment, and job security. Over the long term, interesting 
and challenging work is the most important motivation. Thus, even 
during times of economic crisis or defense cuts, it is necessary to 
maintain meaningful work for defense R&D personnel, possibly 
through research grants and programs not directly tied to 
production. In times of budget cuts and shrinking market, laying off 
quality personnel might yield quick savings but, in long-term it may 
endanger the design and manufacturing capabilities of the base. In 
fact, Turkey needs to develop not only its defense R&D base but 
also the national science and technology base. Currently, it is one of 
the countries with the lowest funding for R&D activities and badly 
in need of an advanced research and development base. Only about 2 
percent of the defense budget is allocated for the financing of 
defense research activities in Turkey. Moreover, in order to access 
civilian   technology   and   to   the   R&D   personnel   employed   in  the 
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larger mobilizable civilian base, Turkey should closely monitor and 
maintain   R&D   capabilities   in   dual-use   areas   such   as   aerospace, 
electronics,   and   advanced   materials,   all   of which   are   critical   to 
designing next generations of military and commercial systems. 
e.        Identifying Core Competencies 
Another important step in creating a national advanced 
defense R&D capability is the identification of core competencies. 
Turkey should immediately identify and prioritize the technologies 
for which it should maintain a domestic knowledge base in the face 
of   growing   resource   constraints   and   international    competition. 
Identifying    such    "core    competencies"   that    are    critical    to    its 
economic    health    and    military    security    can    also    assist    the 
government   in   adequately   funding   a   small   number   of truly   vital 
areas of R&D with limited resources. It also helps in concentrating 
the  defense R&D efforts in those sectors that are both of critical 
importance  to  military  systems  and  not  available  elsewhere.   For 
example, it may be necessary to abandon defense electronics R&D in 
those areas where civilian sector can be depended on to improve 
performance, such as higher speed and smaller size, and concentrate 
on those areas where no civilian R&D is taking place. As a result 
the  country will need to place greater emphasis on civilian R&D. 
Similar arguments hold with respect to foreign-sourced technology. 
Turkey may  have  to  focus  its  R&D  efforts  on  those  technologies 
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deemed to be critical, while placing greater reliance on allies and 
international industry in other areas. 
/. Maintaining Competition 
Competition in R&D might be used to promote 
innovation and impose discipline for greater cost efficiency. But 
while competition must continue in defense R&D, during a period of 
severely limited defense funding, it should be structured differently. 
Rather than competing laboratories, there might be competing 
design teams at the same laboratory. Similarly, in the private sector, 
a few lean design teams with associated manufacturing capability 
can be maintained for each major type of weapon system or 
technology. And, instead of domestic competition among Turkish 
firms, there might be international competition, with Turkey relying 
on a single domestic source in competition with other world-class 
producers. One major question is whether to focus on weapon 
performance rather than manufacturing, reliability, and product 
maintenance. Trading some of the performance for improved 
reliability, lower-cost manufacturing, and reduced maintenance 
requires changing the incentive structure to make other design goals 
as important as performance in the overall development process. 
g.   Developing Design and Prototyping Capability 
A key element of the future TDITB will be a continuous 
design   and   prototyping   capability  that   can   operate   with  reduced 
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R&D spending in the face of curtailed production. The extent to 
which designs are carried through to manufacture will depend on 
whether there is a technological development that provides a 
significant operational performance advantage. Some prototypes 
will lead to force modernization, while others will simply advance 
the state of knowledge within the defense technology base. 
Like R&D in general, the capability to design and 
develop new systems rests largely with people, namely the design 
and engineering teams essential for the development of modern 
weapon systems. These teams may vary in size according to the 
complexity of the system and the stage of development. For 
example, design teams for a modern fighter aircraft can grow from a 
half dozen people in the initial conceptual design phase to a few 
hundred to a thousand engineers with a variety of skills during 
prototype development and testing. The size of the design teams 
also varies considerably by product and can apparently be kept 
small without undue harm to design quality. 
The idea of having a design and prototyping capability 
that is not directly linked to production might be criticized as 
impractical partly because good design teams are unlikely to 
continue to work without seeing any tangible results, and partly 
because the design process needs an occasional 'reality check". In 
fact, these are not undefeatable obstacles. Scales prototypes can test 
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technological innovations, keep design teams interested, and allow 
them to be ready when new requirements arise. 
Overall,    Turkey    should    focus    on    defense    research    and 
development,  and  increase  the  government funding  and  encourage 
private    sector    to    commit    more    funds    into    R&D.    Although 
commercial    and   defense    R&D    are    budgeted   and   administered 
separately, defense R&D benefits the overall economy. In addition 
to  contracted  R&D,  the  government  should  draw  on  independent 
research conducted by defense companies. A portion of these R&D 
expenses   should   be   reimbursed   as   overhead   costs   on   defense 
contracts. All of these efforts will advance the country by allowing 
companies to stay current in critical  areas of defense technology, 
encouraging technical innovations, and giving government scientist 
and engineers valuable insights into ongoing industrial research. 
2.      Efficient, Responsive And Mobilizable Production 
In the face of demand for lesser defense expenditure and 
increased instability in the security environment, Turkey should 
make several tactical decisions to establish an efficient, responsive 
and mobilizable production base. Among these are the determination 
of production planning, which requires a tradeoff between efficient 
peacetime production of weapons and wartime responsiveness and 
the formation of the acquisition system, which might lead to the 
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isolation   of   defense   producers    from   the   rest   of   the   national 
industrial base if not addressed properly. 
a.        Identifying Critical Areas 
Initially, the strategy for future TDITB should identify 
the critical items of defense equipment that might be required for 
future short-notice contingencies. Then, the capacity to design and 
produce these vital defense materials should be developed and 
preserved to meet those needs. Nevertheless, it should also be 
recognized that starting up the production of vital defense materials 
quickly and achieving effective and efficient production depends on 
the amount of parts and components that have been stockpiled for 
future contingency-production. 
Since much of the defense production efforts is 
generally in sub-tier firms, maintaining industrial responsiveness 
entails either preserving critical sub-tier capabilities or allowing 
vertical integration to occur as prime contractors bring more 
subcontracting in-house, possibly by not requiring the second- 
sourcing of spare parts. However, in the Turkish case, vertical 
integration of defense industries is not desirable and Turkey should 
seek to maintain a diverse vendor base of competing subcontractors 
and suppliers, many of them small and mid-sized firms. Competition 
should be sought at the level of subcontractors and suppliers. 
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Establishing a small responsive base of the type 
envisioned requires identifying critical areas of defense production, 
setting priorities, and funding a surge capacity in the identified 
areas. 
b.       Surge Capacity 
Under the current security conditions, surge production 
capacity should be limited to those munitions, spare parts, and 
consumables that are critical to war fighting, and it should be 
recognized that responsiveness also assumes ongoing production. In 
addition, there might be a need for the capability to modify fielded 
systems rapidly as combat experience reveals operational 
shortcomings. Much of this immediate support in a wartime 
contingency would probably have to be maintained in a dedicated 
defense base, although some products, such as clothing and food, 
have sufficient commonality with the civilian production to allow 
for greater use of the civilian base. 
The degree of foreign dependence that Turkey can accept 
in meeting identified surge requirements is a controversial issue, 
and one that should be addressed directly. Domestic laws cannot 
compel priority production of items by foreign manufacturers. 
Nevertheless, Turkey can hedge against defense production 
bottleneck in a crisis by stockpiling foreign-sourced parts. Since the 
responsive  base  will  be  devoted primarily to  supporting military 
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equipment already in the field, some degree of foreign vulnerability 
may be unavoidable but can be minimized by developing multiple 
foreign suppliers. 
Maintaining a selective surge capability requires 
complex and expensive planning. Indeed, the key to having a 
responsive base is to determine which items require a surge 
capability and to fund that capability. Industrial preparedness 
planning requires a coherent management approach and must be 
coordinated with realistic war reserve stocks to ensure rapid 
response in a crisis. 
Production lines for selected surge items should be kept 
open with low levels of production and depot level maintenance of 
the    items    should   be   directed   to   production   facilities    thereby 
decreasing the cost of investment. Since peacetime production rates 
of these items are likely to be too low to support second-sourcing, 
Turkey will have to move toward greater reliance on single sources 
with additional surge capacity.  When meeting  surge requirements, 
civilian goods such as clothing, fasteners and subcomponents, and 
services   such   as   maintenance   and   food   service   should   be   used 
whenever   possible.   Thus,   preserving   a   rapid-response   industrial 
capacity may require substantial changes in the defense-procurement 
statues   and   regulations   to   allow   greater   use   of the   commercial 
industrial base and sole-sources. 
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Having identified the limited number of items to be 
included in the responsive element of the base, the Turkish 
government may chose to fund the capability to surge. This funding 
should be considered as essential as to national security as funding 
for troop exercises or any other training or contingency planning. 
Surge simulations and exercises will also be necessary. 
The Turkish government should be cautious about 
funding surge capability. To be successful, surge capability must be 
supported by stockpiles of components and parts required for 
production. However, maintaining such stockpiles is expensive and 
might be inefficient. It may eventually drain the economic strength 
of the nation. A better approach may be to stockpile finished goods 
in key war fighting areas. These stocks would be a strategic reserve. 
c.       Mobilization Base 
While the responsive portion of the TDITB enables the 
nation to cope with less challenging but more likely theater-level 
contingencies, producing military equipment in peacetime at 
affordable prices requires access to a larger industrial base - partly 
dedicated to defense production and partly remaining in the civil 
sector. This mobilizable component of the production base provides 
a hedge against a great-power threat that can arise over a period of 
years. It comprises defense contractors whose products -tanks, 
ships,     and     fighter    aircraft-    will    not    be    surged    in    lesser 
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contingencies, civilian factories and workers that can be transferred 
to defense production, and some foreign suppliers. Since rapid 
responsiveness is not a requirement, the defense plants in the 
mobilizable component of the base should be sized for small, 
realistic production runs to support the peacetime modernization of 
forces. In addition, reliance on a mobilizable base implies the 
maintenance of a robust, civilian manufacturing sector in 
electronics, machine tools, and heavy vehicles that is capable of 
converting to defense production in an emergency. 
Recent developments in manufacturing technology have 
led to much interest in the so-called "factory of the future," which 
will  make  extensive  use of automation and computer-aided design 
and manufacturing, relying less on computers and robots than on a 
new philosophical approach that emphasizes flexibility in meeting a 
wide     variety     of    customer     demands.     Greater     flexibility     in 
manufacturing will require more integration of civilian and defense 
production.   For   example,   it   may   eventually   become   possible   to 
exploit     the     inherent     flexibility     of    "dual-use"     factories     to 
manufacture   military   components   that   have   no' direct   civilian 
counterparts.   With the  help  of a  small   cadre  of personnel  in  the 
dedicated defense base, dual-use factories can be capable of shifting 
from    civil    production   to    the    manufacture    of   weapons    in    an 
emergency. Nevertheless, such truly flexible manufacturing systems 
218 
remain distant. Success of such an approach depends on access to 
raw materials and semi-finished goods that can feed wartime 
production. 
To harness the country's total industrial strength against 
a major threat and to exploit future flexible manufacturing, weapons 
design should be determined more by commercially available 
technologies than by the desire to optimize military performance. 
Moreover, since the mobilizable component of the defense base is 
embedded in the larger civilian base, the strategy for transition to 
the future TDITB should be shaped by concerns for increasing the 
international competitiveness of Turkish civilian industrial base. 
Maintaining the ability to make national security use of 
the mobilizable production base does not necessarily entail more 
government intervention, but it requires planning and better 
tracking of the changing capabilities of the base. Turkey should 
invest in establishing and updating databases that monitor the 
country's industrial resources and the Ministries of National 
Defense, and Commerce and Technology should assign more staff to 
follow defense-industrial issues. In those cases where MoND 
considers it essential to maintain a domestic capability to 
manufacture particular defense items, the government may have to 
invest in creating or maintaining a domestic source; in less critical 
cases, the decision may be made to source abroad. It is likely that 
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the   mobilizable   production   base   will   place   greater   reliance   on 
interdependence with allies than the responsive base. 
3.        Maintenance and Overhaul 
The maintenance and overhaul component of the base consists 
of   government   facilities   such   as   naval   shipyards,   air   logistic 
centers, and army arsenals and depots, as well as private firms that 
maintain and repair equipment either at their own facilities or in the 
field. Maintenance and repair, always a critical factor in supporting 
military forces, will be increasingly important in a period in which 
currently available equipment will be retained for extended periods, 
due to the desire to lower defense expenditure to provide funds to 
boost the country's battered domestic economy. Several studies have 
indicated that up to 50 percent of the total cost of a weapon system 
are attributed to the operations and maintenance costs over the life 
of the deployed systems. Not only does it make maintenance and 
repair   capabilities   important,    but    it   should    also    increase   the 
importance  of maintainability and reliability  as  design factors in 
weapon systems. 
For most weapons systems, the maintenance and overhaul 
component of the base is generally confronted with limited 
requirements in the short term (5 to 10 years) and increasing 
requirements the longer systems are retained in inventory. The size 
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of the increase also depends on the effort devoted to designing 
improved maintability into new systems. Investing in this area can 
keep maintenance requirements low by historic standards, but 
maintenance improvements are rarely funded in military budgets. 
An important question for this issue is whether maintenance 
should be performed by military overhaul/service depots/centers or 
by the private sector. Traditionally, maintenance and overhaul have 
been a responsibility of the military services, but a growing number 
of manufacturing firms, faced with the prospect of fewer contracts, 
are becoming interested in maintenance, remanufacture, and retrofit 
work. 
In this matter, Turkey should seek to consolidate 4th level and 
5th level maintenance responsibilities of the weapon systems and 
major defense equipment to only one level of depot maintenance and 
maximize the use of outsourcing these services to the producers of 
systems, so that their facilities are kept working and the cost of 
investment is lowered. The military services might argue that in- 
house maintenance facilities provide greater flexibility and 
responsiveness in supporting overall force readiness. Further, the 
services might be wary of over-reliance on private firms. 
As mentioned above, the Turkish defense market is not likely 
to be large enough to accommodate more than one producer of major 
weapon systems like tanks, aircraft and helicopters, battleships and 
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submarines. On the other hand, if the facilities, which have been set 
up for providing the nation with domestic production capabilities, 
cannot   be   supported   by   increased   exports   in   times   of   smaller 
national   demand   levels,   it   might   keep   these   facilities   alive   to 
concentrate    most    of    the    depot    level    maintenance    on    them.. 
Maintenance, overhaul, and upgrade contracts might be critical to 
maintaining   design   and   productio'n   capability   for   some   weapon 
systems  such as armored vehicles.  Additionally, retaining service 
maintenance   and   overhaul   centers   might   also   help   increase   the 
competition in providing higher quality and lower costs. 
C.       INTEGRATED      DECISION      MAKING      AND      BETTER 
MANAGEMENT 
A  sound,  carefully  devised  defense  industry  and  technology 
base strategy, which includes long-term planning objectives, can 
only be executed with qualified cadres in an integrated decision- 
making environment. Management of the DITB depends on skilled 
and experienced personnel. Currently, these skills are often lacking 
in Turkey's system because of the short tenure and inexperience on 
the part of many political appointees and military personnel. 
Therefore, as the first step, a creation of a professional civilian 
acquisition corps similar to those of France, Germany and other 
European countries should be considered immediately to provide 
quality management. 
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Although the Law No. 3238 has decreed a wide-based structure 
for the management and the coordination of the activities of TDITB, 
the   current  management  of TDITB   has  been   carried   out  by  The 
Defense   Industry   Executive   Committee,   which   is   formed   by  the 
Chief of the General Staff and Minister of National Defense under 
the direction of the Prime Minister. Despite the fact that the law has 
ordered that the Defense Industry High Coordination Board would 
meet   at   least   twice   a   year   to   provide   the   highest   level   of 
coordination   and   planning   for   defense   industrial   activities,   the 
board has not ever met since the promulgation of the law in 1985. 
[Ref 63 p.11] This board consists of 14 members including the state 
minister responsible  for Economy,  Ministers  of National Defense, 
Foreign Affairs, Finance, Industry and Trade, the Chief of General 
Staff,   Commanders   of  Army,   Navy   and   Air   Force,   and   3   other 
Undersecrataries. Therefore, in order to integrate defense-industrial 
policy   with   other   industrial,   economic,   and   social   policies   in   a 
systematic     way     to     develop     a     broader     strategic-industrial 
perspective,   Turkish   government   should   take   a   broad   view   of 
national defense covering military forces, civil defense, and their 
economic and industrial underpinnings. In addition to the Ministry 
of National   Defense   and  other  military   authorities,   several   non- 
defense agencies should be included in the higher level decision- 
making   processes.   Along   with   the   Undersecratariat   for   Defense 
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Industry   and   Ministry   of   National   Defense,   the   Ministries   of 
Economics     and     Finance,     Industry    and    Foreign     Trade,     and 
Transportation   should   participate   in   various   aspects   of defense- 
industrial   planning.   In  contrast  to  a  system  where  economic  and 
security decision-making are segregated in different bureaucracies 
and   there   are   few   mechanisms   for   resolving   conflicts   between 
economic   and  national-security  interests,   Turkey   should  adopt  a 
system   where   all   the   agencies,   which   have   responsibilities   that 
might affect national industrial infrastructure and TDITB, should be 
included   to   mitigate   the   risks   of   conflict   in   the   planning   and 
execution of inter-related strategies. Moreover the tendency to make 
decisions     in     a     secretive,     top-down     manner,     with     limited 
accountability   to   Turkish   Grand   National   Assembly   (TGNA),  the 
legislative  body  of Turkey, or the public should be regarded as a 
drawback  of the  current  system  and  should be transformed  into  a 
structure  where  TGNA  and the public  can have  more  information 
about what is going on and hold the members of defense industrial 
management accountable for their conduct and decisions. 
In an environment where long-term manufacturing plans are 
vital for the health of the industry, multiyear budgeting becomes an 
imperative to eliminate the effects of unpredictability. Currently the 
Turkish Parliament approves the annual defense budget as part of 
the   whole   government   budget   and   votes   on   an   overall   spending 
224 
envelope rather than individual line items and weapon systems. The 
relative lack of parliamentary oversight and interference enables the 
government to manipulate the defense budgets to fund other major 
defense programs. Instead of this, a separate budget law for defense 
programs, which can cover more than one fiscal year, might be more 
helpful in eliminating the uncertainty about the future of the 
programs and ensure stronger support from the members of the 
parliament. 
The improvement of the dialog between the TAFs and the 
defense industry can play a critical role in improving TDITB's role 
in international armaments cooperation. Therefore it is critical to 
provide a platform where industry can suggest ways in which TAFs 
can modify policies, procedures, and guidance to make Turkish 
companies more competitive participants in international teaming 
and export markets. Establishment of a standing industry body to 
develop the dialog, advise on and monitor the implementation of 
decisions, and to keep the TAFs leadership informed of additional 
industry concerns in the broad area of international defense trade 
might prove very useful. 
Finally, Undersecratariat for Defense Industry should have the 
sole responsibility for weapon acquisition programs and arms 
exports. In addition to supplying the armed forces and safeguarding 
the autonomy of the national defense industry, SSM should adapt 
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the industry to Turkey's overall industrial needs and negotiate 
collaborative weapon development and production programs with 
other countries. 
As mentioned  above,  Turkey  should replace  its  current  frail 
procurement   system   with   a   centralized,   professional   procurement 
system.    There    are    four    main    advantages    of    a    centralized, 
professional procurements system. First, senior officials (SSM) can 
enjoy   high  prestige   and  morale   and   manifest   a   strong   sense   of 
responsibility   to   the   state.   Moreover,   whereas   military   officers 
move from one position to  another,  civilian  officials  remain with 
major   weapon   programs   for   several   years,   providing   managerial 
expertise    and    institutional    memory.    Second,    there    is    a   more 
cooperative  relationship  between  the   government  and  the   defense 
industry.   One  reason  is  that  in  an  industry   consisting  largely  of 
monopoly suppliers and a single buyer, there is little incentive for 
either party to criticize the system openly. However, there is also 
need for open, transparent procurement transactions with vigorous 
critical review. 
A third advantage is that centralization enables the state to 
engage in multi-service procurements and consolidate R&D 
programs to avoid redundancy. It makes possible the development of 
a single weapon system for all three armed services. It can enable 
SSM to. fund joint programs to develop technologies of use to all 
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services, including missile guidance, command-and-control systems, 
and logistics management; these technologies are then incorporated 
into service-specific weapon systems. 
A final advantage of the' system is that SSM can pursue a 
coherent strategy for managing the defense industry. SSM officials 
will have to seek to balance a variety of objectives, including force 
requirements, the health of both the defense base and the larger 
civilian industrial base, and political goals of the government. 
Because of the need for tradeoffs among these objectives, the 
system will not be designed to optimize individual weapon systems 
but rather to further the nation's military, industrial, and political 
interests. 
Despite these advantages, a centralized procurement system 
may also suffer from a number of problems. The mission of 
preserving an autonomous defense-industrial base might sometimes 
be achieved by procuring national systems that cost more, perform 
less well, or take longer to procure than foreign-sourced weapons. 
D.     FREE MARKET ORIENTATION vs ADMINISTRATIVE 
GUIDANCE 
One of the most important issues is the extent to which the 
government should intervene to manage the TDITB. On one hand, 
Turkey may allow the market forces to determine if they want to 
take part in defense industrial activities, and consequently decide 
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the size of their operations. On the other hand, Turkey can stress 
government participation and guidance in shaping the domestic 
defense industry. 
As mentioned previously, the Turkish defense market is not 
expected to be large enough that it can have several competitors in 
almost every major sector. Therefore, it is very unlikely that there 
might be a domestic defense industry that can shape itself for the 
future through competition, organizational, or financial reasons. 
Moreover, the large amount of capital investment required to 
become a major player in the defense market and the prospect of 
unsatisfactory returns might prevent private sector from playing an 
active role in defense industry. On the other hand, Turkey's vital 
need to reach self-sufficient level in defense technologies and 
production   implies   that   the   administrative   guidance will   be 
essential. 
The Turkish government should step forward to describe the 
TDITB in terms of capacity and technological superiority levels that 
can support Turkey's national security strategy by determining the 
extent to which existing forces and logistic supplies are not fully 
adequate to support that strategy. This analysis should be stated in 
terms of force structure, modernization, readiness, sustainability, 
and mobility. Turkey should use the analysis to calculate 
differences between current capabilities and the desired status, then 
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match the differences against the assessed capability of the TDITB 
to fill the shortfalls in a time certain. This procedure should define 
a TDITB --R&D, primes, lower tier, and strategic materials—that 
will assure that Turkey can: 
■ Maintain sufficient technological capability in mission- 
decisive functions and capabilities. 
■ Deter theater wars or, if deterrence fails, provide the. 
military power to win quickly and decisively. 
■ Provide the resources needed to fulfill the government's 
responsibilities to deal with major natural disasters and 
terrorist attacks. 
However, administrative guidance can take several forms from 
an old-style, strictly regulated model to mostly moral support from 
different government agencies, which can provide only limited 
resources for maintenance or restructuring. 
Turkey should consider direct state intervention as the last 
resort, which may turn out to be not strong enough to force 
enterprises into adopting modern management techniques and 
increase efficiency. One crucial factor for the success of Turkey's 
efforts to develop and preserve a robust domestic defense industry 
will be a subtle but definite and efficient state backing of the 
defense industry. Since Turkey is still struggling to develop its 
national economy in general into a more efficient and productive 
form, a degree of macroeconomic regulation should be seen as 
indispensable if economic growth and modernization are to be 
accomplished.   Decisions   to   promote   certain   sectoral   industrial 
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policies affecting production of, for example, vehicles, electronics 
or machine tools should include the military-related industry. 
It is also important that Turkey should set its defense 
industrial sector as much independent as possible from major 
political changes at the national level. The sector will certainly be 
affected by the general development of the economy, including 
macroeconomic factors such as inflation, unemployment and 
currency stability as well as the changing structure of industry. By 
preventing the political roller coaster from bringing fundamental 
changes in policy concerning the defense industrial sector, Turkey 
can ensure that the trends set in the initial period of macro-level 
planning will not change fundamentally. It also confirms that 
enterprise-level changes are likely to have increasing importance in 
shaping the future. 
State protection and promotion should not be overextended to 
imply that the management of the defense companies can ignore 
market economy conditions. 
At the same time, authorities should keep in mind that 
government decisions (and certainly their implementation) would 
depend on the availability of financial resources. In this matter, 
reinstating of the contributions from the tax on gasoline, which was 
cancelled after being in effect for a long time, might be a quick 
response to increase the amount of funds available to the industry. 
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E.       EXPORT DEPENDENCE 
One way of preserving a viable domestic defense industry and 
ensuring innovation is to expand internationally by seeking foreign 
investment and market access, i.e. increasing the amount of exports 
of the weapon systems and defense equipment produced. Foreign 
sales can maintain warm production lines for major weapon systems, 
aid national defense industrial responsiveness, and help pay for 
additional research and development costs. Moreover, even though 
international arms sales are greatly influenced by political and 
strategic considerations, international competition for export 
markets creates incentives for quality and price discipline. 
The small size of the Turkish domestic arms market implies 
that once established fully, most defense firms will have to rely 
significantly on export sales to permit the economic procurement of 
weapons for Turkey's own use, by amortizing R&D and overhead 
costs over longer production runs. This will require the government 
and the defense industry managers to take export potential into 
consideration when launching a new development program, and the 
timing of Turkish military procurements will have to be tailored to 
meet the needs of foreign customers. Additionally, the buyers of the 
weapon systems might require the seller to provide the loan for the 
sale,    and    this    might    put    additional    burden    on    the    Turkish 
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government  to   set   up   a   financing   system   similar  to   US   Foreign 
Military Sales. 
However, export dependence is not immune to several factors 
that might affect the defense industry negatively. Exports might be 
adversely affected by a number of factors, including changes in oil 
prices, exchange rates, competition from traditional suppliers (US, 
UK, France, etc.), the emergence of new competitors, and the 
dumping of used East European weapons on the world market. 
Heavy reliance on exports also tends to overshadow domestic 
procurement needs; in some cases, foreign contracts for domestic 
weapons might have higher priority than national orders. 
The decline in arms exports might affect the defense industrial 
base both directly, by reducing level of production, and indirectly, 
by undermining the funding mechanism for defense R&D. Although 
the government might pay for most defense related research, 
industry will need to cover a significant share of weapon-system 
development out of profit from foreign sales. During the 
negotiation of an R&D contract, the government and the company 
will need to make an initial assessment of the system's export 
potential and determine on this basis a formula for an equitable 
sharing of R&D costs. Thus, the greater a system's predicted export 
sales, the larger the share of development costs that must be born by 
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industry. This cost-sharing formula may be renegotiated later if the 
export prospects of the system improve or worsen significantly. 
The requirement that defense contractors- internally finance a 
significant share of the development costs may give rise to a number 
of problems. First, joint funding might create strong pressures for 
arms exports, leading to some politically questionable sales. 
Second, company financing of R&D might enable the government to 
launch more weapons development programs than it can afford to 
carry through to completion, resulting in costly stretch-outs and 
delays. Third, a decline in arms sales might reduce the pool of 
money for company-funded R&D. 
There might also be some economic and political drawbacks of 
over-reliance on export sales to support the defense industrial base 
- in particular, to subsidize defense R&D. Not only might the export 
imperative harm Turkish foreign-policy interests in some cases (e.g. 
importer countries might be sanctioned by UN resolutions), but 
unexpected downturns in export sales might limit the ability of 
Turkish defense firms to remain at the technological leading edge. 
F.       INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
1.       General 
After  a long period of hesitation,  there  has  been a growing 
commitment to collaborative armaments programs and international 
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involvement among major producers of defense goods. As nations' 
defense procurement shrinks and defense technology becomes 
increasingly globalized, there will be growing incentives for 
international collaboration in defense R&D and production. While 
the integration and final assembly of weapon systems is likely to 
remain under national control, a growing number of components and 
subsystems containing the best available technology are expected to 
be developed internationally. 
International     cooperation    is    an    important    part    of    the 
globalization   of  the   defense   industry   described   in   the   previous 
chapters. It is an answer to the increased customer demand for more 
performance  and  complexity,   leading  to  increased  specialization, 
which at least for some companies requires an increased degree of 
cooperation. It is also a response to the increasing costs of weapon 
developments. Cooperation with foreign industries may include the 
following   areas:    research,    development,   production,   marketing, 
support and subcontracting.  This strategy gains access to a larger 
customer base and more  capital through agreements  with defense 
industries   in   other   countries   (partners).   Shared   risks   and   longer 
production  runs  are   other  benefits.  As  a  result  of specialization 
inside   the  joint   project,   R&D   and   production   may   partly   move 
abroad, but the domestic industrial base remains relatively intact. 
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One common form of international cooperation is co- 
development, in which companies jointly develop and produce a 
weapon system. For maximum benefits, it is desirable if this also 
includes cooperation between the different armed forces from the 
very beginning, when requirements and specifications are decided. 
Cooperation normally also involves cost and benefit sharing over 
the whole life cycle of the system. Shared risks, costs and 
economies of scale are some of the benefits from co-development. 
[Ref 64 p.8] 
One problem involved is that it can be difficult for countries 
with different geography and force structure to agree on the same 
specifications. Such agreement often is a necessity for obtaining 
maximum benefits. If the weapon system has to be developed and 
produced in different versions, most of the benefits from 
cooperation will not materialize. There is also a risk that part of the 
research and development, as well as production, may move abroad 
due to specialization inside the joint company, thus limiting the 
benefits for Turkish Industry. 
Until the early 1980s, most of the development or co- 
production agreements were based on government to government 
agreements. [Ref 64 p. 13] Normally, the governments also decided 
the work share for each country. This is not easy. It can lead to 
political disputes over each other's share. 
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Today, industry-to-industry defense collaboration is dominant, 
while the government initiated cooperation has stagnated. Where the 
latter exists, it is often a result of offset agreements. The first 
examples of industry cooperation are joint venture companies, a 
subsidiary jointly owned and operated by two or more defense firms. 
Well known examples are Euro-copter and Euro-missile. 
In    regard    to    Turkey,    the    globalization    of   science    and 
technology makes most of the new discoveries abroad increasingly 
likely, either in the laboratories of foreign countries or the foreign- 
based   subsidiaries   of multinational   firms.   Therefore,   maintaining 
cooperative   scientific   programs  with   allies   is  very   important   for 
Turkey to assure access to new developments with potential military 
applications.   Nevertheless,  excessive   dependence   on  allies  is  not 
desirable.  While it will be too costly and practically impossible to 
endeavor to stay ahead in all areas of defense technology, Turkey 
should try to develop and retain world-class competence in critical 
sectors.   However,   the   technological   superiority   of the   US   firms 
forces   European   and   especially   Turkish   companies   to   construct 
alliances with these firms. In this context, US policy of restriction 
of arms and technology transfers causes this kind of cooperation to 
be   hard,   and   European   firms   may   be   more   willing   to   transfer 
technology to foreign countries to compete with the technologically 
advanced US companies. International cooperation may promote that 
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competence, but only if the Turkey benefits as much from 
cooperation as its partner. For this reason, Turkey must ensure that 
future international cooperative programs provide for reciprocal 
flows of technology, and that mechanisms exist to transfer dual-use 
technologies developed through international civilian R&D efforts 
to Turkish defense applications. 
2.       Integration With European Defense Industries 
In the years following the World War II, the United States was 
the NATO defense market's principal supplier. This arrangement 
served both U.S. and NATO interests in rapid European rearmament, 
interoperability and standardization of weapon systems, and 
efficient production. However, each European country bought 
equipment of its own, and. most countries had at least one state- 
owned company churning out guns, planes and missiles. For cutting 
edge weapon systems, Europe turned to US contractors, increasing 
Washington's willingness to help protect countries an ocean away. 
Over time, Europe rebuilt its own design and production 
capability, first through licensed production of US systems and 
offsets, then gradually, under growing national sentiments and 
strengthening European economy, through the rebuilding of an 
indigenous industry. Today, the larger NATO European allies rely 
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primarily on domestic or European systems, while smaller countries, 
like Turkey, are still heavily dependent on US-designed systems. 
After the cold war, the military expenditures of the US and the 
European countries have declined dramatically. Because of this 
decline, the market for the military arms producers decreased 
significantly, too. Moreover, the consolidation of the arms 
producers in the US caused the European firms to take some 
precautionary steps towards increasing competitiveness, which has 
been already in a weak form. European countries' most obvious 
response was the gathering of more than a dozen handful 
multinational players that rank among the world's largest. These 
new companies have the ability to produce the same equipment for 
several European countries at once. They could also compete with 
American giants such as Boeing Corp., Lockheed Martin Corp., and 
Northrop Grumman Corp. 
The motivation is mostly economics; integration cuts the costs 
and yields more sophisticated systems. When each European country 
develops its own projects, defense funds that could be channeled 
into high-tech systems are wasted on overlapping low-tech 
overhead. Multinational firms are offering lots of countries the 
same planes, helicopters and missiles. Common defense systems can 
also ease integration within the multinational defense force of the 
proposed European defense identity. 
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Table VII-1 Europe's Defense Industry Consolidation 
Joint 
Venture Products Partners 
1.   BAE Systems (UK): 37.50 % 
British Aerospace (UK) 
Marconi Electronic Sys. (UK) 
Matra 2.   EADS   (France-Germany-Spain): 37.50 % 
BAE Missiles Aerospatiale (France) Matra Hautes Tech. (France) 
Dynamics Construcciones Aeronauiticas (Spain) 
Daimler Chrysler Aerospace 
(Germany) 
3.   Finmeccanica (Italy): 25 % 
Alenia 
1.   BAE Systems (UK): 50 % 
Marconi Avionics 
2.   Finmeccanica (Italy): 50 % 
Systems 
European Military 
Aviation Co Military Planes 
1. EADS: 50 % 
2. Finmeccanica (Italy): 50 % 
1.   BAE Systems (UK): 25 % 
Astrium Space Systems 
2. EADS: 75 % 
Source: Wall Street Journal, 9 March 2001, p. All 
As part of the Western European Union (WEU) and one of the 
prospective members of the European Union (EU), Turkey should 
continue its current activities in the joint research and technology 
activities in the structure of NATO and the Western European Union 
(WEU). Close European defense cooperation should be a top priority 
for Turkish defense industry as a way of sharing R&D costs, 
expanding markets for its domestic firms and most importantly, 
transferring advanced military technology. On the other hand, it 
should   be   kept   in   mind   that   this   does   not   necessarily   require 
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international and cross-border mergers, which are not so easy. 
Differing national interests, military and foreign policies, 
employment and other constraints makes it very difficult to achieve 
a completely integrated European DIB. 
Table VII-2 Major European Defense Projects 
Program What It Is Value of Program 
Countries 
Developing Status 
Euro-fighter Fighter Jet $ 12 billion (208 orders) 
Germany, 














Tiger Combat Helicopter 
$  1.5 billion 
(160 orders) 
France, 























Meteor Air-to-Air Missile $1.5 billion 
France, 
Germany, 


























Source: Wa 1 Street Journ al, 9 March 20 01, p.All 
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G.       CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION 
1.       The Context and Justification 
Civil-Military Integration (CMI) is a concept that advocates 
bringing together the commercial and military sectors of industry, 
so both commercial and military work can be performed in a 
common facility using commercial processes and practices. [Ref 65 
p.398] It can be defined as the process of merging the Defense 
Industry and Technology Base with the larger Commercial Industry 
and Technology Base (CITB) into a unified National Industry and 
Technology Base. 
Integration of civilian and military operations, and other 
associated issues such as diversification, conversion, and "dual use" 
of both R&D and products, have been one of the most addressed 
topics for the last 10 years. Besides the obvious need for defense 
firms to shift to other markets in order to remain healthy, other 
good reasons, which make these highly interrelated issues so 
critical, have surfaced: 
■ First, only in recent years has commercial technology 
evolved so rapidly that in many areas (e.g., electronics) the 
commercial world actually is ahead of the defense world in 
new technologies and high performance, even for the same 
rugged environments. 
■ Second, as military equipment has become more and more 
dependent on advanced electronics and other "dual use" 
technologies, there is a growing overlap between technologies 
that are critical to defense industries and those that are 
critical to nations' international competitiveness. 
■ Third, since the 1980s process (production) technology has 
been   shifting  toward   "flexible   manufacturing   technologies" 
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wherein factories can now be as efficient with small-volume, 
multi-product production as they could have been in the past 
with single-product, automated mass production. 
■ Fourth, military equipment costs have grown from 
generation to generation of weapon systems, such that a single 
aircraft, ship, or tank is so prohibitively expensive that only 
very few (perhaps an inadequate number for a viable defense 
posture) can be produced. Thus buyers of weapon systems and 
defense equipment are forced more than ever to consider 
production costs and equipment quality as equally important 
as the traditional emphasis on weapons' performance. 
Similarly, R&D trends in weapon systems have resulted in a 
mounting requirement to shrink longer development cycles, 
which in some cases has exceeded the typical technology 
obsolescence period. Therefore, defense firms and their buyers 
need to begin to emphasize much more rapid "new product 
realization. " This shift in emphasis--to cost, quality, and 
rapid development has brought defense equipment 
requirements far closer to the needs of the commercial world. 
[Ref 65] 
Each of these four changes, which have been more or less felt 
by most nations, clearly have encouraged governments and their 
defense suppliers to move in the direction of enhanced civil-military 
integration. In Turkey's case, perhaps the major rationale—from the 
public policy perspective—for moving in this direction will be the 
recognition that in the presence of the immediate need to reduce the 
defense budget to support the nation's efforts to create a more 
sound economy, it simply will be too expensive for the country to 
maintain an efficient, innovative, responsive, and healthy defense 
industry if it subsidizes a unique and isolated industrial structure in 
all areas of technology critical to defense needs. Moreover, a 
smaller defense-only industrial base may not have the capacity to 
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quickly respond to a crisis. With CMI, Turkey can use the 
manufacturing capacity of the entire nation without a lengthy 
process of retooling and build-up. 
Integration implies that many industries can employ the same 
technologies, personnel, administrative procedures, research and 
production facilities for both commercial and military customers. 
The results are a larger industrial base available for defense 
production and greater economies of scale--and hence lower costs 
and higher quality—for defense products. Such an approach might 
not have been possible in past, when defense technology was usually 
more advanced in performance and was designed for more severe 
environments than commercial equivalents and when commercial 
production required high volumes to achieve efficiency. Today, 
however, commercial product and process technologies have 
advanced to the point where such integration is both possible and 
desirable. 
CMI is intended to maintain competitiveness, and also the 
ability to resurge in the case of increased threat, by relying more on 
commercial products, processes and buying practices. Increasing the 
integration between military and civilian industrial technology and 
production will lower overall defense costs, promote technology 
transfer, increase available industrial capacity and strengthen the 
economic dimensions of national security. 
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From the industrial perspective, it is essential that firms that 
have been doing defense business find other markets in order to 
remain healthy, competitive, and growing. Similarly, from the 
government's side, the MoND and armed services must learn to do 
much more of their business with the civilian economy (from buying 
products and services to using commercial specifications, standards, 
procurement and accounting practices, etc.) 
The  most  important  aspect  of the   decision  on  CMI   is  that 
Civil-Military   Integration   should   be   pursued   on   a   case-by-case 
basis.  Greater use of commercial technology might make sense in 
areas   such  as  electronics  and  aerospace,  where  defense  and  civil 
requirements   are   often   similar,   but  not   in  military-unique   fields 
such   as   missile   propellants   and   gun   tubes.   When   the   use   of 
commercial   technologies   is   appropriate,    such   use   can   usually 
provide   a   particular   capability   at   lower   risk   and   cost,   while 
expanding the mobilization potential of the civilian industrial base. 
Therefore, it is particularly important to point out that there will 
still   be   a   need   for   certain   areas   with   specific   defense-unique 
technology.  But it does not necessarily mean that' those products 
must   be   considered   unique   and   be   produced   in   an   all-military 
industry.     When     examining     the     materials,     components,     and 
subsystems   that   the   products   are   made   up   of,   there   are   often 
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commercial  counterparts  that  are  less  costly,  more  advanced  and 
capable of satisfying the same environmental conditions. 
2.       Achieving Civil-Military Integration 
Civil-Military Integration can occur through conversion of 
existing defense plants to commercial products, diversification of 
defense companies into commercial product lines, or using dual-use 
technologies, where a single production line can produce both 
civilian and military components. 
Defense conversion, which is the conversion of military 
capacity to civilian capacity, is generally seen as a way to avoid 
layoffs, plant closings, and business failures in the face of 
downsizing of defense market. It implies that the company stops 
making some military products and changes over to civilian ones, 
i.e., totally or in part moving over to civilian production and 
broadening the product base. People who are working on military 
projects then work on civil ones and factory facilities that were 
being used for military products are turned over to a civilian 
workforce. [Ref 66. pi] The strategy's goal is to retain an industrial 
base available for military production, but at the same time not be 
totally dependent on military customers. Other possible benefits 
include greater economies of scale, lower costs, and higher quality. 
Conversion is not without obstacles. Successful defense conversion 
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depends on emerging new markets for the expansion of existing 
markets. Without them, defense-dependent firms must compete with, 
and their products displace those of, established suppliers. There 
are potential markets that may be able to make use of the existing 
defense technology. However, it is not clear if those markets will 
materialize, or are expanding sufficiently, or can ever be large 
enough to fully utilize the defense industries' capacity. Since there 
are already firms established in these markets, growth must be 
substantial to support new entrants. 
An alternative strategy being followed by some firms is 
diversification outside the defense market by acquiring new 
capabilities or redirecting current ones. Diversification refers to a 
defense firm acquiring a commercial firm or starting a new 
commercial product line. It is an effort by a firm to reduce reliance 
on one particular market or one customer. [Ref 67. p.91] "When 
defense contractors have successfully diversified, rarely has the 
source of competitive advantage rested on technology transferred 
from military side of the business." [Ref 68 p. A12] Indeed favoring 
diversified firms above non-diversified firms for procurement might 
be a good strategy because only a diversified firm might be strong 
enough to turn down a poor defense contract and thus avoid 
repeating some of the severe financial mistakes related to fixed- 
price development contracts. Another diversification strategy is to 
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engage in joint ventures and teaming arrangements. By pooling 
financial resources, technology, and skilled labor, two or more 
firms can enter a market where a single firm cannot compete on its 
own. To the extent that firms offset defense cutbacks with growth in 
commercial sales involving similar technologies, they may mitigate 
the adverse effects on overall military production capabilities of 
declining levels of defense procurement. 
Another strategy for CMI is dual-use technologies. Dual-use 
technology refers to finding products or services that can have both 
military and commercial applications. It is a two-way plan that 
helps defense firms enter the commercial market and commercial 
firms enter the defense market. It can be defined as products, 
services, standards, processes, or acquisition practices that are 
capable of meeting requirements for military and nonmilitary 
applications (It will be discussed in more length in the next 
section). 
Two   expressions   related   to   the   benefits   of   civil-military 
integration are: 
■ Spin-off: The non-defense commercial viability of 
technologies, components, and products already developed for 
defense purposes. 
■ Spin-On: The defense utility of existing non-defense, 
commercially viable technology, components and products 
with emphasis given to technologies that could improve the 
affordability of military systems. [Ref 69] 
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Spin-off has been a factor in the defense debate for a long 
time. The latter one is a more recent entry. One reason for this is 
that it would have been almost impossible to take some of these 
approaches only ten years ago. Up until now, defense technology 
has almost always been more advanced than its civilian equivalent. 
Today, however, civilian product technology is often more 
advanced, and production technologies have advanced to the point 
where integration is not only possible, but also desirable. 
3.        Lessons Learned 
Having to cope with drastic reductions in demand, defense 
industries, almost worldwide, have been moving toward CMI since 
the end of cold war. CMI attempts have been faced with a number of 
obstacles such as the surge in global competition, high barriers to 
entry into high-tech markets, and often, weak economies. 
Accordingly, Turkey can draw very useful lessons from the 
experiences of these countries. 
In general, defense firms might have difficulty breaking into 
commercial markets because of high overhead costs and a lack of 
understanding of commercial business. On the other hand, 
commercial firms may need to make capital investments in special 
processes, test equipment, and tooling to meet government 
requirements  that  are  rarely  useful   commercially.   Experience  has 
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shown that most defense firms have had very tough times converting 
from the high-overhead, "cost-plus" culture to compete in 
commercial markets. Conversely, heavily commercial firms tend to 
view government business as unpredictable, low-profit, burdened 
with onerous regulations, and carrying the potential for loss of 
proprietary information. 
When utilizing CMI strategy, the company wants to integrate 
military work with civilian work and/or expand into the civilian 
sector. New products are added to increase the customer base and 
gain capital and knowledge for increased competitiveness in the 
defense market. This involves the increased use of civilian 
components and standards. R&D and production remains in the 
country. A firm trying to enter a new market faces uncertainty 
regarding customers and requirements. A firm that is used to an 
environment with one or a few customers may have difficulty trying 
to understand new commercial markets, especially if the firm lacks 
the necessary marketing skills and organization, including 
distribution networks for dealing with a broader, more dynamic 
customer base. 
Another factor is the access to capital. The firms with the 
greatest need to convert are often the weakest financially, so they 
may encounter problems in the capital markets. There are mainly 
two  factors  that  are  against them.   They probably have  declining 
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defense sales and they are trying to compete in an unfamiliar 
market. They therefore will not usually command the highest credit 
rating. 
There are also structural barriers for defense-dependent firms. 
The most fundamental structural difference is that the defense 
market has one dominating buyer, the armed forces. Despite exports, 
the defense industry is mostly a domestic market. Also for any given 
defense product there is in most cases only one domestic supplier. 
Finally, the ultimate good being purchased (i.e., national defense) is 
a public good that is difficult to price. 
The difficulty of putting a price on national defense has in 
many cases allowed performance to dominate over the cost. 
Consequently, military technology has in some instances reached a 
level of costly sophistication for which the civilian sector may not 
be willing to pay. The complexity of military systems has led to a 
long development process favoring revolutionary, but slow, 
innovation. The defense industries have gotten used to research, 
design, development and production cultures that may not function 
well in a more cost-conscious and dynamic market environment. 
Recent years' increased competition has put pressure on the 
industry. Today defense industries are forced to be more 
competitive. 
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There is a perception that defense technologies are unique 
because of the way the government procures them. In developed 
countries, Government regulation has, at least to some degree, 
prevented the industry from integrating military and civilian 
production. In general there are three main areas of regulation that 
create barriers to civil-military integration: accounting requirements 
and audits, military specifications and standards, and unique 
contract requirements. To facilitate the move towards integration, 
the military must encourage new types of specifications allowing 
dual use. This might be especially helpful to those industries 
already having commercial production. In countries where the 
greater use of commercial products and processes in the defense 
sector is obstructed by legal and regulatory obstacles rather than 
technological, there is a greater differentiation between defense 
businesses and other segments of the national industry. This fact 
compels the diversified firms to set up separate defense divisions. 
On the contrary in countries where there are less or almost no 
legislative, regulatory, or accounting barriers between civil and 
military procurement, firms have greater flexibility to use 
commercial practices in the defense sector. This flexibility enables 
firms to produce military and civil products in the same factories 
and to rely extensively on dual-use technologies and processes, 
improving efficiency and reducing overhead costs. 
251 
Government should be careful not to impose policies that 
might create obstacles to civil-military integration. Procurement 
rules should accommodate commercial practices and avoid 
constraining the industry's ability to perform military and 
commercial work in the same factory. Performance and 
manufacturing specifications should not be overly rigid, which tend 
to suppress innovation; competition should not be mandatory; cost 
accounting rules and certification requirements should not be too 
rigid. 
Civil-military integration might require a complete overhaul 
of Turkey's acquisition policies. First, MoND must be more willing 
to tailor its requirements to what is commercially available. Second, 
auditing procedures must be set to permit the use of identical parts 
and components in military, and commercial products produced by 
the same firm. Third, defense procurement practices should become 
more similar to commercial ones. Finally, government should 
support R&D on dual-use technologies with both defense and civil 
applications, and make seed money available through loans or grants 
for civil initiatives by defense firms. 
For this to be successful may also require the government to 
make some policy changes. First, it could review laws that tend to 
isolate defense industries from the broader national industrial base. 
Second, as previously mentioned, the armed forces need to accept 
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commercial and international standards in place of military 
specifications. Third, as a shift towards greater civil-military 
integration may require changes in the way research and 
development is carried out, the funding may have to shift from 
military unique R&D, towards research on dual-use technologies. 
H.      DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY 
One means to sustain the defense industrial base and provide 
enough business to sustain contractors within the base would be to 
apply    the    concept    of   dual-use    technology.    The    dual-use    of 
technology is defined as 
... technology that has an indeterminate number of 
potential uses, at least some of which are of significant 
military importance and some are of material non- 
military importance. [ Ref 69. p.37] 
It can also be defined simply as an application that has both 
military and commercial uses. The technology can result from a 
military development and "spin-off" for use in the commercial 
sector, or result from a commercial development and "spin-on" to a 
military application. 
Dual-use technology encompasses "everything" that results in 
the design and production of a major weapon system and its 
commercial counterpart. It includes the information, scientific, 
theoretical and mathematical procedures used in this development 
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and production process, no matter how common or uncommon they 
may seem. [Ref 70. P.4] 
The need for dual-use arises from several factors such as the 
decrease in defense budgets; commercial research and development 
(R&D) outpacing defense R&D investments. It may also be seen as a 
way of reducing operating cost and overhead by spreading this cost 
over a larger base. This orientation can also increase the surge 
capacity of the producers in the base. 
Turkey should have a dual-use technology strategy that aims 
to move toward a cutting-edge national technology and industrial 
base that will serve military as well as commercial needs. This dual- 
use technology strategy should allow the armed forces to exploit the 
rapid rate of innovation and market-driven efficiencies of 
commercial industry to meet defense needs. 
Dual-use technology can be accomplished mainly through (1) 
support for research and development, (2) integration of civilian 
and military industries, and (3) insertion of commercial 
technologies in development, production and support of military 
systems. 
As mentioned previously, through using an agency, which is 
responsible for defense R&D and targets investment in defense 
related areas such as computer hardware, software, electronics and 
simulation that  have   defense  applications  as  well  as  commercial 
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applications (like DARPA of US or DRET of France), Turkey can 
take advantage of advanced commercial techniques. Related civilian 
research in dual-use technology will also be of benefit for defense, 
although the size of the payoff will depend on the technology in 
question. For example, there may be important "spin-ons' - transfer 
of technology from the civilian sector to defense - in areas of 
microelectronics, displays, and software production. Nevertheless, 
civilian technology has little relevance to important military 
technologies such as stealth, many areas of defense electronics, and 
nuclear hardening. 
Integration of defense and commercial production can be 
accomplished through either of two ways. First, a commercial 
application for defense technologies can be found to make 
production more affordable through economies of scale. Second, 
flexible manufacturing can be promoted so custom military products 
can be produced on the same assembly line as commercial products 
with minimal retooling. Flexible manufacturing refers to the ability 
to manufacture different items off the same assembly line with 
minimal number of changes or retooling. Building military products 
on commercial production lines can help reallocate fixed 
infrastructure costs and take advantage of the efficiencies of "cost- 
conscious, market driven commercial practices" 
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Commercial technology insertion takes advantage of new 
commercial technologies that are available while a weapon system is 
in development or upgrade. By inserting the best commercial 
capabilities, materials, products, and processes into military 
systems, Turkey can ultimately realize faster implementation of 
leading-edge technology into weapons systems and defense 
equipment at a much lower overall price. The use of rapidly 
developing commercial technologies should improve the 
performance, affordability, and delivery schedule of weapon 
systems. In order to be able to insert commercial technologies and 
products into military systems, commercial products must be able to 
perform in ä military environment that may be more stressful on the 
component or system than a commercial environment. If the risk is 
low and substitution possible, then commercial units might 
generally be less expensive. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
A.      TURKEY NEEDS A ROBUST DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The end of the cold war has created a safer environment for 
most nations and reduced the need for fielding huge armed forces 
and vast investments for defense. In some countries, defense 
budgets have been reduced by about 40 to 50 % in real termsand 
savings have been devoted to other areas such as lowering national 
debt, improving national infrastructures for education, health and 
social security; developing technological base, etc. 
However, due to her very special strategic position and 
historical responsibilities, Turkey still faces a range of substantial 
threats to its national interests, physical security, economic well 
being and to the safety and security of its friends, and to its far- 
reaching security interests. These threats require the maintenance of 
a broad set of military capabilities in order to deter, and if 
necessary, to fight and win any future conflict. In the future Turkey 
may face challenges to its national security from states, which are 
technologically sophisticated and can afford the resources necessary 
to build a military establishment which is an equal of Turkey's or 
even better. Therefore, Turkey needs a stable, robust defense 
industrial base, which is capable of developing a full range of major 
weapon systems, including fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, 
submarines  and  surface  ships  (nuclear and  conventional),  and an 
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array of missiles. This requires several steps to be taken by both 
government and industry to maintain competition in the development 
and production of defense goods and to ensure that critical skills are 
maintained. 
The defense industry and technology base should be seen as a 
crucial element of Turkish military strength, because if 
appropriately developed and maintained, it will be the major source 
of providing the capability to develop, produce, and support 
military systems in peacetime and to respond to additional military 
requirements in crisis or war. It should be seen as "the fifth 
service," ranking in importance only after the Army, Navy, Air 
Force and Gendarmarie. 
B.       TURKEY NEEDS BETTER PLANNING 
The authors of this thesis strongly believe that, for defense 
industry (as for other forms of economic activity), success and 
prosperity are created., not inherited. One lesson that has become 
clear from our review and analysis of the problems and prospects 
facing the Turkish Defense Industry and Technological Base is that 
creating the conditions for success is very complex and difficult 
task. Defense industry executives and government policy makers 
must deal with an array of pressures, ranging from changes in the 
international security and political-economic structures to emerging 
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trends in the international defense market; within Turkey, the 
domestic political and economic realities of defense procurement 
rather complicate the choices that must be made. 
Our task here, indeed our explicit objective, has not been to 
write a definitive guide for those charged with charting future path 
of the defense industry in Turkey. Rather, we have sought to 
identify and clarify as comprehensively and systematically as 
possible the issues that might affect the decision-making processes 
about the future of a domestic defense industrial base, with a view 
assessing the abilities of the current defense industry and 
technological base in supplying weapon systems and defense 
equipment to Turkish Armed Forces and international markets. 
We believe that efforts to develop and maintain the TDITB 
should be focused on 1) reallocating resources from short-term 
military capabilities to long-term potential for developing and 
producing weapon systems and defense equipment, and 2) exploiting 
the synergies that can result from a closer integration of the R&D, 
production, and maintenance elements of the base. For example, the 
future TDITB might seek to integrate R&D and production through a 
"prototyping-plus" strategy that involves the continuous 
development and limited production of selected prototypes during 
the periods between full production programs. Defense 
manufacturing  might be maintained through some  combination of 
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low-rate production, greater integration of the civil and military 
industrial bases, and the changes in procurement of spare parts and 
maintenance services. 
Turkey   should   pursue   an   active   defense   industrial   policy 
focused on two axes.  The first policy axis should seek to develop 
and promote the technological competencies of the defense industry. 
To this  end,  it  should  encourage defense contractors to diversify 
into  the  commercial  sector,  promote  the  integration  of civil  and 
military  production  investing   in  defense  R&D  at  the  expense  of 
current    production,    urging    firms    to    concentrate    on    areas    of 
excellence   to   improve   their   competitive   advantage,   and   promote 
greater reliance  on dual-use technologies.  The  second policy  axis 
should aim to enable Turkish defense firms to play a significant role 
in the restructuring of defense production on the European scale. 
This   goal   should   be   pursued   through   collaborative   research   and 
development   programs,   strategic   alliances,   and   other   forms   of 
international    collaboration    in    defense    R&D    and    procurement. 
Moreover, Turkey should also seek ways to cooperate with newly 
independent Turkic republics. 
The Turkish government should have two partially competing 
objectives: creating and maintaining a broad defense-industrial base 
capable of furnishing the full range of equipment required by the 
armed   forces   (possibly   even   when   superior   or   less   expensive 
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weapons are available from foreign sources); and procuring military 
systems at an affordable cost. Because of the central importance of 
the defense industry to the country's defense posture and technology 
posture, Turkey should place considerable emphasis on identifying 
and preserving key design and manufacturing skills in the major 
defense firms. This requires a comprehensive planning, 
programming, and budgeting effort, supported by long-term military 
programming law (which sets financial targets for defense 
procurement) and the annual defense budgets. 
C.       STRATEGIC CHOICES AND TACTICAL DECISIONS 
Turkey faces some broad strategic choices about the nature of 
the future defense industrial base, including: 
■ The degree of. international interdependence versus 
national autonomy, 
■ The degree of reliance on the integration of civilian and 
military sectors versus an arsenal approach, and 
■ The allocation of resources between maximizing short- 
term military power versus the potential to develop and 
produce new weapons when needed. 
One strategic choice relates to the extent to which the TDITB 
will be integrated into the world economy. Turkey must choose the 
degree of defense industrial autonomy that is necessary and possible 
in an increasingly global technological environment. There are risks 
both in excessive reliance on foreign sources and in attempting to 
be   fully   autonomous.   In  the  former  case,   Turkey  might  risk  not 
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having both critical capabilities and control over which 
technologies are pursued; in the latter case, it risks higher 
development and procurement costs, protected industries that lack 
innovative drive, and loss of access to foreign technological 
developments. The optimal trade-off between interdependence and 
autonomy will depend on the industrial and technological sector and 
the military importance of the technology. 
A second choice relates to the internal structure of the base. 
There are two alternatives for dealing with this front. On the one 
hand, Turkey can choose to rely solely on arsenals, either 
government or privately owned, that might be sole-source producers 
of particular military systems. On the other hand, it can modify its 
military requirements to conform to what might be available from 
the commercial sector. An optimal strategy may be to rely on the 
civilian industrial base whenever possible, depending on arsenals 
for those areas of defense development and production having little 
or no overlap with civilian technology, or where only monopoly 
producers can survive. 
A third choice concerns the allocation of resources between 
maximizing short-term military might versus the potential to 
develop and produce new weapons when needed. Managing defense 
R&D and procurement to create and preserve a broad-based national 
defense industry for the future, but at some cost to its short-term 
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military requirements might benefit the country and the broader 
national defense industrial infrastructure. A quest to maximize 
short-term military capability might cost to long-term health of 
country's defense industrial base. Therefore, Turkish policymakers 
should find an optimal balance between these two main strategies. 
Technology should be produced and placed on the shelves of 
nation's laboratories and called upon to place in the hands of 
military forces in the field. It is important to prepare 
technologically for everything an adversary might decide to do, but 
because of uncertainty and financial limitations, building very little 
for the field until it is surely known what is going to be needed 
might help the nation with using its resources more efficiently. 
Instead of engaging in physical and labor-intensive defense, 
more technology, ideas and use of information technologies should 
be employed, as in the example of commercial production. It should 
be noted that in developed countries, there is a growing statistical 
discrepancy between Gross National Product and Gross National 
Income, since ideas have been replacing physical bulk and effort as 
creators of value. 
Unlike countries such as US and France, which developed huge 
defense capacities and faced the problem of overcapacity since the 
late 1980's, Turkey can ensure the financial, structural and 
technological health of the defense industry by engaging in long- 
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term planning and various forms of administrative guidance to. The 
US example of relying primarily on market mechanisms rather than 
government intervention runs the risk that firms that are the sole 
source for key components or that possess critical design and 
manufacturing skills may go out of business or leave the defense 
market. 
Before drawing some useful lessons from the successes and 
failures of other nations, which have already experienced the 
painful task of restructuring the current defense industrial base to 
meet the requirements of future fiscal and security conditions, 
Turkish government authorities should remember that some of the 
actions taken by other countries may not be appropriate to the 
Turkish economic and political context. To cite an example, rather 
than seeking quantum leaps in military performance at enormous 
cost; an evolutionary,- low-risk approach to weapons development, 
which may forego some uncritical performance requirements in 
order to limit program costs and technological risk or to develop 
systems suitable for export to developing nations, may be more 
appropriate to the emerging fiscal and security conditions. 
With budgetary limitations and vital public needs in mind, 
acquisition strategies of new-technology, expanded-capability, high- 
cost weapon systems should be considered thoroughly. The choice 
simplifies to developing and procuring less capable (and thus less 
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expensive) systems in numbers large enough to provide a mass 
defense approach; or developing and producing the most advanced 
systems of which are capable, but in smaller, "silver bullet," 
numbers. We would lean toward the latter, augmented with the 
concept of 'high-low" mix. This means that while an arsenal of 
more expensive but highly capable weapon systems can only be 
afforded in small numbers, their force-multiplying effect should 
then be bolstered by low-end, lower cost, and lower-capability 
systems which can be procured in large numbers. The resultant 
"high-low" mix offers both volume and capability. 
In its efforts to increase its own industrial base and 
technological know-how, Turkey should give priority to request co- 
production agreements, which is a good way of transferring 
technology. It should require its partners to teach and transfer 
technological processes. It should also continue to seek offsets to 
reduce the financial impact of its purchases from the foreign 
sources as well. However, it should keep in mind that developed 
countries have been going through a period of "creative 
destruction," the process by which emerging technologies push out 
the old, marshalling the increasingly obsolescent technologies to 
finance the newly produced capital assets that embody cutting-edge 
technologies. Turkey should not be a dumping field of such old 
technologies. 
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Overall, Turkey should spend more resources developing and 
testing military systems without any commitment to full production. 
Emphasis should be placed on research and development to create a 
storehouse of technology, from which critical weapon systems may 
be derived, as affordable. Defense industry and technology base 
plan should include consolidation, diversification into the civil 
sector, shifting emphasis from production to R&D, integrating civil 
and military production and international collaboration. It should 
include short-term surge capability, medium-term expansion 
capability where possible and value-added, and long-term 
reconstitution capability in TDITB. 
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APPENDIX-A  FREE MARKET THEORY VS. DEFENSE MARKET 
PRACTICES 
In his 1989 book, "Affording Defense" Jacques Gansler listed several areas where the 
weapons market and free market theory were different. 
The below table gives Gansler's view of the practices in the defense market compared 
with the tenets of free market theory. 
Free Market Theory Defense Market Practices 
Many small buyers and suppliers One buyer (Govt.) and few large suppliers 
Most items are small, and bought in large quantities Each item is extremely expensive, and bought in 
very small quantities 
Free movement in and out of the market Extensive barriers to entry and exit 
Prices are set by marginal costs Prices are proportional to total costs 
Prices are set by marginal utility Almost any price is paid for desired military performance 
Prices fall with reduced demand to encourage 
buying more 
Prices rise with reduced demand due to total-cost 
based pricing 
Supply adjusts to demand Large excess capacity 
Labor is highly mobile Greatly diminished labor mobility 
Decreasing or constant returns to scale (operating 
difficulty) Increasing returns to scale (in region of interest) 
Market shifts rapidly with changes in supply and 
demand 
7-10 years to develop a new system, then at least 3- 
5 years to produce it 
Market smoothly reaches equilibrium Erratic budget behavior year to year 
General equilibrium- assumes prices will return to 
equilibrium value 
Costs have been rising at 5-7 percent per year 
excluding inflation 
Profits are equalized across economy Wide profit variations between sectors; even wider between firms 
Perfect mobility of capital (money) Difficulty in borrowing 
Capital (equipment) is mobile with changing 
demand 
Large and old capital equipment "locks in" 
companies 
No government involvement Government is regulator, specifier, banker, judge of 
claims etc. 
Selection is based on price related factors Selection is based on promised performance 
No externalities 
All busineses working for government must satisfy 
requirements of osha,eeo, awards to areas of high 
unemploymwent, etc 
Profits are a return for risk Profits are regulated, primarily as a percentage of 
costs 
All products of a given type are the same Essentiaslly each producer's products are different 
Competition is for share of the market Competititon is often for all or none of a market 
Production is for inventory Production occurs after a sale is made 
Size of the market is established by buyers and 
sellers 
Size of the market is established by "third party" 
(comngress) through annual budghetbuyers and 
sellers 
Demand is sensitive to price Demand is "threat sensitive", or reponds to 
availability of new techynology; it is almost never 
price sensitive 
Technology is equal throughout the industry Competitive technologies 
Relatively stable multi-year commitments Annual commitments, with frequent changes 
Benefits of the purchase goes to the buyer A "public good" 
Buyer has a choice of spending now or saving for a Govt. must spend its congressional appropriations 
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later time or might lose it. 
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